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Verition Partners Master Fund Ltd. v.
Aruba Networks, Inc., 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS
52
§ 1.2

Court of Chancery of Delaware
January 26, 2018, Submitted; February 15, 2018, Decided
C.A. No. 11448-VCL
Reporter
2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 52 *
VERITION PARTNERS MASTER FUND LTD. and VERITION MULTI-STRATEGY
MASTER FUND LTD., Petitioners, v. ARUBA NETWORKS, INC., Respondent.
Notice:
THIS OPINION HAS NOT BEEN RELEASED FOR PUBLICATION. UNTIL RELEASED, IT
IS SUBJECT TO REVISION OR WITHDRAWAL.

Subsequent History: Rehearing denied by Verition Partners Master Fund Ltd. v. Aruba
Networks, Inc., 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 160 (Del. Ch., May 21, 2018)

§ 1.3

Core Terms

synergies, fair value, email, valuation, merger, per share, company's, market price, appraisal,
cash flow, projections, analyst, discounted, announced, shares, estimate, negotiations, stock
price, trading, stock, banker, premium, team, buyer, growth rate, stockholders, Proxy, capital
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market, unaffected, earnings

§ 1.4

Case Summary

Overview
HOLDINGS: [1]-After petitioners perfected their appraisal rights and litigated the statutory
appraisal proceeding, the court found that the two most probative indications of fair value,
pursuant to Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 262, were the acquired firm's unaffected thirty day average
market price of $17.13 per share and the court's deal-price-less-synergies figure of approximately
$18.20 per share. The deal-price-less-synergies figure was likely tainted by human error and
incorporated an element of value derived from the merger itself; [2]-In the context of the thirdparty, arm's-length merger, the unaffected market price provided the most persuasive evidence of
fair value. Petitioners' evidence provided no basis to question the integrity of the acquired firm's
pre-announcement market price as an indicator of fair value; [3]-The court did not rely on the
discounted cash flow valuations.

Outcome
The petitioners were awarded $17.13 per share.

§ 1.5

•

LexisNexis® Headnotes

Business & Corporate Law > ... > Shareholder Actions > Appraisal Actions & Dissent
Rights > Fair Market Value

HN1 Appraisal Actions & Dissent Rights, Fair Market Value
When evaluating the reliability of the deal price, a trial judge must remember that the purpose of
an appraisal is not to make sure that the petitioners get the highest conceivable value that might
have been procured had every domino fallen out of the company's way; rather, it is to make sure
that they receive fair compensation for their shares in the sense that it reflects what they deserve
to receive based on what would fairly be given to them in an arm's length transaction. Put
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differently, the issue in an appraisal is not whether a negotiator has extracted the highest possible
bid. Rather, the key inquiry is whether the dissenters got fair value and were not exploited.
More like this Headnote
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote

•

Business & Corporate Law > ... > Shareholder Actions > Appraisal Actions & Dissent
Rights > Fair Market Value

HN2 Appraisal Actions & Dissent Rights, Fair Market Value
Discounted cash flow models should be used in appraisal proceedings when the respondent
company was not public or was not sold in an open market check. When market evidence is
available, the Court of Chancery should be chary about imposing the hazards that always come
when a law-trained judge is forced to make a point estimate of fair value based on widely
divergent partisan expert testimony. More like this Headnote
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote

•
•

Business & Corporate Law > ... > Meetings & Voting > Special Meetings > Fundamental
Changes
Mergers & Acquisitions Law > Mergers > Duties & Liabilities of Shareholders

HN3 Special Meetings, Fundamental Changes
Under Delaware law, unless a corporation's constitutive documents impose a higher voting
requirement, a merger requires the approval of a majority of the voting power represented by the
corporation's outstanding shares. Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 251. More like this Headnote
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote

•

Business & Corporate Law > ... > Shareholder Actions > Appraisal Actions & Dissent
Rights > Remedies

HN4 Appraisal Actions & Dissent Rights, Remedies
Delaware's appraisal statute allows stockholders who perfect their appraisal rights to receive fair
value for their shares as of the merger date instead of the merger consideration. More like this
Headnote
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote
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•

Business & Corporate Law > ... > Shareholder Actions > Appraisal Actions & Dissent
Rights > Fair Market Value

•

Business & Corporate Law > ... > Shareholder Actions > Appraisal Actions & Dissent
Rights > Remedies

HN5 Appraisal Actions & Dissent Rights, Fair Market Value
The trial court's ultimate goal in an appraisal proceeding is to determine the fair or intrinsic value
of each share on the closing date of the merger. To accomplish this task, the court should first
envisage the entire pre-merger company as a going concern, as a standalone entity, and assess its
value as such. Because the court strives to value the corporation itself as distinguished from a
specific fraction of its shares as they may exist in the hands of a particular shareholder, the court
should not apply a minority discount when there is a controlling stockholder. The court should
exclude any synergies or other value expected from the merger giving rise to the appraisal
proceeding. Once the total standalone value is determined, the court awards each petitioning
stockholder his pro rata portion of this total plus interest. More like this Headnote
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote

•

Business & Corporate Law > ... > Shareholder Actions > Appraisal Actions & Dissent
Rights > Fair Market Value

HN6 Appraisal Actions & Dissent Rights, Fair Market Value
When seeking to prove fair value, parties may introduce proof of value by any techniques or
methods which are generally considered acceptable in the financial community and otherwise
admissible in court. The appraisal statute assigns the Court of Chancery the duty to consider the
relevant methods of valuation argued by the parties and then determine which method (and
inputs), or combination of methods, yields the most reliable determination of value. But,
whatever route it chooses, the trial court must justify its methodology (or methodologies)
according to the facts of the case and relevant, accepted financial principles. Although the Court
of Chancery has broad discretion to make findings of fact, those findings of fact have to be
grounded in the record and reliable principles of corporate finance and economics. More like
this Headnote
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote

•

Business & Corporate Law > ... > Shareholder Actions > Appraisal Actions & Dissent
Rights > Fair Market Value

HN7 Appraisal Actions & Dissent Rights, Fair Market Value
In the context of an appraisal proceeding, if a company's shares trade in a market having
attributes consistent with the assumptions underlying a traditional version of the semi-strong
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form of the efficient capital markets hypothesis, then the unaffected trading price provides
evidence of the fair value of a proportionate interest in the company as a going concern. That
evidence is more reliable than the single estimate of any one individual, be he a knowledgeable
market participant, corporate insider, valuation professional, or trial judge. More like this
Headnote
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote

•

Business & Corporate Law > Corporations > Shareholder Actions > Appraisal Actions &
Dissent Rights

•

Business & Corporate Law > ... > Directors & Officers > Management Duties &
Liabilities > Fiduciary Duties
Business & Corporate Law > ... > Management Duties & Liabilities > Causes of
Action > Fraud & Misrepresentation

•

HN8 Shareholder Actions, Appraisal Actions & Dissent Rights
Whether management causes an informational distortion is pertinent not only for a breach of
fiduciary duty claim or fraud action, but for an appraisal proceeding as well. More like this
Headnote
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote

•
•

Business & Corporate Law > ... > Shareholder Actions > Appraisal Actions & Dissent
Rights > Fair Market Value
Mergers & Acquisitions Law > Sales of Assets

HN9 Appraisal Actions & Dissent Rights, Fair Market Value
When a widely held, publicly traded company has been sold in an arm's-length transaction, the
deal price has heavy, if not overriding, probative value. More like this Headnote
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote

•

Evidence > ... > Procedural Matters > Preliminary Questions > Admissibility of Evidence

•

Evidence > ... > Statements as Evidence > Hearsay > Rule Components
Evidence > ... > Exceptions > Business Records > Normal Course of Business

•

HN10 Preliminary Questions, Admissibility of Evidence
Hearsay is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or
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hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Del. R. Evid. 801(c).
Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by law or by the Delaware Uniform Rules of
Evidence. Del. R. Evid. 802. Del. R. Evid. 803(6) recognizes an exception for documents made
at or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in
the course of a regularly conducted business activity, and if it was the regular practice of that
business activity to make the document, all as shown by the testimony of the custodian or other
qualified witness unless the source of information or the method or circumstances of preparation
indicate lack of trustworthiness. The business records exception to the hearsay rule permits the
admission of hearsay documents that are likely to be trustworthy because a business regularly
maintains and relies on them. The principal precondition to admission of documents as a
business record is that the records have sufficient indicia of trustworthiness to be considered
reliable. More like this Headnote
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote

•

Business & Corporate Law > ... > Shareholder Actions > Appraisal Actions & Dissent
Rights > Fair Market Value

HN11 Appraisal Actions & Dissent Rights, Fair Market Value
In a scenario where the underlying market price is reliable, competition and negotiation become
secondary. Under those circumstances, an arm's-length deal at a premium over the market price
is nonexploitive. By definition, it gives stockholders what would fairly be given to them in an
arm's-length transaction. More like this Headnote
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote

•

Business & Corporate Law > ... > Shareholder Actions > Appraisal Actions & Dissent
Rights > Fair Market Value

HN12 Appraisal Actions & Dissent Rights, Fair Market Value
To derive an estimate of fair value, the court must exclude any synergies or other value expected
from the merger giving rise to the appraisal proceeding itself. More like this Headnote
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote

•

Business & Corporate Law > ... > Shareholder Actions > Appraisal Actions & Dissent
Rights > Fair Market Value

HN13 Appraisal Actions & Dissent Rights, Fair Market Value
The discounted cash flow methodology is a valuation technique that the financial community
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generally accepts and that Court of Chancery frequently uses in appraisal proceedings. While the
particular assumptions underlying its application may always be challenged in any particular
case, the validity of the discounted cash flow technique qua valuation methodology is no longer
open to question. It is a standard method that gives life to the finance principle that firms should
be valued based on the expected value of their future cash flows, discounted to present value in a
manner that accounts for risk. The discounted cash flow model entails three basic components:
an estimation of net cash flows that the firm will generate and when, over some period; a
terminal or residual value equal to the future value, as of the end of the projection period, of the
firm's cash flows beyond the projection period; and finally a cost of capital with which to
discount to a present value both the projected net cash flows and the estimated terminal or
residual value. Although widely considered the best tool for valuing companies when there is no
credible market information and no market check, discounted cash flow valuations involve many
inputs—all subject to disagreement by well-compensated and highly credentialed experts—and
even slight differences in these inputs can produce large valuation gaps. More like this
Headnote
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote

•

Business & Corporate Law > ... > Shareholder Actions > Appraisal Actions & Dissent
Rights > Fair Market Value

HN14 Appraisal Actions & Dissent Rights, Fair Market Value
Under Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 262, the court must make a point estimate of fair value measured
in dollars and cents. When determining fair value, the Court of Chancery must exercise its
considerable discretion while also explaining, with reference to the economic facts before it and
corporate finance principles, why it is according a certain weight to a certain indicator of value.
More like this Headnote
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote

•

Business & Corporate Law > ... > Shareholder Actions > Appraisal Actions & Dissent
Rights > Fair Market Value

HN15 Appraisal Actions & Dissent Rights, Fair Market Value
Market prices are typically viewed superior to other valuation techniques because, unlike, e.g., a
single person's discounted cash flow model, the market price should distill the collective
judgment of the many based on all the publicly available information about a given company and
the value of its shares. In many circumstances a property interest is best valued by the amount a
buyer will pay for it and a well-informed, liquid trading market will provide a measure of fair
value superior to any estimate the court could impose. More like this Headnote
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote
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•

Business & Corporate Law > ... > Shareholder Actions > Appraisal Actions & Dissent
Rights > Fair Market Value

HN16 Appraisal Actions & Dissent Rights, Fair Market Value
The time for determining the value of a dissenter's shares is the point just before the merger
transaction on the date of the merger. If the value of the corporation changes between the signing
of the merger and the closing, the fair value determination must be measured by the operative
reality of the corporation at the effective time of the merger. More like this Headnote
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote

•

Business & Corporate Law > ... > Shareholder Actions > Appraisal Actions & Dissent
Rights > Fair Market Value

HN17 Appraisal Actions & Dissent Rights, Fair Market Value
When an acquirer purchases a widely traded firm, the premium that an acquirer is willing to pay
for the entire firm anticipates incremental value both from synergies and from the reduced
agency costs that result from unitary (or controlling) ownership. Like synergies, the value
created by reduced agency costs results from the transaction and is not part of the going concern
value of the firm. The value belongs to the buyer, although the seller may extract a portion of it
through negotiations. Eliminating shared synergies therefore only goes part of the way towards
eliminating any element of value arising from the accomplishment or expectation of the merger.
A court also must eliminate the share of value that accrues from the reduced agency costs.
More like this Headnote
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote

•

Business & Corporate Law > ... > Shareholder Actions > Appraisal Actions & Dissent
Rights > Fair Market Value

HN18 Appraisal Actions & Dissent Rights, Fair Market Value
When none of the parties establishes a value that is persuasive, the Court of Chancery must make
a determination based on its own analysis. The appraisal statute requires that the court shall
determine the fair value of the shares, Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 262(h). This means that the
chancellor must reach his own, independent determination of fair value. More like this
Headnote
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote
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Counsel: [*1] Stuart M. Grant, Michael J. Barry, Christine M. Mackintosh, Michael T. Manuel,
Rebecca A. Musarra, GRANT & EISENHOFFER P.A., Wilmington, Delaware; Attorneys for
Petitioners.
Michael P. Kelly, Steven P. Wood, McCARTER & ENGLISH, LLP, Wilmington, Delaware;
Marc J. Sonnenfeld, Karen Pieslak Pohlmann, Laura Hughes McNally, MORGAN, LEWIS &
BOCKIUS LLP, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Attorneys for Respondent.
Judges: LASTER, V.C.
Opinion by: LASTER

§ 1.6

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION
LASTER, V.C.
In May 2015, Hewlett-Packard Company ("HP") acquired Aruba Networks, Inc. ("Aruba" or the
"Company"). The transaction was governed by an Agreement and Plan of Merger by and among
Aruba, HP, and Aspen Acquisition Sub., Inc., a wholly owned subsidiary of HP. Under the
merger agreement, each share of Aruba common stock was converted into the right to receive
consideration of $24.67 per share, subject to the holder's statutory right to eschew the merger
consideration and seek appraisal.1 The petitioners perfected their appraisal rights and litigated
this statutory appraisal proceeding. This is the court's post-trial decision on the issue of fair
value.
The Delaware Supreme Court's decisions in Dell2 and DFC3 endorse using the market price
of a widely [*2] traded firm as evidence of fair value.4 As in Dell and DFC, the market for
Aruba's shares exhibited attributes associated with the premises underlying the efficient capital
markets hypothesis. Under Dell and DFC, these attributes provide sufficient evidence of market
efficiency to make Aruba's stock price "a possible proxy for fair value."5 Aruba's thirty-day
average unaffected market price was $17.13 per share.
The Delaware Supreme Court's decisions in Dell and DFC endorse using the deal price in a
third-party, arm's-length transaction as evidence of fair value.6 HN1 When evaluating the
reliability of the deal price, a trial judge must remember that
the purpose of an appraisal is not to make sure that the petitioners get the highest conceivable
value that might have been procured had every domino fallen out of the company's way; rather, it
9

is to make sure that they receive fair compensation for their shares in the sense that it reflects
what they deserve to receive based on what would fairly be given to them in an arm'slength
transaction.7
Put differently, "[t]he issue in an appraisal is not whether a negotiator has extracted the highest
possible bid. Rather, the key inquiry is [*3] whether the dissenters got fair value and were not
exploited."8
In this case, the merger was an arm's-length transaction that provided stockholders with
consideration of $24.67 per share. By definition, it provided stockholders with "fair
compensation" in the sense of "what would fairly be given to them in an arm's-length
transaction."9 The petitioners proved that the Company's negotiators might have done better,
but there is no reason to believe that they left any of Aruba's fundamental value on the
bargaining table. When the merger consideration of $24.67 per share is compared to the
unaffected market price of $17.13 per share, it is not possible to say that Aruba's stockholders
were exploited. The deal price therefore provides reliable evidence of fair value.
The Dell and DFC decisions recognize that a deal price may include synergies, and they endorse
deriving an indication of fair value by deducting synergies from the deal price.10 The
respondent's expert cited a study that provides data on the base rates at which targets successfully
extract a share of anticipated synergies from acquirers. Using that data, this decision arrives at a
midpoint valuation indication for Aruba of $18.20 [*4] per share. I personally believe that
Aruba's negotiators did not extract as great a share of the synergies as they might have, which
suggests that deal-price-less-synergies figure is slightly higher.
The Dell and DFC decisions caution against relying on discounted cash flow analyses prepared
by adversarial experts when reliable market indicators are available.11 The decisions teach that
HN2 discounted cash flow models should be "used in appraisal proceedings when the
respondent company was not public or was not sold in an open market check."12 When market
evidence is available, "the Court of Chancery should be chary about imposing the hazards that
always come when a law-trained judge is forced to make a point estimate of fair value based on
widely divergent partisan expert testimony."13 In this case, the discounted cash flow analysis
prepared by the petitioners' expert generated a value of $32.57, which was inconsistent with the
market evidence. The discounted cash flow analysis prepared by the respondent's expert
generated a value of $19.75, nestled nicely between the unaffected market price and the deal
price. Its methodological underpinnings, however, provided cause for concern, as did
the [*5] meandering route by which the expert arrived at his final figure. I do not rely on the
discounted cash flow valuations.
The two most probative indications of fair value are Aruba's unaffected market price of $17.13
per share and my deal-price-less-synergies figure of approximately $18.20 per share. In the
context of this case, the unaffected market price provides the most persuasive evidence of fair
value. My deal-price-less-synergies figure suffers from two major shortcomings.
First, my deal-price-less-synergies figure is likely tainted by human error.14 Estimating
synergies requires exercises of human judgment analogous to those involved in crafting a
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discounted cash flow valuation. The Delaware Supreme Court's preference for market indications
over discounted cash flow valuations counsels in favor of preferring market indications over the
similarly judgment-laden exercise of backing out synergies.15
Second, my deal-price-less-synergies figure continues to incorporate an element of value derived
from the merger itself: the value that the acquirer creates by reducing agency costs.16 A buyer's
willingness to pay a premium over the market price of a widely held firm reflects [*6] not only
the value of anticipated synergies but also the value created by reducing agency costs.17 The
petitioners are not entitled to share in either element of value, because complex matters and
could be wrong. More broadly, the baseline data about the manner in which buyers and sellers
allocate synergies could reflect sampling or measurement errors. both "aris[e] from the
accomplishment or expectation of the merger."18 The synergy deduction compensates for the
one element of value arising from the merger, but a further downward adjustment would be
necessary to address the other.19
Fortunately for a trial judge, once Delaware law has embraced a traditional formulation of the
efficient capital markets hypothesis, the unaffected market price provides a direct route to the
same endpoint, at least for [*7] a company that is widely traded and lacks a controlling
stockholder.20 Adjusting down from the deal price reaches, indirectly, the result that the market
price already provides. Aruba's unaffected market price provides the most persuasive evidence of
fair value.
By awarding fair value based on the unaffected market price, this decision is not interpreting
Dell and DFC to hold that market price is now the standard for fair value. Rather, Aruba's
unaffected market price provides the best evidence of its going concern value.21 The fair value
of Aruba is $17.13 per share.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The parties reached agreement on 180 stipulations of fact in the Pre-Trial Order. Trial took place
over three days. The parties submitted 996 exhibits, including eleven deposition transcripts.
Three fact witnesses and three experts testified live. The parties proved the following facts by a
preponderance of the evidence.

A. Aruba
Aruba was a Delaware corporation headquartered in Sunnyvale, California. Aruba went public in
2007. Until its acquisition by HP, Aruba's common stock traded on the NASDAQ under the
symbol "ARUN."22
Aruba principally sold components for enterprise [*8] wireless local area networks
("WLANs").23 From 2008 until 2014, its market share increased from 8.6% to 12.8%. Shortly
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before the merger, Aruba's market share peaked at 14%.24 Although Aruba was a significant
player in the industry, Cisco Systems, Inc. dominated it.25 For those same years, Cisco's
market share hovered around 50%.26
During the years leading up to the merger, Dominic Orr served as Aruba's CEO.27 Before
joining Aruba, Orr already had enjoyed a successful career in the technology and
telecommunications sectors.28 In 2002, in his early fifties, Orr retired to pursue a range of
personal interests.29
In 2006, the Aruba board of directors (the "Board") lured Orr out of retirement. Orr anticipated
serving for three years. But when his first term ended in 2009, the Board had not identified a
successor. Orr agreed to stay on for a second three-year term, but when that term ended, the
Board still had not identified a successor. At that point, Orr agreed to stay on "year by year," on
the condition that Aruba seriously engage in succession planning.30 The Board agreed but did
not move rapidly. The Board did not engage an executive search firm until 2014. Even then, the
Board [*9] limited the engagement to developing a position specification for a "CEO succession
review."31 Active recruitment would require a separate engagement.32 There remained "[n]o
firm date" for Orr's retirement.33
By the time he led the merger negotiations with HP in late 2014 and early 2015, Orr was ready to
return to an active retirement.34 As a responsible and conscientious individual, he was not
about to leave Aruba in the lurch, and he cared deeply about the Company and its employees.35
But he also had other things that he wanted to do with his life. The sale of Aruba to HP gave Orr
a path to an honorable personal and professional exit.

B. Wall Street Analysts Question Aruba's Financial Performance.
One of the precipitating events for the merger talks between HP and Aruba was a negative stock
market reaction to Aruba's results for the third quarter of 2014.36 In May 2014, Aruba
announced its quarterly results. Revenue exceeded both Aruba's own guidance and the Wall
Street consensus estimates.37 But the Company reported a gross margin of 70.5%, below the
consensus estimate of 72% and Aruba's "longstanding target of 71-73%."38
The resulting analyst coverage [*10] was harsh. Wall Street firms headlined their reports with
titles like "Weak Gross Margins Outweigh Sales Upside; Maintain Market Perform" and
"FY3Q14: Disappointing Gross Margin Offsets Ongoing 802.11ac Ramp."39 Aruba's stock
price dropped 12.11% on the news, from $20.06 to $17.63.40
Internally, Aruba management was disappointed.41 They had not anticipated the furor over
gross margins.42 Orr vented to the Board: "[W]e, as an executive team, are finally sick of wall
st discrediting our tremendous come back in revenue growth because they said we are not as
profitable as Ubiquiti (give me a break!)."43
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To improve margins, Aruba management developed a cost optimization plan called "Project
Greyhound."44 It contemplated eliminating approximately 130 employees and relocating
another eighty to "lower-cost geographies."45 Management undertook the project because the
"Company value [was] not adequately reflected in [the] stock price."46
In August 2014, Aruba announced its results for the full year of 2014, including quarterly results
for the fourth quarter. Aruba achieved record revenue. Orr told investors that Aruba had achieved
"significant market share gains" and had a [*11] "strong platform for future growth."47 Aruba
simultaneously announced the implementation of Project Greyhound.48
The analysts' reactions were mixed. Some were positive.49 Others were more cautious.50
Traders bid up Aruba's stock price by 8%, from $20.24 to $22.01.51

C. HP Approaches Aruba.
HP had been monitoring Aruba as an acquisition candidate. HP felt it had strong offerings in the
wired networking space and wanted to combine those products with Aruba's wireless offerings.
HP believed the combined product set could compete effectively with Cisco and take significant
market share.52
On August 27, 2014, the day after Aruba announced its full-year earnings, HP approached Aruba
about a deal. Antonio Neri, a Senior Vice President at HP, contacted Orr.53 Orr promptly
notified Daniel Warmenhoven, Aruba's lead independent director.54 Warmenhoven, in turn,
contacted Frank Quattrone, a senior investment banker at Qatalyst Partners LP.55
The next day, Warmenhoven notified the full Aruba Board of HP's interest. He also reported that
he had contacted Quattrone and that Orr would contact Stuart Francis, an investment banker who
had recently left Barclays Capital Inc. to join [*12] Evercore Group L.L.C.56 Warmenhoven
told the other directors that HP wanted to proceed "quickly and present the proposal to the [HP]
board on Sept[ember] 16."57
Qatalyst jumped at the potential engagement. Immediately after hearing from Warmenhoven,
Quattrone reached out to Orr and sent him a proposed engagement letter.58 Two days later,
George Boutros, another senior banker with Qatalyst, sent Orr a "[s]cript for [d]iscussion with
H[P]."59 Meanwhile, Warmenhoven reconsidered reaching out to Francis. Warmhoven "had no
experience with Evercore" and "didn't know the team."60
On August 29, 2014, Neri again spoke with Orr. Neri insisted that HP was serious. Orr tried to
"delicately set expectations that this is going to be a high premium deal."61
On September 1, 2014, Neri and Orr met in person. A talking point that Boutros prepared for the
meeting stressed the importance of price: "[T]here will have to be a very substantial premium to
market, well in excess of the typical m&a premium, in order to fully reflect both the substantial
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upside potential we have as an independent company, and our strategic value to you and
others."62
On September 2, 2014, Warmenhoven spoke with HP's CEO, Meg [*13] Whitman. She
confirmed HP's interest.63 Later that day, the Aruba Board met. Orr described the
developments with HP and reported that HP had not yet proposed "any financial terms or other
parameters regarding a possible strategic transaction."64
During the meeting, members of the Board expressed concern about having Qatalyst advise the
Company in discussions with HP. Qatalyst had represented Autonomy Corporation PLC when
HP bought it for $11 billion in 2011.65 The deal was widely understood to have been a
"disaster"66 for HP that resulted in an $8.8 billion write-down and protracted litigation.67
HP's acquisition of Aruba would be its first significant deal since Autonomy. The directors
wondered if HP would balk at working across from Qatalyst.68
When Warmenhoven raised these concerns with Quattrone and Boutros, they reassured him that
(i) Qatalyst had worked off of Autonomy's audited financials and was as much a victim as
anyone else, (ii) HP understood this, (iii) the entire HP M&A team had turned over since
Autonomy, and (iv) Qatalyst had a good relationship with the new team. The Aruba Board
accepted these reassurances.69
With the Autonomy concerns allayed, Qatalyst and Aruba [*14] negotiated the terms of
Qatalyst's engagement letter. Qatalyst projected that a deal price "around $30" per share was "the
most likely outcome" and proposed a fee equal to 1.25% of the transaction value for a deal at $30
per share or higher.70 Qatalyst proposed a richer fee of 1.5% for a price at $36 or higher.
Qatalyst felt that a price below $30 warranted 1% of deal value.71
Aruba's CFO, Mike Galvin, pushed back. He pointed out that "it's universally thought that
[Aruba] is undervalued right now" and, therefore, a price at the higher end of the range was a
strong possibility.72 Orr agreed with Galvin's assessment. He stressed that the "board doesn't
want [a] deal below $30; I want it above $33."73 He further advised that he was "not comfy
[with] a ramp from 30 to 33," because "[i]t would not be spicy enough" to incentivize Qatalyst
"to focus on the 33-35 target range we want."74 After heated negotiations, the final engagement
letter provided for a flat 1% fee.75

D. The Discussions With HP Move Forward.
Orr and Neri met again on September 10, 2014. Orr emphasized Aruba's strong results, its
willingness to remain independent, and the synergies that a deal would produce.76
Internal [*15] HP analyses confirmed the potential for substantial synergies.77
On September 15, 2014, HP kicked off its due diligence. From that point on, management
representatives at various levels met on a series of occasions.78 The speed and intrusiveness of
HP's diligence surprised Orr.79 In a discussion with Neri on September 18, Orr stressed that for
14

a transaction to occur, HP would "have to pay a very compelling price that reflects both the
significant upside potential that we have ahead of us, and the strategic value of Aruba . . . . This
means that this deal will not happen at a conventional M&A premium."80

E. No Other Strategic Buyers Show Interest.
On September 25, 2014, the Aruba Board authorized Qatalyst to contact other potential buyers to
gauge their interest. Qatalyst developed a preliminary list.81 The Board instructed Qatalyst to
focus on "a limited number of third parties with financial wherewithal and a strategic interest in
mobile technology" that would enjoy "compelling synergies" so that the buyer could be
"competitive with any potential proposal from [HP]."82 The Board instructed Qatalyst not to
contact any private equity firms, believing that "given the Company's volatile [*16] revenues
and unpredictable cash flows and the potential for synergies between Aruba's business with a
strategic acquiror, private equity firms would not be competitive in their potential valuations."83

Qatalyst identified thirteen "Selected Potential Partners."84 Between September 29 and October
4, 2014, Qatalyst approached five of them.85 By October 9, each had declined.86 Boutros
explained that "[i]t was very clear that none of them had any interest in an acquisition" and that it
had "nothing to do with price."87 Orr concluded that "[n]ow our only (but strong) weapon is to
say we go alone."88 Boutros was "not at all troubled by that," observing that it was "what we
expected anyway."89

F. The Parties' Initial Valuations
In early October 2014, Aruba provided HP with a set of internal projections based on figures
from Aruba's revised three-year strategic financial plan, which Aruba had prepared in the
ordinary course of business in June (the "June Plan").90 In August, Galvin and his finance team
had updated the June Plan to incorporate the effects of Project Greyhound and to make the plan
more conservative. They had reduced the anticipated revenue growth rate for 2016 and
2017 [*17] and adopted more conservative assumptions for bookings, gross margin, and
operating margin.91 In September, the Aruba team reviewed the numbers with Qatalyst,
describing the plan as a "medium" case that was "more moderate" than the June Plan.92 By
early October, the Aruba team and Qatalyst had created a more bullish set of projections that
forecasted revenue consistent with the June Plan (the "October Projections").93 Using the
October Projections and a discounted cash flow methodology, Qatalyst derived a valuation range
for Aruba of $23.50 to $31.08 per share.94
HP's internal deal team used the October Projections to prepare a discounted cash flow valuation
of its own. HP estimated Aruba's value as a standalone company at $18.76 per share.95 But HP
also estimated that a transaction between Aruba and HP would generate $1.4 billion in revenue
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synergies and another $300 million in cost synergies.96 With synergies, the team estimated that
the pro forma value of Aruba could be as high as $32.05 per share.97

G. HP Begins Recruiting Orr.
While the HP deal team was internally developing its pricing parameters, the senior members of
the team continued their discussions with [*18] Orr. Neri and Orr had a "pretty open dialogue,"
and Orr "remain[ed] positive about [HP's] approach."98 Neri understood from Orr that Aruba
was "not running a sales process," and Orr made no effort to "postur[e] about trying to pin [HP]
against someone else."99
In early November 2014, HP's Global Head of Corporate Development, Joakim Johansson, met
with Orr. In an email to Qatalyst and other Aruba executives, Orr recounted that Johansson let
him "know clearly that, post combination, they expect me to run the whole networking
business."100 Orr said that Johansson wanted "to look me in the eye and see that I have no
objection. I told him I have no objection."101
HP's solicitation of Orr violated the terms of a confidentiality agreement that HP had entered into
with Aruba on October 2, 2014. That agreement contained a non-solicit provision, which stated:
HP hereby agrees that, except to the extent expressly authorized by the board of directors of the
Company (or any authorized committee thereof) in advance, neither HP nor any of its
Representatives acting on its behalf will directly or indirectly have any formal or informal
discussions, or directly or indirectly enter into any agreement, [*19] arrangement or
understanding (whether or not binding), with any director, officer or other employee of the
Company relating to (i) any retention, severance or other compensation, incentives or benefits
that may be or become payable to any directors, officers or employees of the Company in
connection with the Transaction or following the consummation thereof, or (ii) any directorship,
employment, consulting arrangement or other similar association or involvement of any
directors, officers or other employees of the Company with HP or any of its businesses or
operations following the consummation of a Transaction.102
The Aruba Board had not authorized HP's solicitation of Orr.103

H. The HP Board Balks.
On November 6, 2014, the HP deal team asked Whitman to approve paying up to $3 billion for
Aruba, or $26.66 per share.104 In its presentation to Whitman, the deal team scaled back the
synergies slightly, with revenue synergies of $1.26 billion and cost synergies of $295 million.105
The pro forma, with-synergies discounted cash flow value of Aruba declined to $31.17 per
share.106 Whitman backed the acquisition; the next step was to obtain authority from HP's
board of directors (the "HP Board").107
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On November 20, 2014, Aruba announced its earnings for the first quarter of 2015. Management
described an "outstanding quarter" that included "[r]ecord revenues" that exceeded "the top end
of [their] guidance range."108 Management also reported that Project Greyhound had improved
margins, "with non-GAAP operating margin growing to 21.8%."109 But Aruba also announced
a range of revenue guidance for the second quarter of 2015 that was 1% lower at the midpoint
than the pre-announcement analyst consensus.110 Analysts fixated on the lowered guidance.
Although Aruba management explained that they were trying to be prudent,111 Aruba's stock
dropped by 14%, closing at $18.82.112
The HP deal team saw the price drop as an opportunity to buy Aruba at a discount.113
Internally, HP acknowledged that Aruba's results were "better than we expected,"114 that they
validated the case that the deal team had presented to the HP Board,115 and that "[t]he softer
guidance did not cause us to change our financial model."116
The HP Board, however, remained skittish after the Autonomy fiasco, and it was not ready to
authorize a bid. Neri told Orr that the HP Board had questions about the deal and that it would
take another [*21] two or three weeks to answer them.117
Orr felt the process had dragged on long enough, and he recommended that the Aruba Board
terminate discussions.118 With the Aruba Board's backing, management conveyed that Aruba
was moving on.119 Aruba formally terminated discussions on November 25.120

I. HP Engages Advisors And Continues Analyzing The Deal.
After Aruba terminated discussions, HP continued working on the deal. In late November 2014,
HP engaged McKinsey & Company to validate its business case for the acquisition. McKinsey
concluded that HP could expect market share gains and revenue and cost synergies that were in
line with HP management's estimates.121
In December 2014, HP engaged Barclays as its financial advisor.122 At the time, Barclays had
an existing relationship with Aruba, having worked with Aruba on a potential convertible debt
financing since June 2013.123 The debt financing had been ready to launch in September 2014,
but Aruba declined to move forward. The lead banker at Barclays inferred that Aruba was
considering a major M&A transaction.124 Barclays spent the next three months trying to get a
role representing Aruba, until they secured the engagement for HP.125 Barclays also
was [*22] one of two banks executing Aruba's ongoing share repurchase program, which had
been in place since June 2012.126 In February 2014, the Aruba Board had authorized
management to repurchase up to $500 million of Aruba's common stock in the open market at
prices up to $25 per share.127 When approving the repurchases, the Board made the following
determination: "The recent trading price of the Company's stock on the NASDAQ Global Select
Market has been depressed and the Board believes that the trading price of the Company's
common stock may be undervalued . . . ."128 Aruba management suspended the repurchases in
October 2014 because of the discussions with HP.129 After terminating discussions with HP in
November 2014, Orr recommended resuming the repurchase program and buying shares worth
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up to $75 million, because "the stock is underperforming."130 Aruba resumed its repurchases at
up to $25 per share, believing its shares to be undervalued below that figure.131
Using consensus analyst estimates for Aruba's standalone performance, Barclays provided HP
with a range of discounted cash flow values for Aruba as a standalone company and compared
them with pro [*23] forma values for Aruba that incorporated synergies.132
Discount Rate

11%
12%
13%

Perpetuity Growth Rate
2%
3%
4%
Street Synergy Street Synergy Street Synergy
19.31 $29.49 $20.86 $32.29 $22.85 $35.89
17.61 $26.45 $18.80 $28.62 $20.30 $31.32
16.21 $23.98 $17.16 $25.69 $18.32 $27.78

Barclay's valuation work confirmed the HP deal team's internal estimates.

J. HP Approaches Aruba Again.
Meanwhile, Aruba's stock price remained stuck around $18-19 per share, and analysts continued
to criticize the Company. Orr felt that the analysts had soured on Aruba and were complaining
about everything.133 Galvin expressed frustration that analysts seemed unwilling to
"acknowledge the 6 very strong [quarters] in a row we've had."134 One analyst suggested to
Aruba management that the stock price was low enough to justify an accelerated buyback,
observing that if management did not pursue that option, an activist might.135 A group of
investors met with management and privately criticized the Company's performance.136
Against this backdrop, in late December 2014, Whitman and Neri invited Orr to dinner.137 The
meeting took place on January 21, 2015. Whitman told Orr that HP still wanted to acquire
Aruba.138 Orr responded positively and suggested that [*24] they try to sign up a deal by early
March. He told Whitman that Aruba had "over 2000 customers and partners coming to
Atmosphere 2015 in Vegas the week of March 1-5," and "[i]t would be silly not to announce it
there."139 Whitman "completely agreed," observing "that, in her experience, mergers need
forcing function and let this be the one."140
Whitman also told Orr that HP would not work with Qatalyst under any circumstances. That
same night, Orr told Warmenhoven that "Meg [Whitman] spoke with conviction and emotion
over dinner that they [Qatalyst] were guilty. Qatalyst will argue the reverse, but it does not
matter."141 Orr concluded that "if we don't insert [a] buffer person, our negotiation will suffer
severely."142 To resolve the problem, Warmenhoven doubled back to the solution he had
previously dismissed: using Francis. Warmenhoven reminded Orr that Francis "is in a new firm
and not conflicted, and Meg [Whitman] knows and (I think) trusts him."143 He offered to call
Whitman to see if involving Francis would be acceptable.144
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On January 23, 2015, Warmenhoven updated the Aruba Board. He reported that Aruba should
receive a formal offer letter soon. He explained [*25] that "[w]e do have a bit of an issue and
that is our choice of advisors. [HP] is very anti [Qatalyst]."145 He reminded the Board that the
Company already had a signed engagement letter with Qatalyst, so Aruba would have to pay
Qatalyst regardless, but he suggested hiring Francis to handle the negotiations. Warmenhoven
pointed out that "Evercore is new in the tech sector, so they may be willing to do a deal at 1/4%
just to get a deal done that they can brag about publicly."146
Warmenhoven spoke with Whitman that same day. She told him that "Qatalyst, Frank
[Quattrone] & George [Boutros] are not welcome in the negotiations. The issue is bigger than
Autonomy and goes back to EBay & Yahoo."147 Whitman described Boutros as "evil."148
But Whitman said that she would happily negotiate with either Francis or Warmenhoven, as long
as Qatalyst stayed "in the back room."149 She also wanted Qatalyst "squeezed a bit" on their
fees.150
Aruba retained Evercore that day. Francis reported to his partners that the "[d]eal timing is to try
to sign a merger agreement and announce by mid February."151 His partners were thrilled. One
replied: "Truly amazing! This is a franchise transaction! Well [*26] done!"152 Another
responded: "This is franchise defining. Well done, and it shows the power of loyalty, which you
have always eschewed! [sic]"153 A third offered: "Just remarkable, Stu[.] What a coup! Would
be, as you say, a dynamic advance for Evercore in The Valley."154

K. Qatalyst Tries To Repair Its Relationship With HP.
Qatalyst was as crushed by the news as Evercore was elated. When Orr told Boutros, he was "so
emotional, defensive AND offensive (to Meg [Whitman]) that he hardly let me talk."155
Quattrone asked Warmenhoven to intervene with Whitman on his behalf, and Warmenhoven
asked Whitman to meet personally with Quattrone.156 Quattrone then sent Whitman an email
of his own:
I was very surprised and disappointed to learn from Dan Warmenhoven today that you recently
expressed very strong negative feelings about our firm, some of our people (including me) and
our current representation of Aruba. I would greatly appreciate the opportunity to speak or meet
with you at your earliest convenience to understand from you directly what your concerns are
and give me the opportunity to address them. . . . [W]hile our loyalties are always to our client on
any assignment, I am confident we can address [*27] your concerns, play a constructive role and
engage with your team in a professional manner.157
When Whitman did not respond, Warmenhoven followed up the next day, vouched for Qattrone,
and expressed confidence that "if you two could 'clear the air' [then] Frank [Quattrone] and
[Qatalyst] could be constructive participants in getting this deal done."158
In an email to Aruba management, Warmenhoven explained why the dispute with Whitman was
so important to Quattrone:
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The issue is not Aruba. It is about the [Qatalyst] brand . . . . If word spreads that they were tossed
from this deal because HP will not engage with them on any M&A transaction, that creates a big
issue for them. . . . Frank [Quattrone] wants to save his firm . . . . The relationship, or lack
thereof, between [Qatalyst] and HP / Meg [Whitman] is now their focus.159
Orr wondered "how much time we allow" before saying "sorry, [Qatalyst]. We need to protect
our transaction. [W]e cannot worry about your brand!"160
Whitman finally spoke with Quattrone on January 29, 2015.161 She repeated the concerns she
had relayed to Warmenhoven and again emphasized that "we cannot have [Qatalyst] as the
primary representation for Aruba [*28] interacting with us and with our board."162 On
February 1, Aruba formally retained Evercore for a contingent fee equal to 0.25% of the deal
value.163

L. HP's Initial Proposal
By the time Whitman and Neri had dinner with Orr at the end of January 2015, HP had worked
with Barclays to analyze a range of prices from $23 to $26.50 per share. Based on this analysis,
HP anticipated making an "opening bid" of $24.00 and received board approval to go up to
$25.00.164 After the dinner and Orr's enthusiastic response, HP revised its strategy. On January
31, Johansson called Orr to notify him that HP was preparing a written offer.165 Orr remained
eager. He suggested accelerating the timeline and "getting a deal announced by [Aruba's]
earnings on Feb 26."166 He offered that to achieve that timeline, Aruba "would respond as
early as Monday/Tuesday of this week."167
Later that day, HP sent Aruba a written indication of interest for a cash transaction at $23.25 per
share, for an aggregate valuation of $2.563 billion.168 The price per share represented a 40.2%
premium to Aruba's closing price on the previous day and a 35.1% premium to the stock's thirtyday average price.169 The price exceeded Barclays' latest stand-alone [*29] discounted cash
flow valuations of Aruba based on analyst estimates, which ranged from $17.47 to $22.61 per
share.170 The price was seventy-five cents below the opening bid of $24.00 per share that HP
had been considering at the beginning of the month. The offer was $3.80 per share below the low
end of Barclays' most recent pro forma discounted cash flow valuations that included synergies,
which valued Aruba at between $27.05 and $37.61 per share.171

M. Aruba Responds.
The Aruba Board initially met to consider HP's proposal on January 31, 2015. The directors
decided to defer any detailed consideration of the proposal until after management presented
revised projections and Evercore and Qatalyst had an opportunity to analyze them.172
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On February 2, 2015, the Aruba Board met again. Management presented an updated version of
the October Projections, prepared in the ordinary course of business, that reflected the
Company's performance to date (the "February Projections").173 Qatalyst reported that they
had spoken with a sixth potential strategic partner who also was not interested in acquiring
Aruba.174
While the Aruba Board was meeting, a new analyst report criticized the Company, and the stock
price [*30] fell.175 Aruba's General Counsel forwarded the report to Evercore and Qatalyst,
telling them that they should inform HP that "today's stock price does not reflect reality."176
She noted that Aruba was going to beat its guidance for the quarter, but that "no one knows that
yet."177 Francis was similarly concerned that the negative analyst reports had depressed the
stock price and created a buying opportunity for HP.178 But he also worried that HP would
disengage if Aruba waited to release its quarterly results first and then negotiated from a place of
strength; to get a deal done, it was "now or never."179
On February 4, 2015, the Aruba Board met again and received a presentation from Evercore on
valuation.180 Using the February Projections, Evercore generated the following discounted
cash flow valuation range for Aruba on a standalone basis:

Perpetuity Growth Rate
WACC 4.0% 4.3% 4.5% 4.8% 5.0%
10.5% $23.97 $24.80 $25.71 $26.69 $27.76
11.0% 22.03 22.73 23.49 24.31 25.20
11.5% 20.35 20.95 21.60 22.29 23.03
12.0% 18.88 19.40 19.95 20.54 21.17
12.5% 17.58 18.03 18.51 19.01 19.56
Based on these figures, the Board authorized a counteroffer at $29 per share.181
Evercore conveyed the counteroffer to Barclays. Evercore emphasized that "now [*31] is not an
opportune time for a sale, given the stock is at a 52-week low."182 Evercore also told Barclays
that "[t]he low stock price reflects a misperception in the market that [Aruba] will miss its
quarter. In fact, [Aruba] will beat consensus and have good guide."183 Barclays responded that
the counteroffer was "not even within the realm of possibility."184

N. HP Counters At Effectively The Same Price.
After receiving Aruba's counter, HP management caucused with its advisors. They prepared
talking points which stated, contrary to HP's synergy-based valuations, that HP did "not have the
ability to reach anywhere near" Aruba's counteroffer.185 The talking points also focused on
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timing, stressing that "[i]f we don't seize the opportunity now, there are many external pressure
points that impact HP's ability to do a transaction with [Aruba] in the foreseeable future."186
On February 7, 2015, Barclays told Evercore that any price increase would be on the scale of
"quarters, not dollars."187 Evercore's reaction "was pretty constructive."188 Evercore
"emphasized that [Aruba would] like to announce deal at or before the [Aruba] earnings
announcement" because Aruba was "afraid stock runs like Ubiquiti's [*32] did which could
make the deal more challenging from the [Aruba] perspective."189
During the call with Barclays, Evercore also explained that Aruba's share repurchases had
rendered outdated the share count contained in its public disclosures. Aruba in fact had 119.1
million shares outstanding, which was 4.5 million fewer than reported. Evercore told Barclays
that HP should increase its price per share to account for the change.190
On February 9, 2015, Barclays recalculated the deal price based on the new share count. With
fewer shares, the same aggregate consideration of $2.563 billion resulted in a price per share of
$23.89.191 This was still below the opening bid of $24.00 per share that HP had contemplated
before Whitman and Neri had dinner with Orr. That opening bid had equated to aggregate deal
consideration of approximately $3 billion. With the lower share count, that same $3 billion
enterprise value generated a price of $24.67 per share.192 HP decided to tell Aruba that its best
and final bid was $24.67 per share, a figure that yielded the same enterprise value that HP
originally intended to offer as its opening bid. Internally, HP described $24.67 as "the new
$24.00," because [*33] the price merely adjusted for the change in Aruba's public share
count.193
On February 9, 2015, Barclays communicated the counter of $24.67 per share to Evercore. The
Aruba Board immediately met and authorized a counter at $25.00.194 Orr conveyed Aruba's
ask of $25 per share to Neri.195 Orr also spoke to Whitman. Neither budged on price.196
Later that day, HP sent Aruba a "Revised Indicative Non-Binding Proposal" that proposed a cash
price of $24.67 per share.197 HP described the bid as its "best and final offer."198 The
proposal represented a 51.6% premium to Aruba's closing price on the previous day and a 48.9%
premium to Aruba's thirty-day average trading price.199

O. Aruba Accepts.
On February 10, 2015, the Aruba Board met to consider HP's revised proposal. Evercore, Orr,
and Warmenhoven reported that the revised price resulted from considerable negotiation. They
believed it represented HP's best and final offer. Qatalyst advised that it was unlikely that any
other party would offer a higher price.200 The Board discussed "the recent weakness" in
Aruba's share price and considered the alternative of continuing as a standalone company.201
The Board also considered standing firm on its [*34] ask for $25 per share. Ultimately, the
Board decided to accept HP's offer of $24.67 per share.202
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On February 18, 2015, the Aruba Board considered whether to permit HP to speak with Orr and
other members of Aruba's senior management about employment opportunities.203 No one
disclosed to the Board that HP previously had made clear to Orr that they wanted him to run
Aruba after the merger, or that Orr had told HP that he was willing to do so. The Board
consented to the discussions and waived the non-solicitation provision in the confidentiality
agreement with HP.204
With approval from the Aruba Board in hand, HP conducted additional due diligence. Evercore
approached this phase as an extended audition for future work from HP. In late February 2015,
Francis reported to his partners about "a really interesting negotiating dinner at Meg's house
Thursday night" and that "it was fun to be the only banker in the room to help both sides think
through some issues."205 A senior Evercore banker responded "That's HUGE! Meg is going to
be very active. . . . Would be a great new relationship."206 Francis bragged about having
effectively acted as HP's advisor:
Agreed... I [*35] think we made a pretty good impact from an advisory perspective, and she and
I have known each other a long time socially through [P]rinceton events and when our kids were
at Menlo school...please pardon the "pat on the back" nature of this comment, but after the
meeting one of the people on our side said we had done a "masterful" job of taking [M]eg
[Whitman] through the issues as if we were her advisor...let's hope that can help us get some
traction in the future with her...207
Rather than acting as a banker for Aruba, Evercore acted as a banker for the deal.

P. The Deal Leaks.
On February 25, 2015, one day before Aruba was scheduled to announce its earnings,
Bloomberg News ran a story on the merger.208 Internally at Qatalyst, Boutros speculated that
HP had leaked the news so that Aruba's "results and subsequent stock price reaction won't be
easy to measure."209 Aruba's stock price jumped from $18.37 to $22.24 on the news.210 An
analyst issued a report positing that, in light of the synergies from the merger, a deal price of
"$28 or a premium of 25% from today's close is reasonable [for Aruba]."211
On February 26, 2015, Aruba released its second quarter results. The Company [*36] beat
analyst expectations and hit management's guidance.212 Analysts called the results
"impressive"213 and "[b]etter-[t]han-[e]xpected."214 One praised Aruba for "[a]nother
[s]trong [q]uarter."215 An analyst at Citi doubted that Aruba would be willing to sell "at prices
near the current trading level" and suggested that Aruba would not take "less than $30/share."216

On February 27, 2015, Aruba's stock closed at $24.81 per share, above the merger price.217
That evening, the Aruba Board met to discuss how to respond. Qatalyst advised the Board that
the deal still represented a 28% premium to Aruba's average trading price and a 44% premium to
its thirty-day average price.218 Qatalyst also explained that the 10% price bump that Aruba

23

enjoyed after its earnings release matched the price performance of peer firms after reporting
similar results.219
Despite Qatalyst's report on the market reaction to peer companies reporting similar results, the
Aruba Board concluded that "the higher trading price was primarily being driven by market
speculation of a transaction, and not by changes in the fundamentals of the business."220 The
Board discussed renewing its request for $25 per share but rejected the idea in favor of
using [*37] the stock price as leverage to insist on a lower termination fee and stronger deal
terms.221 After the meeting, Aruba notified HP that it would not "be asking for a higher
price."222

Q. The Final Board Approvals
On February 28, 2015, the HP Board met to consider the definitive merger agreement. Barclays
prepared a discounted cash flow analysis based on Aruba's "management case"—the February
Projections. The analysis produced a valuation range of $26.20 to $33.64 per share for Aruba on
a standalone basis.223 With synergies, Barclays valued Aruba at between $27.53 and $39.69
per share.224 Not surprisingly, Barclays opined that the deal price of $24.67 per share was fair
to HP and its stockholders. The HP Board approved the merger agreement.225
On March 1, 2015, the Aruba Board convened to consider the definitive merger agreement. Both
Qatalyst and Evercore gave valuation presentations. Qatalyst's discounted cash flow valuation
ranged from $23.23 to $26.76 per share.226 Evercore's discounted cash flow valuation ranged
from $21.12 to $29.78 per share.227 Both firms opined that the deal price of $24.67 per share
was fair to Aruba and its stockholders. The Aruba Board approved the merger agreement.228
Getting the [*38] Aruba deal signed was a key step in Qatalyst's effort to get back in HP's good
graces. Afterwards, Quattrone reported to his partners that Whitman had "asked [Orr] to pass
along the message to us that there is now a path towards 'rehabilitation' of our relationship."229
Quattrone proposed to contact Whitman and "get her assurance that if we don't send the blast
email" announcing Qatalyst's role in the deal, then Qatalyst would have "a clean slate going
forward" with HP.230 His partners supported this approach, so Quattrone sent Whitman an
email asking for a "clean slate."231 Quattrone also added "an appeal to your fairness," noting
that "we have already been embarrassed and our business damaged by what has already
occurred."232

R. Stockholder Approval
On March 2, 2015, Aruba and HP formally announced the merger.233 The final merger
agreement (i) prohibited Aruba from soliciting competing offers and required the Aruba Board to
continue to support the merger, subject to a fiduciary out and an out for an unsolicited superior
proposal; (ii) included a $90 million termination fee; and (iii) provided a drop-dead date of
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February 28, 2016.234 Orr and Keerti Melkote, Aruba's co-founder and Chief
Technology [*39] Officer, entered into voting agreements supporting the merger.235
No competing bidder emerged. On May 1, 2015, Aruba held a meeting of stockholders to
consider the merger.236 HN3 Under Delaware law, unless a corporation's constitutive
documents impose a higher voting requirement, a merger requires the approval of a majority of
the voting power represented by the corporation's outstanding shares.237 Approximately
80.88% of Aruba's outstanding shares were represented at the meeting either in person or by
proxy. Approximately 98% of those shares voted in favor of the merger.238 As a result,
approximately 80% of the outstanding shares voted in favor of the merger, clearing the statutory
requirement. The transaction closed on May 18, 2015.239

S. This Litigation
At the effective time of the merger, petitioners Verition Partners Master Fund Ltd. and Verition
Multi-Strategy Master Fund Ltd. (jointly, "Verition") owned in the aggregate 2,288,234 shares of
Aruba's common stock.240 Verition filed this appraisal proceeding on August 28, 2015. The
parties engaged in discovery for nearly two years. During discovery, Aruba's counsel took
several aggressive and credibility-impairing positions.
On May 5, 2016, [*40] Verition noticed Whitman's deposition. Aruba promptly filed for a
protective order seeking to limit the deposition to three hours. Aruba asserted that Whitman had
"limited involvement in HP's acquisition of Aruba," that "Aruba and HP are aware of nothing in
the vast discovery in this case to suggest there were any communications between Ms. Whitman
and any representative of Aruba negotiating pricing terms of the Aruba deal," and that her view
towards Qatalyst was immaterial because it "has no bearing on the fair value of Aruba as a standalone company."241 While perhaps technically correct, these representations created a
misleading picture of Whitman's involvement. Verition submitted exhibits in response to the
motion that made the assertions look silly, and the evidence at trial subsequently reinforced their
misleading character. I denied the motion for protective order and required Whitman to testify
from day to day until the deposition was completed.242
The parties next clashed when Verition moved to strike aspects of the report of Kevin Dages,
Aruba's valuation expert. In his report, Dages relied on an email exchange between Aruba
management and the Company's lawyers at Wilson Sonsini [*41] Goodrich & Rosati, P.A. for
information about stock-based compensation. During Dages's deposition, it became evident that
Aruba had withheld the communication as privileged. Dages then attempted, unpersuasively, to
suggest the citation had been a typographical error and that he had actually drawn the
information from a different source that Aruba had produced. Complicating matters further,
Verition showed that, during the deposition of another witness (Galvin), Aruba's lawyers
engaged in substantive discussions about the email with the witness during a break. At the
hearing, I expressed significant concern about Aruba's discovery conduct, but I concluded that I
could address the matter by weighing the evidence rather than by striking a portion of Dages's
report.243
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Verition dug deeper. Aruba had served a vast privilege log containing 20,000 entries and
spanning 1,462 pages. Verition confirmed that at least 529 entries asserted privilege for
communications about Aruba's projections and stock-based compensation. Those
communications took place during the preparation of Aruba's proxy statement, and Wilson
Sonsini lawyers were copied on the communications as part of the team, but the
communications [*42] were not privileged. Aruba had asserted privilege for those
communications simply because a lawyer appeared on the document. After Aruba produced
them, Verition renewed its motion to strike. This time, I found that Verition had shown a broader
pattern of problematic conduct that had prejudiced Verition. It was too late to remedy the
prejudice through other means, and I therefore struck the portions of Dages's report relating to
stock-based compensation.244
Trial took place from December 13-15, 2016. Through no fault of the parties, the post-trial
proceedings became protracted. The parties initially completed post-trial briefing by March 30,
2017, and post-trial argument was scheduled for May 17. I postponed the hearing once it became
clear that the Delaware Supreme Court's forthcoming decision in DFC likely would have a
significant effect on the legal landscape. The Delaware Supreme Court issued its decision on
August 1. Both sides submitted supplemental briefs addressing the implications of DFC, and
post-trial argument took place on September 29.
While this matter was under submission, on December 14, 2017, the Delaware Supreme Court
issued its decision in Dell. I invited the parties [*43] to provide supplemental submissions
addressing the implications of Dell and the extent to which attributes of the market for Aruba's
stock resembled the attributes that the Delaware Supreme Court emphasized in Dell. The parties
filed their submissions on January 26, 2018.

II. LEGAL ANALYSIS
HN4 Delaware's appraisal statute "allows stockholders who perfect their appraisal rights to
receive 'fair value' for their shares as of the merger date instead of the merger consideration."245

[T]he purpose of an appraisal is not to make sure that the petitioners get the highest conceivable
value that might have been procured had every domino fallen out of the company's way; rather, it
is to make sure that they receive fair compensation for their shares in the sense that it reflects
what they deserve to receive based on what would fairly be given to them in an arm's-length
transaction.246
Put differently, "[t]he issue in an appraisal is not whether a negotiator has extracted the highest
possible bid. Rather, the key inquiry is whether the dissenters got fair value and were not
exploited."247
HN5 The trial court's "ultimate goal in an appraisal proceeding is to determine the 'fair or
intrinsic value' of each share on [*44] the closing date of the merger."248 To accomplish this
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task, "the court should first envisage the entire pre-merger company as a 'going concern,' as a
standalone entity, and assess its value as such."249 "Because the court 'strives to value the
corporation itself as distinguished from a specific fraction of its shares as they may exist in the
hands of a particular shareholder,' the court should not apply a minority discount when there is a
controlling stockholder."250 The court should exclude "any synergies or other value expected
from the merger giving rise to the appraisal proceeding."251 "[O]nce the total standalone value
is determined, the court awards each petitioning stockholder his pro rata portion of this total . . .
plus interest."252
HN6 When seeking to prove fair value, parties may introduce "proof of value by any
techniques or methods which are generally considered acceptable in the financial community and
otherwise admissible in court."253 "[T]he statute assigns the Court of Chancery the duty to
consider the relevant methods of valuation argued by the parties and then determine which
method (and inputs), or combination of methods, yields the most reliable determination [*45] of
value."254 "But, whatever route it chooses, the trial court must justify its methodology (or
methodologies) according to the facts of the case and relevant, accepted financial principles."255
"Although the Court of Chancery has broad discretion to make findings of fact, those findings
of fact have to be grounded in the record and reliable principles of corporate finance and
economics."256
In this case, "the relevant methods of valuation argued by the parties" are (i) Aruba's unaffected
market price, (ii) the deal price, and (iii) competing discounted cash flow analyses. The degree of
emphasis that the parties have placed on these methodologies has evolved. During discovery and
at trial, both sides focused on their experts' discounted cash flow valuations. As the number of
opinions that focused on the deal price mounted, the respondent placed greater emphasis on that
metric, and the petitioners responded by attacking the process that led to the deal. After DFC, the
respondent stressed a combination of the unaffected market price and the deal price. After Dell,
the respondent redoubled its emphasis on the combination of the unaffected market price and the
deal price.

A. The Unaffected Market [*46] Price
The Delaware Supreme Court's recent decisions in DFC and Dell teach that HN7 if a
company's shares trade in a market having attributes consistent with the assumptions underlying
a traditional version of the semi-strong form of the efficient capital markets hypothesis,257 then
the unaffected trading price provides evidence of the fair value of a proportionate interest in the
company as a going concern. That evidence is more reliable than the single estimate of any one
individual, be he a knowledgeable market participant, corporate insider, valuation professional,
or trial judge.258 Under this standard, Aruba's unaffected market price provides persuasive
evidence of fair value.

1. The Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis
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Both Dell and DFC endorse the [*47] efficient capital markets hypothesis and its predictions
about the reliability of market prices. In DFC, the Delaware Supreme Court stated that "real
world transaction prices can be the most probative evidence of fair value even through appraisal's
particular lens."259 The high court observed that "[m]arket prices are typically viewed superior
to other valuation techniques because, unlike, e.g., a single person's discounted cash flow model,
the market price should distill the collective judgment of the many based on all the publicly
available information about a given company and the value of its shares."260 The court added
that, from the perspective of economics, when the subject company's shares are "widely traded
on a public market based upon a rich information base," then the fair value of a proportionate
interest in the company as a going concern would "likely be best reflected by the prices at which
[the] shares were trading as of the merger."261
In Dell, the Delaware Supreme Court stated that "the price produced by an efficient market is
generally a more reliable assessment of fair value than the view of a single analyst, especially an
expert witness who caters her valuation to the litigation [*48] imperatives of a well-heeled
client."262 The court explained that, when the market for a company's stock has attributes
associated with efficient trading, the stock price
reflects the judgments of many stockholders about the company's future prospects, based on
public filings, industry information, and research conducted by equity analysts. In these
circumstances, a mass of investors quickly digests all publicly available information about a
company, and in trading the company's stock, recalibrates its price to reflect the market's
adjusted, consensus valuation of the company.263
The court concluded that, when the market for a company's shares has the requisite attributes, the
stock price is "likely a possible proxy for fair value."264
Under Dell and DFC, the critical question is whether the market for the subject company's shares
has attributes associated with market efficiency. In Dell, the high court described the relevant
attributes as follows: "A market is more likely efficient, or semi-strong efficient, if it has many
stockholders; no controlling stockholder; highly active trading; and if information about the
company is widely available and easily disseminated to the market."265
In both [*49] Dell and DFC, the Delaware Supreme Court found that the market for the subject
company's shares had the necessary attributes. The Dell decision described the market for Dell's
stock as follows:
Dell's stock traded on the NASDAQ under the ticker symbol DELL. The Company's market
capitalization of more than $20 billion ranked it in the top third of the S&P 500. Dell had a deep
public float and was actively traded as more than 5% of Dell's shares were traded each week. The
stock had a bid-ask spread of approximately 0.08%. It was also widely covered by equity
analysts, and its share price quickly reflected the market's view on breaking developments. Based
on these metrics, the record suggests the market for Dell stock was semi-strong efficient,
meaning that the market's digestion and assessment of all publicly available information
concerning Dell was quickly impounded into the Company's stock price. For example, on
January 14, 2013, Dell's stock jumped 9.8% within a minute of Bloomberg breaking the news of
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the Company's take-private talks, and the stock closed up 13% from the day prior—on a day the
S&P as a whole fell 0.1%.266
The DFC decision described the market for DFC's stock in similar, [*50] albeit more
abbreviated, terms:
DFC's shares were traded on the NASDAQ exchange from 2005 until the merger. Throughout its
history as a public company, the record suggests that DFC never had a controlling stockholder, it
had a deep public float of 39.6 million shares, and, it had an average daily trading volume just
short of one million shares. DFC's share price moved sharply in reaction to information about the
company's performance, the industry, and the overall economy . . . .267
The high court later noted that "DFC's stock was listed on a major U.S. exchange, traded
actively, and had moved sharply over the years when the company was poised for growth or
facing dimming prospects."268
In neither case did an expert render an opinion on market efficiency, as is common in federal
securities law actions when a plaintiff seeks to invoke the presumption of reliance associated
with the fraud-on-the-market theory.269 Nor was all of the market evidence part of the trial
record. In DFC, the Delaware Supreme Court cited record evidence for some of the information
about DFC's stock profile; it drew other information from DFC's public filings with the SEC or
from an expert report addressing valuation issues. [*51] 270 In Dell, the Delaware Supreme
Court similarly drew much of the market-related information from public filings with the SEC or
from an expert report addressing valuation issues.271
In this case, as in Dell and DFC, no expert offered an opinion, pro or con, on whether the subject
company's shares traded in an efficient market. During trial, the parties did not emphasize the
attributes of the market for Aruba's common stock. Nevertheless, information drawn from
sources comparable to those the Delaware Supreme Court used in Dell and DFC indicates that
the market for Aruba's common stock had basic attributes consistent with what the high court
found sufficient in those decisions:
• Aruba's shares traded on the NASDAQ through the date of the merger under the symbol
ARUN.272
• Aruba did not have a controlling stockholder.
• Aruba made public filings in compliance with the disclosure requirements imposed by federal
securities laws.
• Thirty-three securities analysts covered Aruba.273
• Aruba's weekly trading volume was 9.5 million shares or 8.7% of total shares outstanding.274
• Aruba's bid-ask spread was 0.055%.275
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The following table compares the numerical attributes of Aruba's common stock with the
comparable attributes for the subject companies in Dell and DFC.
DFC
Dell
Aruba
Market Cap.
$375 million $20 billion $2.5 billion
Shares in public 37.5 million 1.45 billion 104 million
float
Public float as %
95%
85%
96%
of outstanding
Bid-ask spread
0.098%
0.08%
0.055%
# of analysts
10
33
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Given these attributes, Aruba's stock price is "likely a possible proxy for fair value."276
In addition, as in Dell, there is evidence that the Company's stock price reacted quickly to the
release of news about the Company.277
• When Aruba announced Project Greyhound after the market closed on August 26, 2014, the
stock price rose by 5% the next day, closing at $21.26 on a day when the S&P 500 was stagnant.
• When Aruba announced its first quarter fiscal year 2015 earnings after the market closed on
November 20, 2014, Aruba's stock price dropped by 14% on November 21 on a day when the
S&P 500 was up 0.5%.
• When Bloomberg News reported that HP was in talks to buy Aruba on February 25, 2015,
Aruba's stock price rose 21%. The news came out at 3:02 p.m. and, within one minute, Aruba's
stock price had increased [*53] 12.7%. By 3:11 p.m., the price had increased to $22.86, before
closing at $22.24 at 4 p.m. The same day, the S&P 500 decreased 0.1%.
• When Aruba announced its second quarter fiscal year 2015 earnings after the market closed on
February 26, 2015, the stock price increased the next day by 9.7%. That same day, the S&P 500
decreased by 0.3%.
• When the merger was confirmed and the merger price of $24.67 announced on March 2, 2015,
the stock price decreased slightly to close at $24.65.
Obviously, these are anecdotal observations and not event studies, but they compare favorably
with the Dell court's observation that Dell's share price "quickly reflected the market's view on
breaking developments," citing, as an example, that "on January 14, 2013, Dell's stock jumped
9.8% within a minute of Bloomberg breaking the news of the Company's take-private talks, and
the stock closed up 13% from the day prior—on a day the S&P 500 as a whole fell 0.1%."278
Similar evidence in this case reinforces the conclusion that Aruba's stock price leading up to the
merger is "likely a possible proxy for fair value."279
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2. Evidence Of Market Mispricing
The petitioners dispute the reliability of Aruba's market price [*54] in this case, contending that
HP timed its acquisition to take advantage of a trough in the market. They rely on a range of
authorities, including the Delaware Supreme Court's decision in Glassman v. Unocal Exploration
Corp., which stated that, if an acquisition "was timed to take advantage of a depressed market, or
a low point in the company's cyclical earnings, or to precede an anticipated positive
development, the appraised value may be adjusted to account for those factors."280
The petitioners argue that the market mispricing in this case began after the Company reported
positive quarterly results in May 2014. Revenue exceeded both management guidance and Wall
Street consensus estimates,281 but the Company reported a gross margin of 70.5%, below the
consensus estimate of 72% and Aruba's "longstanding target of 71-73%."282 The miss
triggered harsh analyst coverage,283 and Aruba's stock price dropped 12.11% on the news,
declining from $20.06 to $17.63. As evidence of the market overreaction, the petitioners rely on
internal assessments by Aruba management.284
To address the gross margin issue, Aruba management developed Project Greyhound.285
Management undertook the project because the [*55] "Company value [was] not adequately
reflected in [the] stock price."286 Aruba announced record results in August 2014 and
simultaneously announced the implementation of Project Greyhound.287 Analysts had mixed
reactions.288 Aruba's stock price rose by roughly 9%, from $20.24 to $22.01.289 As evidence
of continued mispricing, the petitioners rely on Aruba management's internal view that it would
take "a couple of quarters" after the implementation of Project Greyhound for Wall Street to
credit the results.290
The petitioners contend that matters worsened in November 2014. That month, Aruba reported
on an "outstanding quarter" that included "[r]ecord revenues" that exceeded "the top end of [its]
guidance range" and improved margins thanks to Project Greyhound.291 But Aruba also
announced a range of revenue guidance for the upcoming quarter that was 1% lower at the
midpoint than the pre-announcement analyst consensus.292 Analysts fixated on the lowered
guidance. Aruba's stock dropped by 14%, closing at $18.82.293 As evidence of the market
overreaction, the petitioners rely on the internal assessments of Aruba management, who
explained that they lowered guidance simply to be [*56] prudent and not because of any change
in the business dynamics.294 They also rely on internal assessments by the HP deal team, who
viewed Aruba's strong results as validating their internal business case295 and saw the price
drop as an opportunity to buy Aruba at a discount.296
After Dell and DFC, I do not believe that the petitioners' evidence provides any basis to question
the integrity of Aruba's pre-announcement market price as an indicator of fair value. As a
threshold matter, it is not clear that Glassman has continuing relevance to a widely held, publicly
traded entity. Although the Delaware Supreme Court in Glassman did not limit its comments
about the appraisal standard to any particular context, the case involved a short-form merger in
which a controlling stockholder eliminated the minority.297 Aruba was not a controlled
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company, and the market for its shares exhibited the attributes that the Delaware Supreme Court
in Dell and DFC found sufficient to give effect to the implications of the semi-strong form of the
efficient capital markets hypothesis.
In Dell, at the trial level, I found "widespread and compelling evidence of a valuation gap
between the market's perception [*57] and the Company's operative reality."298 As I viewed
the evidence, "[t]he gap was driven by (i) analysts' focus on short-term, quarter-by-quarter results
and (ii) the Company's nearly $14 billion investment in its transformation, which had not yet
begun to generate the anticipated results."299 In making this finding, I relied on record
evidence indicating that (i) Michael Dell and other members of management valued the company
at levels significantly above the market price in light of its ongoing transformation and a related
cost-savings initiative,300 (ii) the financial advisors to the special committee running the sale
process generated valuations implying values for the company that far exceeded its market
price,301 and (iii) Mr. Dell and the special committee's advisors (including two financial
advisors and a consulting firm) believed that the valuation gap existed because the company's
stockholders were focused on the short-term rather than the long-term.302
On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court held that, in light of the attributes of the market for
Dell's shares and the implications of the semi-strong form of the efficient capital markets
hypothesis, my reliance on the views [*58] of these knowledgeable insiders constituted an abuse
of discretion.303 I had cited various analyst reports as evidence of the contrast between
external views and the insiders' assessments. The high court found that the analyst reports
showed "just the opposite: analysts scrutinized Dell's long-range outlook when evaluating the
Company and setting price targets, and the market was capable of accounting for Dell's recent
mergers and acquisitions and their prospects in its valuation of the Company."304 More
broadly, the Delaware Supreme Court held that my finding "ignored the efficient market
hypothesis long endorsed by this court."305 The high court found that "[t]he apparent
efficiency of Dell's pre-signing stock market and the long-term approach of its analysts
undermine concerns of a 'valuation gap.'"306
In this case, I regard the petitioners' evidence of market mispricing as considerably weaker than
what I abused my discretion by crediting in Dell. The evidence in Dell involved the company's
likelihood of successfully completing [*59] a corporate transformation after spending $14
billion to acquire eleven businesses over three years. The evidence in this case concerns revenue
guidance for an upcoming quarter and the implications of a cost-cutting effort (Project
Greyhound). As in Dell, the analyst reports show that market observers were assessing these
variables. As in Dell, there is no indication that management did not try to communicate
forthrightly with the market. In contrast to Dell, the internal concerns that Orr and other
members of management expressed in this case lacked the degree of analytical and valuationbased support that accompanied the critiques by Mr. Dell, his management team, and the special
committee's advisors. In this case, the internal concerns seem more like reactive expressions of
frustration. To reiterate, the evidence in Dell was insufficient to support my finding regarding the
existence of a valuation gap. Indeed, the Delaware Supreme Court regarded it as the equivalent
of no evidence at all.307 The weaker evidence here is insufficient to undermine the reliability
of Aruba's unaffected market price.

32

The DFC decision points to the same conclusion. There, the Court of [*60] Chancery found
DFC's performance "appeared to be in a trough, with future performance depending on the
outcome of regulatory decision-making that was largely out of the company's control."308 The
trial court relied on record evidence that the acquirer "was aware of DFC's trough performance
and uncertain outlook" and that "these attributes were at the core of [the acquirer's] investment
thesis to obtain assets with potential upside at a favorable price."309 On appeal, the Delaware
Supreme Court explained that "the market's assessment of the future cash flows necessarily takes
regulatory risk into account as it does with all the other reasonable uncertain factors that affect a
company's future."310 The senior tribunal found that "the record reveals that equity analysts,
equity buyers, debt analysts, debt providers and others were in fact attuned to the regulatory risks
facing DFC."311 The same reasoning applies here in terms of the ability of equity analysts and
other market participants to assess the risk associated with Project Greyhound and Aruba's ability
to meet management guidance.
The Delaware Supreme Court in DFC also questioned whether a trial court should have relied
on [*61] evidence that the buyer thought it was getting a good deal to support the possibility of
underpricing:
One would expect a buyer to think it made a wise decision with an upside, and, to be candid, it is
in tension with the statute itself to argue that the subjective view of post-merger value of the
acquirer can be used to value the respondent company in an appraisal, as the statute's exclusion
of transaction-specific value seems to be directed at the concern a buyer who pays fair value
should not have its economic upside for taking that risk expropriated in the appraisal process, a
result that if it were the law, would discourage sales transactions valuable to selling stockholders.
That a buyer views itself as having struck a good deal is far from reliable evidence that the
resulting price from a competitive bidding process is an unreliable indicator of fair value. . . .
[O]ne would think that the buyer who paid the highest price in a competitive process had the
most confidence there was an upside and must think that post-purchase gains would justify its
purchase; otherwise, no sale would ever occur in the world. That [the acquirer] expected to profit
does not mean that the collective [*62] view of value that results from the deal price is not a
reliable indicator of fair value; to hold otherwise, is to adopt a non-binary view of fair value in
which only the upside view of what could happen in the future is taken into account.312
This passage cautions against regarding HP's belief that it had seized upon an opportune time to
purchase Aruba as sufficient to undercut the reliability of Aruba's market price.

3. Bundling Aruba's Earnings Release With The Merger Announcement
So far, the petitioners' evidence of a market trough or other mispricing is conceptually similar to
the types of evidence that the Delaware Supreme Court rejected in Dell and DFC. But the
petitioners advanced another argument that falls into a slightly different category because it
involved Aruba and HP making conscious decisions about when to release information. At the
end of January 2015, HP offered to acquire Aruba for $23.25 per share. During the first week of
February, while Aruba was considering its response, another analyst report criticized the
Company, and the stock price fell again, closing around $16.07 the day after the report.313
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Contrary [*63] to the market's perception, Aruba management knew internally that Aruba was
having an excellent quarter and would beat its guidance.314 But, rather than correcting the
market's perception, Aruba management proposed to time the announcement of the merger to
coincide with the announcement of Aruba's February 2015 earnings.315 Companies often
announce significant items as part of an earnings release, particularly if the earnings are bad and
the news is good (or vice versa).316 In this case, Aruba management believed that an increase
in the stock price would hurt their chances of getting the deal approved. Providing both pieces of
information simultaneously would blur the market's reaction to Aruba's strong quarterly results
and help get the deal approved.317
In Dell, the Delaware Supreme Court implied that a petitioner might be able to call into question
the integrity of the market price if they proved that management had withheld information from
the market or misled investors. As one of its several reasons for holding that I abused my
discretion, the high court noted that I "expressly found no evidence that information failed to
flow freely or [*64] that management purposefully tempered investors' expectations for the
Company so that it could eventually take over the Company at a fire-sale price."318 My
prediction of the law before the Delaware Supreme Court's decision in Dell would have been that
scienter did not matter for an appraisal case where the sole litigable question is valuation rather
than culpability. But this passage indicates that HN8 whether management causes an
informational distortion is pertinent not only for a breach of fiduciary duty claim or fraud action,
but for an appraisal proceeding as well.
In this case, the petitioners contend that Aruba and HP manipulated the timing of announcing
Aruba's strong quarterly results and the merger to interfere with investors' ability to perceive
Aruba's standalone value. The petitioners do not contend that management never provided the
quarterly results or falsified the quarterly results, only that they bundled them together with the
announcement of the merger.
As framed by the Delaware Supreme Court in Dell and DFC, the semi-strong form of the
efficient capital markets hypothesis does not contemplate that directional error will arise from
the order in which information is released [*65] or from bundling information together.
Releasing information simultaneously or in close proximity might make it difficult for an expert
to disentangle the price reaction for purposes of an event study, but the market still would have
the information and would respond. As the high court stated in Dell, when a market is efficient,
"a mass of investors quickly digests all publicly available information about a company and, in
trading the company's stock, recalibrates its price to reflect the market's adjusted, consensus
valuation of the company."319 And as the high court observed in DFC, "in an efficient market,
you can trust prices, for they impound all available information about the value of each
security."320 Aruba's stock traded briefly above the deal price, indicating the market took into
account both the announcement of the deal and Aruba's strong results. Viewed within the
framework established by DFC and Dell, the record does not provide a persuasive reason to
question the reliability of Aruba's trading price based on the decision by Aruba management to
bundle together two pieces of information.321
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4. The [*66] Conclusion Regarding The Market Price Evidence
Aruba's thirty-day average unaffected market price was $17.13.322 Viewed within the
framework established by DFC and Dell, Aruba's market price provides reliable evidence of the
going concern value of the firm.

B. The Deal Price
The Delaware Supreme Court's recent decisions in DFC and Dell hold that HN9 when a widely
held, publicly traded company has been sold in an arm's-length transaction, the deal price has
"heavy, if not overriding, probative value."323 Applying that standard in this case, the merger
price carries heavy weight, although the inclusion of elements of value arising from the merger
requires adjustments to generate an indication of fair value.

1. The Role Of The Deal Price
On three occasions, the Delaware Supreme Court has declined to establish a presumption
regarding the relationship between the deal price and fair value. In Golden Telecom, the high
court explained that "Section 262(h) neither dictates nor even contemplates that the Court of
Chancery should consider the transactional market price of the underlying company. Rather, in
determining 'fair value,' the statute instructs that the court 'shall take into account all relevant
factors.'"324 The [*67] court reasoned that "[r]equiring the Court of Chancery to defer—
conclusively or presumptively—to the merger price, even in the face of a pristine, unchallenged
transactional process, would contravene the unambiguous language of the statute and the
reasoned holdings of our precedent."325
In DFC, the Delaware Supreme Court again rejected a request to establish a presumption that the
deal price reflects fair value, seeing "no license in the statue for creating a presumption" and
expressing doubt about "our ability to craft, on a general basis, the precise pre-conditions that
would be necessary to invoke a presumption of that kind."326 At the same time, the Delaware
Supreme Court cautioned that its
refusal to craft a statutory presumption in favor the deal price when certain conditions pertain
does not in any way signal our ignorance to the economic reality that the sale value resulting
from a robust market check will often be the most reliable evidence of fair value, and that
second-guessing the value arrived upon by the collective views of many sophisticated parties
with a real stake in the matter is hazardous.327
The Delaware Supreme Court also cautioned that "we have little quibble with the
economic [*68] argument that the price of a merger that results from a robust market check,
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against the back drop of a rich information base and a welcoming environment for potential
buyers, is probative of the company's fair value."328
The DFC court reversed a decision by this court to give only one-third weight to the deal price.
The high court noted that the trial court had made the following post-trial findings of fact:
i) the transaction resulted from a robust market search that lasted approximately two years in
which financial and strategic buyers had an open opportunity to buy without inhibition of deal
protections;
ii) the company was purchased by a third party in an arm's length sale; and
iii) there was no hint of self-interest that compromised the market check.329
The high court further observed that
[a]lthough there is no presumption in favor of the deal price, under the conditions found by the
Court of Chancery, economic principles suggest that the best evidence of fair value was the deal
price, as it resulted from an open process, informed by robust public information, and easy
access to deeper, non-public information, in which many parties with an incentive to make a
profit had a chance to [*69] bid.330
The Delaware Supreme Court determined that the Court of Chancery's "decision to give onethird weight to each metric was unexplained and in tension with the Court of Chancery's own
findings about the robustness of the market check."331 The senior tribunal therefore reversed
and remanded the case so the trial court could "reassess [its] conclusion as to fair value in light
of our decision."332
Most recently, in Dell, the Delaware Supreme Court reiterated that "there is no requirement that
the court assign some mathematical weight to the deal price."333 On the facts presented,
however, the high court held that I "erred in not assigning any mathematical weight to the deal
price" under circumstances suggesting that "the deal price deserved heavy, if not dispositive
weight."334 Those circumstances included (i) stock market attributes associated with efficient
trading335 and (ii) a sale process that involved "fair play, low barriers to entry, outreach to all
logical buyers, and the chance for any topping bidder to have the support of Mr. Dell's own
votes."336
The decisions in DFC and Dell identify factors that make the deal price so probative that a trial
court abuses its discretion by failing [*70] to give it enough weight, but they provide less
guidance for determining when a process is sufficiently bad to warrant discounting the deal
price. One passage in the DFC decision suggests an answer to the latter inquiry by stating that
the purpose of an appraisal is not to make sure that the petitioners get the highest conceivable
value that might have been procured had every domino fallen out of the company's way; rather, it
is to make sure that they receive fair compensation for their shares in the sense that it reflects
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what they deserve to receive based on what would fairly be given to them in an arm's-length
transaction.337
This test focuses on whether the deal in question was an arm's-length transaction, and it appears
to rule out inquiry into whether a different transaction process might have achieved a superior
result. A passage from Dell points in a similar direction, where the high court stated: "The issue
in an appraisal is not whether a negotiator has extracted the highest possible bid. Rather, the key
inquiry is whether the dissenters got fair value and were not exploited."338 As with the passage
from DFC, the passage from Dell appears to discount whether a different approach [*71] might
have done better. The Dell test turns on exploitation.

2. The Deal Price In This Case
In this case, the HP-Aruba transaction was a third-party, arm's-length merger. HP was not a
controller engaged in squeezing out the minority. Nor was the transaction a management buyout
where insiders' informational advantages might have raised concerns. The transaction did not
involve particular stockholders, such as members of management or a large blockholder, rolling
over their shares or otherwise receiving differential treatment. Nothing about the deal structure
could be considered exploitive.
The ultimate decision makers for Aruba—the Board and the stockholders—did not labor under
any conflicts of interest. The Board was disinterested and independent. Of its eight members, six
were experienced, outside directors. Aruba's stockholder base was widely dispersed. No one
identified any stockholders with a dominant position or divergent interests.
Aruba negotiated with HP over the price. On January 31, 2015, HP sent Aruba a written
indication of interest for a cash transaction at $23.25 per share, for an aggregate valuation of
$2.563 billion.339 Aruba countered at $29 per share.340 While HP considered [*72] Aruba's
counter, it learned that Aruba in fact had fewer shares outstanding than HP had believed.341
HP had based the $23.25 per share price on Aruba's old share count. When HP recalculated its
offer to reflect the correct share count, the same aggregate consideration of $2.563 billion
resulted in a price per share of $23.89.342 Based on that calculation, HP raised its bid to $24.67
per share, or just over 3% on an as-adjusted basis.343 Aruba asked for $25.00 per share, but HP
held firm.344
There is evidence that the price credited Aruba with a portion of the substantial synergies that the
transaction would generate from combining Aruba's strength in wireless networking with HP's
strength in wired systems.345 HP's final internal analysis, reflecting independent research and
validation by McKinsey, anticipated total synergies of $1.41 billion, consisting of revenue
synergies of $1.175 billion and cost synergies of $235 million.346
HP and Aruba agreed to terms for the merger agreement that the petitioners have not
meaningfully challenged. The merger agreement contained a no-shop clause that prevented
Aruba from communicating with third parties about an acquisition proposal unless both the
Aruba Board's fiduciary duties required it and the acquisition proposal was reasonably likely to
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lead to a superior proposal.347 The merger agreement granted HP an unlimited match right,
with five days to match the first superior proposal and two days to match any subsequent
increase,348 and during the match period Aruba had to negotiate exclusively and in good faith
with HP.349 The merger agreement provided that if the Aruba Board complied with the nosolicitation provision, including the match right, then the Aruba Board could terminate the
merger agreement to accept a superior proposal after first paying HP a termination fee of $90
million, or 3% of equity value.350 This combination of defensive provisions would not have
supported [*74] a claim for breach of fiduciary duty.351
Considering these factors as a whole, the HP-Aruba merger looks like a run-of-the-mill, thirdparty deal. Nothing about it appears exploitive. Particularly given the inclusion of synergies,
there is good reason to think that the deal price exceeded fair value and, if anything, should
establish a ceiling for fair value.352

a. The Absence Of Competition
In an effort to undermine the probative value of the deal price, the petitioners argue that HP did
not face a meaningful threat of competition. They note that the recent decisions in Dell and DFC
cited with approval the open nature of the deal processes in those cases.353
The Dell and DFC decisions did not hold that a deal price would be rendered unreliable in the
absence of competition. Instead, the high court indicated that, for an appraisal petitioner to call
into question a deal process based on lack of competition, the petitioner should be able to point
to a likely bidder and make a persuasive showing that increased competition would have led to a
better result.354 The Dell decision stressed that "[f]air value entails at minimum a [*75] price
some buyer is willing to pay—not a price at which no class of buyers in the market would
pay."355 "[I]f a company is one that no strategic buyer is interested in buying, it does not
suggest a higher value, but a lower one."356
Other aspects of the Dell and DFC decisions similarly discounted the importance of competition.
The DFC decision stressed that the purpose of an appraisal "is not to make sure that the
petitioners get the highest conceivable value,"357 and the Dell decision cautioned that "[t]he
issue . . . is not whether a negotiator has extracted the highest possible bid."358 Competition
might help a seller extract a higher price, but that is not the focus of the inquiry under Dell and
DFC.
The role of competition also must be evaluated in light of the Delaware Supreme Court's
endorsement of the efficient capital markets hypothesis. At the trial level, Chancellor Bouchard
found in DFC and I found in Dell that the market prices of the acquired firms were depressed and
had not been representative of fair value. From that factual starting point, we examined the sale
processes for evidence of competition or a meaningful threat of competition that would
be [*76] sufficient to overcome the market mispricing and generate fair value. On appeal in
DFC and Dell, the Delaware Supreme Court relied on the efficient capital markets hypothesis to
hold that the factual findings about market troughs constituted abuses of discretion. From that
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different factual starting point, there is less need for competition among bidders to drive a
meaningful sale process, and less need for a court to delve into the details. With a reliable market
price as the base line, an arm's-length deal at a premium is non-exploitive. By definition, it
provides stockholders with "fair compensation for their shares," defined as "what they deserve to
receive based on what would fairly be given to them in an arm's-length transaction."359
In this case, the petitioners proved that HP knew it did not face a meaningful threat of
competition. In October 2014, during its first pass at Aruba, HP's executives established a "pretty
open dialogue" with Orr,360 and he informed HP that Aruba was "not running a sales
process."361 Orr did not make any effort to create the impression of competition by "posturing
about trying to pin [HP] against someone else."362 HP consequently did not feel any pressure
to [*77] bid. After three full months of discussions and due diligence, HP still had not put a
number on the table.
Aruba has pointed out that, at the end of November 2014, Orr decided that the discussion had
dragged on long enough, and he terminated them with the Aruba Board's backing.363 Under
different circumstances, this move might have given Aruba some bargaining leverage by
signaling that Aruba was prepared to pursue its standalone plan.364 But in this case, Orr
undercut that implication when he had dinner with Whitman and Neri on January 21, 2015. After
Whitman told Orr that HP still wanted to acquire Aruba,365 Orr responded enthusiastically and
proposed to announce the deal at an industry conference during the first week of March.366
Days later, when an HP executive called Orr to say that HP would be sending over its proposal,
Orr suggested getting a deal announced by the end of February.367
HP's bidding tactics suggest that HP knew it did not face competition. Before the dinner with
Orr, HP planned to open with $24.00 per share and negotiate up to $25.00.368 After Orr's
response, HP lowered its opening bid to $23.25.369 When Aruba countered at $29, Barclays
told Evercore that any price [*78] increase would be on the scale of "quarters, not dollars."370
Based on a new share count that Evercore provided, HP recalculated its opening bid as equating
to $23.89 per share.371 This was still below the planned opening bid of $24.00 per share that
HP contemplated before Whitman and Neri had dinner with Orr. With the lower share count, the
same enterprise value generated a price of $24.67 per share.372 HP told Aruba that its best and
final bid was $24.67, which HP internally called "the new $24.00" because the price merely
adjusted for the change in Aruba's public share count.373 HP increased its bid to $24.67 and
refused to budge. The deal ended up at the number HP had planned to use for its opening bid.374

So far, so good for the petitioners. But although they proved that HP knew it did not face a
meaningful threat of competition, they failed to identify any other likely bidder who would have
paid more for Aruba. The Dell decision teaches that "[f]air value entails at minimum a price
some buyer is willing to pay."375 Elaborating, the court emphasized that, if no one else is
interested in buying, "it does not suggest a higher value, but a lower one."376 In this case,
Aruba (through Qatalyst) [*79] contacted six potential strategic partners; none were
interested.377 Nor did anyone come forward after the deal announcement. Under Dell and
DFC, the petitioners failed to undermine the deal price by showing a lack of competition.
Instead, the lack of competition supports the reliability of the deal price.
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Under Dell and DFC, the test instead is whether the Aruba-HP transaction was exploitive. "[T]he
purpose of an appraisal is not to make sure that the petitioners get the highest conceivable value .
. . ."378 This decision already has found that Aruba's stock price exhibited attributes associated
with the premises of the efficient capital markets hypothesis. The merger consideration of $24.67
per share provided Aruba's stockholders with a significant premium over a reliable market price.
As a result, the Aruba-HP transaction provided stockholders with "fair compensation for their
shares," defined as "what they deserve to receive based on what would fairly be given to them in
an arm's-length transaction."379

b. The Negotiators' Incentives
The petitioners next contend that the deal price in this case is unreliable because Aruba's
negotiators were compromised. The petitioners argue [*80] that Aruba's bankers catered to HP,
and that Orr faced divergent interests of his own. Citing DFC and various trial court rulings, they
argue that the deal price should be discounted because Aruba lacked representatives who
engaged in vigorous, arm's-length bargaining on its behalf.380
As with the element of competition, the petitioners regard the negotiators' incentives as a thread
which, if pulled, could unravel the sweater. But like competition, the concept of negotiation
cannot be excised from the broader framework that the DFC and Dell decisions established. The
Dell opinion cautioned explicitly that "[t]he issue . . . is not whether a negotiator has extracted
the highest possible bid."381 If this were a case where the market price was depressed or
unreliable, then perhaps a detailed inquiry into issues like competition or negotiation might
become important in assessing whether the deal process achieved fair value. HN11 In a
scenario where the underlying market price is reliable, competition and negotiation become
secondary. Under those circumstances, an arm's-length deal at a premium over the market price
is non-exploitive. By definition, it gives stockholders "what would fairly [*81] be given to them
in an arm's-length transaction."382
In this case, the petitioners proved that the Aruba's bankers catered to HP. Once Whitman
refused to work opposite Qatalyst,383 Quattrone and Boutros perceived HP's stance as an
existential threat to their technology-centered franchise.384 They wanted and needed to get
back on HP's good side. Their primary goal from that point on was to rehabilitate their
relationship with HP.385
Evercore also wanted to get on HP's good side. The firm was a new entrant in the Silicon Valley
market and had recently hired Francis as "their first tech sector person."386 Evercore
understood the value of completing a highly visible deal as their first Silicon Valley
transaction,387 and they saw the sale process as an extended audition for HP's business.388
During meetings between Aruba and HP, Evercore positioned itself as the banker to the deal.
After one session, Francis reported to his colleagues that "it was fun to be the only banker in the
room and help both sides think through some issues."389 He even bragged about having done
"a 'masterful' job of taking [M]eg [Whitman] through the issues as if we were her advisor."390
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Even accepting that investment [*82] bankers are always on the lookout for new clients,
Evercore's eagerness in this case went far enough to undermine its role as Aruba's advisor.
Warmenhoven testified that the bankers' relationships with HP did not negatively affect the
negotiations and that having two bankers meant Aruba had "two star players on the same
team."391 Orr testified similarly.392 Notwithstanding this testimony, I credit that the bankers'
interests made them less effective negotiators than they might have been
The petitioners likewise proved that Orr had divergent interests, although his motivations were
subtler and less openly mercenary. The sale to HP helped Orr achieve a combination of personal
and professional goals that included hastening his return to a personally fulfilling retirement.393
That said, he was not about to leave Aruba under circumstances that would hurt the Company
or its employees.394 From his standpoint, selling Aruba to HP was the perfect solution.395
As with the issue of competition, the answer on negotiation is that the petitioners proved what
they sought to prove, but that is not enough to call into question the deal price for purposes of
appraisal. [*83] Once again, "[t]he issue in an appraisal is not whether a negotiator has extracted
the highest possible bid. Rather, the key inquiry is whether the dissenters got fair value and were
not exploited."396 "[F]air value is just that, 'fair.' It does not mean the highest possible price
that a company might have sold for had Warren Buffett negotiated for it on his best day and the
Lenape who sold Manhattan on their worst."397
The evidence does not convince me that the bankers, Orr, the Aruba Board, and the stockholders
who approved the transaction all accepted a deal price that left a portion of Aruba's fundamental
value on the table. Perhaps different negotiators could have extracted a greater share of the
synergies from HP in the form of a higher deal price. Maybe if Orr had been less eager, or if
Qatalyst had not been relegated to the back room, then HP would have opened at $24 per share.
Perhaps with a brash Qatalyst banker leading the negotiations, unhampered by the Autonomy
incident, Aruba might have negotiated more effectively and gotten HP above $25 per share. An
outcome along these lines would have resulted in HP sharing a greater portion of the anticipated
synergies with Aruba's stockholders. [*84] It would not have changed Aruba's standalone value.
Hence, it would not have affected Aruba's fair value for purposes of an appraisal.

3. Deducting Synergies
Under Dell and DFC, the deal price in this case has substantial probative value. But the evidence
shows that the deal generated significant synergies. Under the DFC decision, it is to be assumed
that HP shared some of those with Aruba's stockholders.398 HN12 To derive an estimate of
fair value, the court must exclude "any synergies or other value expected from the merger giving
rise to the appraisal proceeding itself."399
The parties agree that it is not possible to determine with precision what portion of the final deal
price reflects synergy value. The respondent's expert conceded that "[t]he percentage of
synergies actually paid by HP to Aruba cannot be accurately measured."400
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Delaware decisions have recognized the difficulties inherent in quantifying synergies.401
Despite these difficulties, this court has used a deal-price-less-synergies metric. In Union Illinois,
Chief Justice Strine, then a Vice Chancellor, started with the deal consideration of $10.20 per
share.402 He then discounted that figure by 13% to reflect the synergies captured [*85] by the
seller, basing that figure on the opinion of the respondent's valuation expert, and also citing the
fairness opinion of the seller's financial advisor, which "had mid-range synergy assumptions of
15%-20% for the synergy value that would be shared" with the seller.403
In the Highfields case, Vice Chancellor Lamb gave 75% weight to a deal-price-less-synergies
metric.404 The transaction price was $31 per share. The respondent's expert opined that the
deal price incorporated shared synergies equal to 25% of the deal price, or $7.75 per share. The
court rejected this estimate because it relied, in part, on a discounted cash flow analysis that the
expert had declined to rely on when rendering his other valuation opinions. The court found
more credible an analysis prepared by the acquirer, which estimated the lower end of shared
synergies at $9.54 per share. Vice Chancellor Lamb regarded this estimate as too high, because it
undervalued the acquired company in certain respects. After correcting the acquirer's estimate to
account for the undervaluation, Vice Chancellor Lamb concluded that the deal price incorporated
synergies of $4.12 per share.405 That figure worked out to a deduction [*86] of 13%, the same
number used in Union Illinois.
In this case, the HP deal team anticipated $1.41 billion of synergies. McKinsey projected $1.555
billion in synergies. Barclays' figure was $1.5 billion.406 McKinsey was an outside consulting
firm hired to vet the HP deal team's calculation, adding some credence to its view. This decision
therefore uses McKinsey's figure.407 Aruba's expert drew on a March 2013 study by the
Boston Consulting Group which suggested that, on average, sellers collect 31% of the capitalized
value of synergies, with the seller's share varying widely from 6% to 51%.408 Using these
figures, the range of synergy value shared in the deal could run from $93 million at the low end
to $793 million at the high end. The deal price implied a value for Aruba of $2.651 billion.409
Using the low-end synergy deduction of $93 million implies a standalone value of $2.558 billion,
or $21.08 per share. Using the high-end synergy deduction of $793 million implies a standalone
value of $1.858 billion, or $15.32 per share. The midpoint is a standalone value of $2.208 billion
or $18.20 per share. Recognizing that it would be arbitrary to import the 13% synergy figure
used in both Union Illinois [*87] and Highfields, that percentage nevertheless implies a
standalone value of $2.306 billion or $19.06 per share.
Because I am inclined to think that Aruba's representatives bargained less effectively than they
might have, I tend to think that they obtained a relatively low share of the synergies from HP.
This would indicate that they obtained fewer synergies than the midpoint range and imply a
standalone value north of $18.20 per share. Having no way to gauge the marginal impact of their
ineffectiveness, this decision uses $18.20 per share as the valuation indication for the deal price
less synergies.

C. The Experts' Analyses

42

Both sides submitted opinions from valuation experts. Both experts used the discounted cash
flow methodology to value Aruba. Both experts believed that the discounted cash flow
methodology provided the best approach for determining the fair value of the Company. The
respondent's expert, Kevin Dages, said so explicitly: "It is my opinion that Aruba's standalone
fair value is most accurately measured using a [discounted cash flow] analysis based on the
Management Projections."410 The petitioners' expert, Paul Marcus, expressed his view
implicitly by relying exclusively [*88] on the discounted cash flow approach.411
HN13 The discounted cash flow methodology is a valuation technique that the financial
community generally accepts and that this court frequently uses in appraisal proceedings.412
"While the particular assumptions underlying its application may always be challenged in any
particular case, the validity of [the discounted cash flow] technique qua valuation methodology is
no longer open to question."413 It is a "standard" method that "gives life to the finance
principle that firms should be valued based on the expected value of their future cash flows,
discounted to present value in a manner that accounts for risk."414
The DCF model entails three basic components: an estimation of net cash flows that the firm will
generate and when, over some period; a terminal or residual value equal to the future value, as of
the end of the projection period, of the firm's cash flows beyond the projection period; and
finally a cost of capital with which to discount to a present value both the projected net cash
flows and the estimated terminal or residual value.415
The Delaware Supreme Court has recently cautioned that "[a]lthough widely considered the best
tool for valuing [*89] companies when there is no credible market information and no market
check, [discounted cash flow] valuations involve many inputs—all subject to disagreement by
well-compensated and highly credentialed experts—and even slight differences in these inputs
can produce large valuation gaps."416

1. Marcus's Valuation Opinion
Marcus used a discounted cash flow analysis to opine that the Company's fair value at closing
was $32.57 per share. His model generally adhered to the valuation literature and the teachings
of the Delaware courts. From a methodological perspective, his model appears sound.
As a source of estimated future cash flows, "Delaware law clearly prefers valuations based on
contemporaneously prepared management projections because management ordinarily has the
best first-hand knowledge of a company's operations."417 Marcus used the February
Projections, which covered the fiscal years 2015-2017. The February Projections had their roots
in management's three-year plan, prepared in the ordinary course of business and with input from
the Aruba Board.418 Management completed an iteration of its three-year plan in
summer [*90] 2014.419 Management updated the plan in October 2014.420 In February
2015, management revised the plan to reflect intervening results and to adopt more conservative
assumptions.421 To cover the final two years of his projection period, Marcus used an
extension of the February Projections that Qatalyst prepared working in conjunction with Aruba
management.422 Qatalyst used the same projections as the basis for the fairness opinion that it
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delivered to the Aruba Board.423 Aruba also used the same projections in the proxy statement
for the deal.424 Marcus adopted management's estimates for the cost of stock-based
compensation425 and Aruba's tax rates.426
The projections resulted in Aruba having a high compound annual growth rate ("CAGR") of
10% at the end of the projection period. To normalize Aruba's high growth and transition the
Company into a steady state, Marcus added a second, five-year stage to create a three-step
discounted cash flow model. During the added second stage, he stepped down the growth rate to
reach his terminal, third-stage growth rate of 3.5% per year.427 Delaware decisions and the
valuation literature [*91] support this approach.428 Like Marcus, HP used a three-stage
discounted cash flow method when valuing Aruba.429
Marcus calculated Aruba's weighted average cost of capital ("WACC") using the capital asset
pricing model ("CAPM").430 "Under CAPM, the cost of equity capital is the risk-free rate of
return plus the subject company's risk. The subject company's risk is determined by multiplying
the equity risk premium for the market by the company's beta."431 Marcus used a risk-free rate
of 2.75%, based on the twenty-year U.S. Treasury maturity rate, and a supply-side equity risk
premium of 6.19%.432 Marcus drew these figures from reliable sources, and Dages used the
same risk-free rate and a virtually identical supply-side equity risk premium.433 Marcus
calculated a beta for Aruba of 0.91, which he derived by giving one-third weight to Aruba's twoyear, weekly, raw beta (0.81) and two-thirds weight to the two-year, weekly, raw, unlevered
betas of a group of peer companies (1.11).434 Court of Chancery precedent supports the
blended approach,435 and the valuation literature supports the selection of a two-year period
for Aruba.436 He then [*92] added the fifth-decline size premium.437 These calculations
resulted in a 10% WACC.438
To calculate value for the terminal period, Marcus used the Gordon Growth Model.439 "To
calculate terminal value using the Gordon Growth Model, the Court must select a long-term
growth rate, i.e., the expected growth rate of free cash flows into perpetuity."440 As noted,
Marcus selected a perpetuity growth rate of 3.5%. He believed it was reasonable to assume that
Aruba would grow at the rate of the overall economy, but to be conservative he selected a growth
rate approximately at the midpoint of the risk-free rate (2.75%) and nominal GDP growth rate, as
predicted by reliable, oft-cited studies (4.3%).441
Marcus sensitized his valuation for discount rates of 9.5% to 10.5% and terminal growth rates of
3.0% to 4.0%, generating a valuation range for $29.16 to $36.93. The midpoint, based on a
discount rate of 10% and a terminal growth rate of 3.5%, was $32.57.442
My primary concerns with Marcus's opinion are his beta and the contrast between [*93] his
valuation and market indicators. Marcus's raw and blended betas were both lower than one,
indicating that Aruba, a relatively young and growing technology company, exhibited less
volatility than the market as a whole.443 Although the data supported the low beta, no one
could offer a good explanation as to why the number was so low.444 Marcus's beta of 0.91 also
fell roughly 20% below the median two-year adjusted beta of companies in Aruba's peer group
and approximately 35% below Aruba's five-year adjusted weekly beta.445 That said, Aruba's
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low beta was not unique. The bankers' fairness presentations identified other networking and
WiFi companies that had betas of less than 1.446
Marcus's valuation outcome diverged significantly from market indications. His valuation of
$32.57 is
• approximately 32% higher than the deal price of $24.67;
• approximately 39% higher than the mean of the last batch of unaffected analyst price targets at
$23.4;447
• approximately 21% above the mean of the midpoints of the final valuations prepared by all
three advisors at $26.57;448 and
• nearly double Aruba's thirty-day average unaffected market price of $17.13 per share.
Despite its seemingly [*94] sound methodology, these market indicators combine to create
significant doubt regarding the reliability of the Marcus discounted cash flow analysis and its
resulting valuation.

2. Dages's Valuation Opinion
Dages rendered several different valuation opinions. They produced relatively stable outputs but
changed substantially in their inputs. Dages also made a significant judgment call by selecting a
WACC from a menu of possibilities, rather than calculating a beta to generate a WACC as
contemplated by CAPM.
In his opening report, Dages opined that the standalone fair value of Aruba was $19.85 per share,
which he derived using a discounted cash flow methodology.449 Like Marcus, Dages used the
February Projections with the two-year extension prepared by Qatalyst with management's
input.450 Unlike Marcus, who used management estimates for stock-based compensation and
tax rates, Dages used a stock-based compensation figure from Barclays,451 and his own
estimate of Aruba's effective tax rate.452 Despite recognizing the issue raised by Aruba's high
growth rate at the end of the projection period,453 Dages used a traditional two-stage model
rather than a three-stage model. For his terminal value, Dages explained [*95] the principles
used when selecting a long-term growth rate in much the same terms as Marcus,454 but then
chose the risk-free rate (2.75%) because "some financial economists caution that the risk-free
rate . . . should serve as the ceiling for a stable, longterm growth rate" and this court had used
that rate in "a recent opinion."455
For his discount rate, Dages started out using CAPM to develop a WACC. He used the same
risk-free rate as Marcus (2.75%)456 and a supply-side equity risk premium that was
substantially similar to Marcus's (6.21%).457 On the issues of a beta and size premium,
however, Dages punted. He described a variety of possible betas, including (i) raw and adjusted
betas for Aruba derived using two years of weekly measurements, five years of weekly
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measurements, and five years of monthly measurements, and (ii) raw and adjusted betas for peer
companies derived using the same measuring periods.458 Rather than selecting a beta, Dages
used the various candidates to generate nine possible WACCs. He then added into the mix the
WACCs used by the three financial advisors and WACCs from two analysts, for a total [*96] of
fourteen possibilities.459 After surveying these, he chose a WACC of 11%.460 His WACC
implied a beta of 1.33.461 This court has criticized similarly unstructured approaches to
valuation inputs.462
After I issued an evidentiary ruling precluding Dages from rendering an opinion on stock-based
compensation, Dages changed course and relied at trial on a set of projections that he had created
himself using industry growth rates and referenced in a footnote in his opening report.463
When he ran his discounted cash flow model with those projections and management's figures
for stock-based compensation expense, his model generated a value of $19.45 per share, forty
cents below his original opinion. At trial, Dages revised his view on Aruba's tax expenses and
agreed with management's use of a 4% tax rate for 2015 and 2016, although he continued to
endorse the use of a 30% tax rate for subsequent years rather than management's rate of 25%.464
This modification added thirty cents per share to his valuation, resulting in a figure of $19.75
per share. Serendipitously, that result fell just ten cents below the valuation in his opening report,
although reached using substantially different [*97] inputs. This is the fair value figure that
Aruba endorsed at post-trial argument.
Dages's final opinion of $19.75 per share comported with market evidence by falling between the
unaffected market price and the deal price. Its methodological underpinnings, however, provided
cause for concern, as did the meandering route by which Dages arrived at this figure.

D. Weighing the Valuation Methodologies
This decision has discussed each of the relevant methods of valuation that the parties presented.
HN14 Under the statute, the court must make a point estimate of fair value measured in dollars
and cents. When determining fair value, "[t]he Court of Chancery must exercise its considerable
discretion while also explaining, with reference to the economic facts before it and corporate
finance principles, why it is according a certain weight to a certain indicator of value."465
The forceful discussion of the efficient capital markets hypothesis in Dell and DFC indicates that
Aruba's unaffected market price is entitled to substantial weight.
[C]orporate finance theory reflects a belief that if an asset—such as the value of a company as
reflected in the trading value of its stock—can be subject to [*98] close examination and bidding
by many humans with an incentive to estimate its future cash flows value, the resulting collective
judgment as to value is likely to be highly informative . . . .466
HN15 "Market prices are typically viewed superior to other valuation techniques because,
unlike, e.g., a single person's discounted cash flow model, the market price should distill the
collective judgment of the many based on all the publicly available information about a given
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company and the value of its shares."467 "[I]n many circumstances a property interest is best
valued by the amount a buyer will pay for it" and "a well-informed, liquid trading market will
provide a measure of fair value superior to any estimate the court could impose."468
In this case, because Aruba's shares "were widely traded on a public market based upon a rich
information basis," the fair value of the petitioners' shares "would, to an economist, likely be best
reflected by the prices at which their shares were trading as of the merger."469 Aruba had "a
deep base of public shareholders" and "highly active trading," so "the price at which its shares
trade is informative of fair value."470 The [*99] unaffected thirty-day average market price of
Aruba's stock was $17.13 per share.
Dell and DFC teach that the deal price is also entitled to substantial weight. "In economics, the
value of something is what it will fetch in the market. That is true of corporations, just as it is
true of gold."471 For a court to give weight to the deal price, it need not be the most reliable
evidence of the Company's value as a going concern.472 This court has authority "to determine,
in its discretion, that the deal price is the most reliable evidence of fair value . . . , and that's
especially so in cases . . . where things like synergy gains or minority stockholder discounts are
not contested."473
The deal price in this case resulted from an arm's-length transaction involving a publicly traded
company without a controlling stockholder. The deal price in this case contained synergies, so it
logically exceeded fair value. There is also the fact that the petitioners failed to identify a bidder
who would pay more than HP. "Fair value entails at minimum a price some buyer is willing to
pay . . . ."474 Taken together, these propositions indicate that the deal price in this case
operates as a ceiling for fair [*100] value.
The Dell and DFC decisions recognize that a deal price may include synergies and endorse
deriving an indication of fair value from the deal price by deducting synergies.475 In this case,
the evidence shows that the deal generated significant synergies. Using the low-end synergy
range implies a standalone value of $21.08 per share. Using the high-end synergy range implies a
standalone value of $15.32 per share. This decision has adopted the midpoint of $18.20 per share
as its deal-price-less-synergies value.
This decision does not give any weight to the discounted cash flow analyses. As in Dell, "this
appraisal case does not present the classic scenario in which there is reason to suspect that
market forces cannot be relied upon to ensure fair treatment of the minority."476 Discounted
cash flow models are "often used in appraisal proceedings when the respondent company was
not public or was not sold in an open market check."477
The reason for that is not that an economist wouldn't consider the best estimate of a private
company's value to be the price it sold at in an open sale process of which all logical buyers were
given full information and an equal opportunity to compete. Rather, the [*101] reason is that if
such a process did not occur, corporate finance instructs that the value of the company to
potential buyers should be reflected in its ability to generate future cash flows.478

47

"But, a single person's own estimate of the cash flows are just that, a good faith estimate by a
single, reasonably informed person to predict the future. Thus, a singular discounted cash flow
model is often most helpful when there isn't an observable market price."479 When market
evidence is available, "the Court of Chancery should be chary about imposing the hazards that
always come when a law-trained judge is forced to make a point estimate of fair value based on
widely divergent partisan expert testimony."480
Marcus's discounted cash flow valuation of $32.57 per share diverged substantially from market
indications. His figure is nearly double Aruba's thirty-day average unaffected market price of
$17.13. It is approximately 32% higher than the deal price of $24.67 per share. In a transaction
involving a financial buyer that could be expected to generate few if any combinatorial
synergies, the Delaware Supreme Court recently emphasized the lack of reliability of a
discounted cash flow analysis that [*102] yielded a result that was 40% over the deal price.481
The transaction in this case generated substantial synergies.
Dages's initial discounted cash flow valuation of $19.85 and revised discounted cash flow
valuation of $19.75 fell nicely between the unaffected market price and the deal price. His
figures also landed close to HP's standalone discounted cash flow valuation of $18.98 and
Barclay's standalone discounted cash flow valuation of $19.93. The relative lack of
methodological rigor in the analysis, however, creates cause for concern about the strategic
selection of inputs to channel the result into this range.
The two probative indications of value in this case are the unaffected market price of $17.13 and
the deal-price-less-synergies value of approximately $18.20 per share. Using these indicators
nevertheless carries conceptual difficulties because HN16 "[t]he time for determining the value
of a dissenter's shares is the point just before the merger transaction 'on the date of the
merger.'"482 If the value of the corporation changes between the signing of the merger and the
closing, the fair value determination must be measured by the "operative reality" of the
corporation at the effective [*103] time of the merger.483
The unaffected market price provides direct evidence of the collective view of market
participants as to Aruba's fair value as a going concern during the period before the
announcement of the transaction, which could be different than Aruba's fair value as of closing.
The same disconnect exists for the deal price, which provides evidence of how the parties to the
merger agreement valued Aruba during the price negotiations, which could be different than
Aruba's fair value as of closing. Addressing a similar issue in the Union Illinois case, Chief
Justice Strine described the temporal gap as a "quibble" and "not a forceful objection," noting
that "[t]he negotiation of merger terms always and necessarily precedes consummation."484
Observing that "[n]othing in the record persuades me that [the company] was more valuable by
[closing] than it was when the Merger terms were set," he continued to use the deal price as an
indicator of value.485 Similarly in this case, neither side proved that Aruba's value had changed
materially by closing, so this decision sticks with the unaffected market price and the deal price
less synergies.
The difficult question is how to choose between, [*104] weigh, or otherwise exercise my
discretion non-abusively when evaluating the two probative valuation indications. The
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unaffected market price provides a direct measure of the collective judgment of numerous
market participants about Aruba's value as a going concern. The deal price less synergies
provides an indirect measure with two significant sources of uncertainty. One is the problem of
measurement error. Under the traditional view of the efficient capital markets hypothesis, errors
are randomly distributed and cancel out.486 My deal-price-less-synergies figure could have
errors at multiple levels. To cite just a few, I may have erred when making my case-specific
allocation of synergies to the sell-side. I might have misinterpreted the information that Aruba's
expert cited, or that data itself could contain sampling and measurement errors. The size of the
original synergy estimates might also be off, as could any number of individual estimates that
added up to the overarching estimates. After all, they were necessarily predictions about complex
matters. Perhaps errors at one level might counterbalance errors at another, but there is no way to
know, and the smaller number of judgments [*105] involved (compared to the number of trades
generating the market price) makes it more likely that the errors could skew the figure, just like a
small and undiversified portfolio can produce extreme results. The Delaware Supreme Court's
expressed preference in Dell and DFC for market indicators over discounted cash flow
valuations counsels in favor of preferring market indicators over the output of a similarly
judgment-laden exercise of backing out synergies.487
The other difficulty is that my deal-price-less-synergies figure continues to incorporate an
element of value resulting from the merger. HN17 When an acquirer purchases a widely traded
firm, the premium that an acquirer is willing to pay for the entire firm anticipates incremental
value both from synergies and from the reduced agency costs that result from unitary (or
controlling) ownership.488 Like synergies, the value created by reduced agency costs results
from the transaction and is not part of the going concern value of the firm.489 The value
belongs to the buyer, although the seller may extract a portion of it through negotiations.490
Eliminating shared synergies therefore only goes part of the [*106] way towards eliminating
"any element of value arising from the accomplishment or expectation of the merger."491 A
court also must eliminate the share of value that accrues from the reduced agency costs.492
For Aruba, using its unaffected market price provides the more straightforward and reliable
method for estimating the value of the entity as a going concern. I could strive to reach the same
endpoint by backing out shared synergies and a share of value for reduced agency costs, but both
steps are messy and provide ample opportunities for error. For Aruba, the unaffected market
price provides a direct estimate of the same endpoint.493 Rather than representing my own
fallible determination, it distills "the collective judgment of the many based on all the publicly
available information about a given company and the value of its shares."494 "[T]he price
produced by an efficient market is generally a more reliable assessment of fair value than the
view of a single analyst," particularly when a trial judge is playing the analyst's role.495
This approach does not elevate "market value" to the governing standard under the appraisal
statute. The governing standard for fair [*107] value under the appraisal statute remains the
entity's value as a going concern. For Aruba, the unaffected public market price provides the best
evidence of its value as a going concern.
In this case, the best evidence of Aruba's fair value as a going concern, exclusive of any value
derived from the merger, is its thirty-day average unaffected market price of $17.13 per share. I
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recognize that no one argued for this result. I also recognize that the resulting award is lower
than Aruba's proposed figure of $19.75 per share. That figure relied on its expert's discounted
cash flow analysis, which this decision has found unpersuasive.
HN18 "When . . . none of the parties establishes a value that is persuasive, the Court must
make a determination based on its own analysis."496 The appraisal statute requires that "the
Court shall determine the fair value of the shares."497 This means that I must reach my own,
independent determination of fair value.498 That determination is $17.13 per share.

III. CONCLUSION
The petitioners are awarded $17.13 per share. The legal rate of interest, compounded quarterly,
shall accrue on this amount from the date of closing until the date of payment.
The [*108] parties shall cooperate in preparing a final order. If the parties identify additional
issues that need to be resolved, they shall submit a joint letter within two weeks that explains the
issues and recommends a schedule for bringing this case to conclusion, at least at the trial court
level.
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me again.").

•

120
See JX 328; JX 367 (email from Aruba to Qatalyst advising it had "decided to terminate
discussions with [HP] at this time" and that it would "let [Qatalyst] know if discussions
resume").

•

121
JX 383 at 1, 3 (McKinsey report projecting "share gains in line with what is in the
business case (2.6-3.1% share gain in wired vs. 3% in the business case and
correspondingly 4.3-5.6% share gain in wireless vs. 7% in the business case)").

•

122
See JX 387 (internal Barclays email dated December 19: "HP wants to have our views on
value on Monday"); JX 389 (email from Barclays to HP on December 22 providing "the
deck we plan to review on our 10am conference call").

•

123
See PTO ¶¶ 51, 54; JX 224 (Aruba Board subcommittee minutes); Galvin Tr. 601.
Evercore was also advising in connection with the potential debt financing. See JX 286
(email from Francis to Orr and Galvin discussing fiscal year 2014 results ahead of
"meeting on the convertible market").

•

124
JX 325 at 1 (email from Galvin relaying conversation wherein he told Barclays banker
Aruba would not be executing the convertible offering and banker responded "in my
business, when this happens, either an exec is leaving the company or a major M&A
[transaction] is in process").

•

125
65

See, e.g., JX 335 at 2 (email from Barclays banker to Aruba management: "[W]e're
hearing (from non-Aruba sources) that HP has reinitiated dialogue with you" and "[w]e
want to be as helpful as we can."); id. at 1 (describing phone call in which Barclays
banker reminded Orr that "we helped you with the Barclay IT people, we walked away
from [the] Ruckus IPO when Galvin said it was competitive . . . , [and] we have done a
lot [o]f work to support you in the last 8 years"); id. (banker telling Orr that Barclays
"would be disappointed if the HP rumor is true and you do not work with us"); JX 384
(email between Barclays bankers: "I am trying to get back in front of the Aruba team.
Seems like we have given up on the HP side.").
•

126
PTO ¶ 53; JX 227 (minutes). See generally Galvin Tr. 594-96 (discussing share
repurchase program).

•

127
JX 226 at 1-2 (minutes).

•

128
PTO ¶ 133.

•

129
See id. ¶ 136.

•

130
JX 328.

•

131
See JX 373 at 1 (internal Aruba emails discussing share repurchase program); see also
Orr Tr. 448 (testifying that, in breaking off discussions, he considered that "[w]e have a
stock buy-back program that . . . we have to resume"); Galvin Tr. 595-96 (discussing the
share repurchase and stating "[w]e had a standard set of language that, when we
approached these things, that it may be depressed, it may be undervalued").

•

132
JX 389 at 16-17 (Barclays deck).

•

133
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Orr Tr. 454 (comparing analysts to "somebody [who] has decided to get out of a
relationship" because "the other party can learn how to cook, clean the floor, you know,
be available on the weekend, and so on. Something is always wrong."); see also JX 406 at
1 (email from Orr: "we simply cannot miss Q2 and have the stock tanked further, risking
employee morale and retention getting into an unrepairable state").
•

134
JX 378 at 2 (email among Aruba executives).

•

135
JX 374 at 1 (email from Jason Adler, analyst at William Blair & Company).

•

136
See JX 377 (email from Galvin recapping meeting).

•

137
PTO ¶ 154; JX 392 (correspondence between Orr and Neri scheduling dinner).

•

138
PTO ¶ 155.

•

139
JX 423 (email from Orr relaying conversation to Aruba management); see also Orr Tr.
524-25.

•

140
JX 423; see also Orr Tr. 527 ("We're saying that let's use this as a forcing function.").

•

141
JX 412 at 1. Warmenhoven disputed at trial whether he correctly understood Orr to be
saying that Whitman felt that Qatalyst, rather than Autonomy, was guilty. His deposition
transcript indicates that his counsel planted this idea. See Warmenhoven Tr. 336-40;
Warmenhoven Dep. 141-43 ("[Aruba counsel]: If you are going to move off of this,
would you mind if I clarify one point? [Verition counsel]: Okay, that's fine. [Aruba
counsel]: Mr. Warmenhoven, if you don't mind my interjecting -- The Witness: No, I
know where you're going. . . . That's how I interpreted it at that time. That's not right.
Meg [Whitman's] conviction was that Autonomy was guilty -- not Qatalyst -- that
Autonomy was guilty of fraud."). Aruba's counsel should not have influenced the
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substance of Warmenhoven's testimony during his deposition. Nor should counsel have
been reshaping Warmenhoven's recollection of the facts.
•

142
JX 412 at 1; see also Warmenhoven Tr. 247-49 (discussing JX 412); Orr Tr. 449-51
(same).

•

143
JX 412 at 1.

•

144
Id.; accord Warmenhoven Tr. 249-51; Orr Tr. 451 ("Obviously, the top of mind is the
person that I started out with, and that has been a trusted advisor to the company and to
me, and that was Stu [Francis].").

•

145
JX 413.

•

146
Id.; accord JX 414 (email from Orr to Warmenhoven: "I think Qatalyst will not be willing
to carve out fees for Stu [Francis]."); JX 426 at 2 (internal Aruba email summarizing
discussions with Francis concerning fees: "He started at Evercore 5 months ago and is
their first tech sector person. They want this deal to establish a presence in tech."); see
also PTO ¶ 46 ("J. Stuart Francis is a Senior Managing Director of Evercore. Mr. Francis
joined Evercore in the summer of 2014.").

•

147
JX 420 (email from Warmenhoven recounting discussion to Aruba Board and
management).

•

148
Id.

•

149
Id.; accord Warmenhoven Tr. 252-53 (Whitman told Warmenhoven "I don't care who
you get, but it can't be Qatalyst" and that "I'm not going to take into my boardroom a deal
proposed by Qatalyst"); id. at 341-45; Orr Tr. 530.
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•

150
JX 432 at 1 (email among Aruba management discussing negotiation of Qatalyst's fees).

•

151
JX 422 at 1 (email among Evercore senior bankers).

•

152
JX 427.

•

153
Id.

•

154
JX 428; accord JX 439 (congratulatory emails from two additional senior bankers).

•

155
JX 426 (email from Orr to Aruba management updating on negotiations with Qatalyst).
Orr expressed his opinion that Boutros "reacted so strongly cause (1) pride of their brand
(2) reaction to Stu [Francis] coming in[to] the picture [and] (3) protecting their fees." Id.
He noted that "[n]one of the above related to the benefits of [A]ruba!" Id.

•

156
JX 430.

•

157
JX 434 at 1.

•

158
JX 436 at 1. See generally Warmenhoven Tr. 344-45 (recounting process of attempting to
ingratiate Qatalyst with HP).

•

159
JX 437 at 1; see also JX 438 (Quattrone sending Warmenhoven what he described as a
cordial rejection by Whitman of a social invitation as evidence that she had no bias
against Qatalyst and was bluffing to gain leverage in the negotiations).
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•

160
JX 440 at 1 (email from Orr to Aruba management).

•

161
JX 447 at 1 (email from Whitman to Quattrone dated January 28, 2015: "Will call you
tomorrow.").

•

162
Whitman Dep. 127-28.

•

163
PTO ¶ 47; see also JX 5 (executed engagement letter); JX 232 (Aruba Board minutes
authorizing Evercore engagement).

•

164
JX 398 at 1-2 (cover email for internal deck seeking HP Board approval); JX 805 at 12
(internal HP deck).

•

165
JX 455 at 1 (email from Orr to Aruba management and Qatalyst recounting call).

•

166
JX 454 (internal Barclays email summarizing Johansson's relay of the call).

•

167
Id.

•

168
JX 452 at 3 ("Indicative Non-Binding Proposal").

•

169
Id. at 3-4.

•

170
JX 782 at 4 (Barclays deck).
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•

171
Id.

•

172
JX 461 at 2 (internal Evercore email relaying what Aruba's General Counsel anticipated
to be the timeline of events).

•

173
JX 233 (minutes); JX 910 at 3 (Aruba 8-K comparing October Projections and February
Projections); Galvin Tr. 558-63 (discussing process of extending ordinary course sixmonth budgeting projections out to three years to create February Projections).

•

174
Proxy at 51.

•

175
JX 466 at 1-2 (internal Aruba email distributing report).

•

176
Id. at 1.

•

177
Id.

•

178
JX 470 at 1 (email from Francis to other Evercore bankers: "I am thinking about the
analyst downgrades and if there [is] anything we can do.").

•

179
Id.

•

180
JX 794 at 14 (Evercore deck).

•

181
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JX 234 (minutes); accord Warmenhoven Tr. 261 (testifying the Aruba Board came to the
figure because "[w]e wanted to reaffirm that we thought there was great value there,
meaning they should bid higher, but we felt like if we put a 3 in the first digit and started
at 30, that they might conclude that's too big a gap to close and stop discussion").
•

182
JX 477 at 1 (Barclays email relaying counteroffer to HP).

•

183
Id.

•

184
Id.

•

185
JX 484 at 1.

•

186
Id.

•

187
Proxy at 51.

•

188
JX 491 (email from Barclays to HP recounting exchange).

•

189
Id. Ubiquiti announced financial results on February 5, 2015 that beat the consensus
estimates, and its stock rose by 14%. See JX 639 (Ubiquiti earnings transcript); JX 902
(Ubiquiti 8-K announcing results).

•

190
JX 491; accord JX 488 at 4 (internal Evercore emails confirming change in shares
outstanding and suggesting repurchases caused the change).

•

191
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JX 798 at 2 (Barclays slide entitled "Impact of New Share Count and B/S Data on Offer
Price").
•

192
Id.

•

193
JX 497 (internal HP email from Johansson); accord JX 805 at 12 (timeline showing
"02/08 — HP offer $24.00 and present as best and final. [Aruba] provide new shares
outstanding and cash information supporting paying $24.67 at the same enterprise
value.").

•

194
Proxy at 52.

•

195
Id.; accord JX 494 at 2 (email from Neri to Whitman summarizing conversation).

•

196
JX 496 at 1 (email from Francis to Aruba management transmitting revised proposal:
"They did not move up just as Meg [Whitman] said to you.").

•

197
Id. at 3.

•

198
Id.

•

199
Id.

•

200
JX 235 at 1-2 (minutes); accord Proxy at 52; Boutros Dep. 219-20 (describing lack of
interest from other strategic bidders); Warmenhoven Dep. 104 (same).

•

201
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JX 235 at 1-2; see also Warmenhoven Tr. 265-66 (testifying prospects of standing alone
"were looking extremely challenging" because the "core market" was "going to zero
growth" and Aruba was experiencing difficult "market conditions" and "competitive
positioning").
•

202
JX 235 at 1-2; accord Proxy at 52; Warmenhoven Tr. 263.

•

203
JX 237 (minutes).

•

204
Id.; accord Proxy at 52. See generally Orr Tr. 466-70 (discussing negotiation of new
employment agreement with HP).

•

205
JX 505 at 1 (internal Evercore email).

•

206
Id.

•

207
Id. (reproduced in full, ellipses in original); see also Reisenberg Dep. 248-54 (discussing
JX 505).

•

208
JX 866 (article).

•

209
JX 510 (internal Qatalyst email); see also Boutros Dep. 206-07 ("[N]ow the stock is
going to trade based on takeover speculation and no more based on fundamentals, pure
fundamentals. There is a lot of noise.").

•

210
Proxy at 53.

•

211
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JX 152; accord JX 155 (JMP Securities report stating "[w]e believe the acquisition would
be a logical step for HP" and anticipating "that Aruba's board would look for an
acquisition price in the $23-$27 range").
•

212
JX 514 at 1, 3 (internal Barclays email discussing results).

•

213
JX 156 (Macquarie Research report).

•

214
JX 159 (William Blair report).

•

215
JX 157 (Jeffries report).

•

216
JX 168 at 3-4 (Citi report).

•

217
Proxy at 53.

•

218
JX 517 at 3 (Qatalyst board deck).

•

219
Id. at 6.

•

220
Proxy at 53.

•

221
Id.

•

222
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JX 520 (internal Barclays email).
•

223
JX 806 at 14 (Barclays deck).

•

224
Id. at 15.

•

225
JX 238 at 1-3 (HP Board minutes).

•

226
JX 811 at 19 (Qatalyst deck).

•

227
JX 812 at 14 (Evercore deck).

•

228
Proxy at 53.

•

229
JX 521 at 1; see also Boutros Dep. 270 (testifying he understood Whitman to be
amenable to "resolution of the issues she had and the feelings she had towards Qatalyst").

•

230
JX 521 at 2.

•

231
JX 522 at 2 ("[W]e do want to have a good relationship with you, and we are willing to
explore alternatives to our normal course of business in marketing this deal, if I can have
your assurance that by doing so, we will have a 'clean slate' with you and HP immediately
going forward.").

•

232
Id. at 3. Aruba and HP announced the merger before Whitman responded. Qatalyst held
off on publicity efforts pending her response. On March 3, 2015, Whitman told Quattrone
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he should "go ahead and do whatever communication feels right to you under the
circumstances." Id. at 1-2. On March 4, Qatalyst sent out a blast announcing its role in
the deal. JX 541 at 2. Whitman also told Quattrone that she was willing to "get together .
. . and discuss the path forward." JX 522 at 2. The meeting eventually took place in
October 2015. Afterwards, Quattrone sent Whitman a follow-up email which emphasized
that he was "look[ing] forward to next steps in building a strong long-term relationship
between our firms." JX 572 at 1-2.
•

233
JX 907 (8-K announcing signing).

•

234
Id. at 3-4, 73-78.

•

235
Id. at 4.

•

236
Proxy at 1.

•

237
See 8 Del. C. § 251.

•

238
Aruba Networks, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (May 1, 2015). Although the parties
did not submit this filing as an exhibit, the Delaware Supreme Court has taken judicial
notice of public filings in an appraisal case and relied on them for the truth of their
contents. See, e.g., DFC, 172 A.3d at 351 n.7.

•

239
JX 914 at 2 (8-K announcing closing).

•

240
See PTO ¶¶ 11, 17.

•

241
Dkt. 56 at 11-13 (motion opening brief).
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•

242
Dkt. 65.

•

243
See Dkt. 125 (transcript and rulings on motion to strike).

•

244
See Dkt. 153 (transcript and rulings on renewed motion to strike).

•

245
Dell, 2017 Del. LEXIS 518, 2017 WL 6375829, at *1.

•

246
DFC, 172 A.3d at 370-71.

•

247
Dell, 2017 Del. LEXIS 518, 2017 WL 6375829, at *24.

•

248
2017 Del. LEXIS 518, [WL] at *13 (quoting Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett, 564 A.2d
1137, 1142-43 (Del. 1989)).

•

249
Id. (quoting Cavalier Oil, 564 A.2d at 1144).

•

250
Id. (quoting Cavalier Oil, 564 A.2d at 1144).

•

251
Glob. GT LP v. Golden Telecom, Inc. (Golden Telecom Trial), 993 A.2d 497, 507 (Del.
Ch. 2010) (Strine, V.C.), aff'd, 11 A.3d 214 (Del. 2010); accord DFC, 172 A.3d at 368
("[B]y valuing the company on its value as a 'going concern,' the [Delaware Supreme]
Court [in Cavalier Oil] seemed to require the excision of any value that might be
attributable to expected synergies by a buyer."); M.P.M. Enters., Inc. v. Gilbert, 731 A.2d
790, 797 (Del. 1999) ("[S]ection 262(h) requires that the Court of Chancery discern the
going concern value of the company irrespective of the synergies involved in a merger.").
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•

252
Dell, 2017 Del. LEXIS 518, 2017 WL 6375829, at *14.

•

253
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 713 (Del. 1983).

•

254
Dell, 2017 Del. LEXIS 518, 2017 WL 6375829, at *15 n.105.

•

255
2017 Del. LEXIS 518, [WL] at *15.

•

256
DFC, 172 A.3d at 372.

•

257
By "traditional," I mean a framing of the efficient capital markets hypothesis consistent
with Eugene Fama's seminal work and its baseline Chicago-school assumptions. See
Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25
J. Fin. 383 (1970).
At the trial court level in Dell, I cited some points of entry into a significant and growing
body of literature that raises question about the assumptions undergirding the traditional
model, which suggest a need for greater nuance. See In re Appraisal of Dell, Inc. (Dell
Trial Fair Value), 2016 Del. Ch. LEXIS 81, 2016 WL 3186538, at *25 n.16 (Del. Ch.
May 31, 2016), rev'd in pertinent part sub nom. Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Glob. Event
Driven Master Fund Ltd, A.3d , 2017 Del. LEXIS 518, 2017 WL 6375829 (Del. Dec.
14, 2017). In the legal field, much of this work has responded to the United States
Supreme Court's relatively high-level framing of the efficient capital markets hypothesis
as the cornerstone for using the fraud-on-the-market theory to create a presumption of
reliance in securities fraud actions. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241-42,
243-44, 246, 108 S. Ct. 978, 99 L. Ed. 2d 194 (1988). The field of behavioral economics
has yielded particularly powerful insights. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Theories,
Assumptions, and Securities Regulation: Market Efficiency Revisited, 140 U. Pa. L. Rev.
851 (1992); Larry E. Ribstein, Fraud on a Noisy Market, 10 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 137
(2006); Jeff Schwartz, Fairness, Utility, and Market Risk, 89 Or. L. Rev. 175 (2010).
Noise trading theory and chaos theory have yielded additional insights. See, e.g.,
Lawrence A. Cunningham, From Random Walks to Chaotic Crashes: The Linear
Genealogy of the Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis, 62 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 546
(1994); Lawrence A. Cunningham, Capital Market Theory, Mandatory Disclosure, and
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Price Discovery, 51 Wash & Lee L. Rev. 843 (1994); Andrei Schleifer & Lawrence H.
Summers, The Noise Trader Approach to Finance, 4 J. Econ. Persp. 19 (1990).
Perhaps future appraisal litigants will retain experts on market efficiency, as is common
in federal securities actions, and maybe future appraisal decisions will consider subtler
aspects of the efficient capital markets hypothesis. This decision does not provide any
opportunity for doing so. In its supplemental submissions on the implications of Dell and
DFC, the petitioners alluded to potential objections to the Delaware Supreme Court's
framing of the efficient capital markets hypothesis, but they did not develop those
objections in any meaningful way. Absent a case-specific expert opinion supported by
credible evidence and the weight of social-science research, I do not believe a trial judge
has the flexibility to disregard the Delaware Supreme Court's framing of the efficient
capital markets hypothesis.
•

258
Dell, 2017 Del. LEXIS 518, 2017 WL 6375829, at *17; DFC, 172 A.3d at 369-70.

•

259
DFC, 172 A.3d at 370.

•

260
Id. at 369-70.

•

261
Id. at 367.

•

262
Dell, 2017 Del. LEXIS 518, 2017 WL 6375829, at *17.

•

263
Id. (internal quotation marks and footnote omitted).

•

264
2017 Del. LEXIS 518, [WL] at *1 (reversing trial court's fair value determination
because, among other reasons, "[h]ere, the trial court gave no weight to Dell's stock price
because it found its market to be inefficient. But the evidence suggests that the market for
Dell's shares was actually efficient and, therefore, likely a possible proxy for fair value.").

•

265
80

2017 Del. LEXIS 518, [WL] at *17 (internal quotation marks omitted).
•

266
2017 Del. LEXIS 518, [WL] at *3 (footnotes omitted).

•

267
DFC, 172 A.3d at 352.

•

268
Id. at 372.

•

269
See, e.g., Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Tr. Funds, 568 U.S. 455, 471 n.6, 133 S. Ct.
1184, 185 L. Ed. 2d 308 (2013) (noting trial court relying on "unchallenged expert report
. . . expressly found that the market for Amgen's stock was efficient"); IBEW Local 98
Pension Fund v. Best Buy Co., Inc., 818 F.3d 775, 779 (8th Cir. 2016) (noting "plaintiffs
submitted a report by their expert" to support their "motion for class certification [which]
relied on Basic's fraud-on-the-market presumption"); Schleicher v. Wendt, 618 F.3d 679,
682 (7th Cir. 2010) ("A financial economist concluded, in an expert report that the
district judge credited, that the market for Conseco's shares was efficient . . . and that
investors therefore can use the fraud-on-the-market doctrine as a replacement for personspecific proof of reliance and causation."). See generally 7AA Charles Alan Wright,
Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1781.1 (3d ed.
2005).

•

270
See DFC, 172 A.3d at 352-53 (citing analyst reports and petitioners' and respondent's
expert reports on valuation).

•

271
See Dell, 2017 Del. LEXIS 518, 2017 WL 6375829, at *3 nn.9-15 (citing public filings
with SEC and report of Dell's valuation expert).

•

272
See Marcus Tr. 59 (Verition's expert testifying that "the stock was trading well"); Marcus
Dep. 198-99 (Verition's expert testifying that Aruba was "actively traded" as contrasted
with "a company that, you know, is thinly traded" and where "there might be some
efficiency issues"); see also Aruba Networks, Inc., Notification of Removal from Listing
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and/or Registration Under Section 12(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Form
25) (May 19, 2015).
•

273
See Marcus Opening Report Ex. 3-1 ("Summary of Analyst Price Targets"); Marcus Tr.
59 (Verition's expert noting that "[t]here was lots of analyst coverage"); Marcus Dep.
198-99 (Verition's expert noting that Aruba had "30 plus analysts covering them").

•

274
JX 164 (BMO Capital Markets report containing trading statistics); see also Dell, 2017
Del. LEXIS 518, 2017 WL 6375829, at *3 n.10 (citing 5 Alan R. Bromberg et al.,
Bromberg [*52] & Lowenfels on Securities Fraud § 7:484 (2d ed. June 2017 Update)
("Turnover measured by average weekly trading of 2% or more of the outstanding shares
would justify a strong presumption that the market for the security is an efficient one.")).

•

275
See Dell, 2017 Del. LEXIS 518, 2017 WL 6375829, at *3 (stating that Dell's spread of
approximately 0.08% was indicative of market efficiency).

•

276
2017 Del. LEXIS 518, [WL] at *1; see also DFC, 172 A.3d at 367-68.

•

277
See, e.g., JX 245; Dkt. 162 at 13 (Petitioners' Opening Post-Trial Brief containing stock
price chart); Dkt. 188 Ex. A (publicly available stock-price data for Aruba & S&P 500).

•

278
Dell, 2017 Del. LEXIS 518, 2017 WL 6375829, at *3.

•

279
2017 Del. LEXIS 518, [WL] at *1; see also DFC, 172 A.3d at 367-68.

•

280
777 A.2d 242, 248 (Del. 2001).

•

281
See JX 47 (Barclays report); JX 48 (Janney Capital Markets report).
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•

282
JX 47 at 1.

•

283
JX 259 at 2-3 (email collecting analyst coverage).

•

284
See JX 260 at 5-6 (email thread among management discussing market reaction); JX 267
(Orr reporting to the Aruba Board: "[W]e, as an executive team, are finally sick of wall st
discrediting our tremendous come back in revenue growth because they said we are not
as profitable as Ubiquiti (give me a break!)."); JX 269 at 2 (Orr email to Galvin:
"Between you and me, if we do all these and our stock price stays $13-20, you and I fail
miserably. I don't know why we are doing all these [sic] tough stuff. I really don't."); see
also Warmenhoven Tr. 235 ("It was very frustrating for the management team, I must
say. I mean, in -- in fiscal year 2014, they had 20 percent year-over-year growth, and we
were delivering everything to the street, and the stock really didn't move.").

•

285
See JX 280 (internal Aruba deck on Project Greyhound).

•

286
JX 273 at 2 (draft internal talking points); see also Orr Tr. 486 (suggesting Project
Greyhound was motivated, in part, by sense stock price "does not reflect what we believe
is our commitment to deliver to what the analysts and the investors want us to do");
Galvin Tr. 597-98 (acknowledging Aruba undertook Project Greyhound, in part, because
"we did have pressure from Wall Street to improve what we were dropping to the bottom
line"); id. at 600 (agreeing "Greyhound was initiated because there was a perception that
the company value was not adequately reflected in the stock price").

•

287
JX 828 (press release announcing results).

•

288
Compare JX 59 at 2 and JX 62 at 1 with JX 61 at 1 and JX 64 at 1. See also JX 309 at 7
(Aruba Board deck summarizing analyst reports and noting that fifteen analysts increased
their target price).

•

289
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JX 245.
•

290
Galvin Tr. 602-03 (testifying that, with respect to Project Greyhound, "there were things
that would play out over time"); Galvin Dep. 82 (agreeing "that it would take a couple of
quarters after announcement of the initiation of the transformation to see the real results
and have the results on Wall Street").

•

291
JX 638 at 3 (transcript from Aruba earnings call).

•

292
JX 363 (internal HP email summarizing the earnings announcement).

•

293
JX 245.

•

294
JX 638 at 13 (Galvin stating Aruba was "just being prudent in a mixed environment" and
"[n]ot getting ahead of our skis"); see also JX 355 at 1 (email from Galvin to Aruba
Board: "our guide is shaping up to be more cautious than our strong results").

•

295
See JX 357 at 1 (Neri: "We told our story and we were on point."); JX 360 (email from
HP's Senior Vice President of Corporate Development: "I thought the results were pretty
good. . . . They blew past the revenue expectations for the quarter. But they guided soft,
below consensus."); JX 780 at 2 (internal HP deck discussing Aruba's November earnings
announcement and commenting that "[t]he softer guidance did not cause us to change our
financial model")

•

296
See JX 357 at 1 (internal email among members of the HP deal team: "They are down 8%
after hours though because of guidance below consensus for this quarter (although it
looks like the range of guidance is still within expectations). Good time to pull the trigger
and snap them up I would say."); Hardegree Dep. 193 (observing that the stock price drop
"probably did, on balance" put HP "in a more tacti[cally] advantaged position").

•

297
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See 777 A.2d at 243 ("In this appeal, we consider the fiduciary duties owed by a parent
corporation to the subsidiary's minority stockholders in the context of a 'short-form'
merger.").
•

298
Dell Trial Fair Value, 2016 Del. Ch. LEXIS 81, 2016 WL 3186538, at *32.

•

299
Id.

•

300
See 2016 Del. Ch. LEXIS 81, [WL] at *1-2, *34.

•

301
See 2016 Del. Ch. LEXIS 81, [WL] at *34.

•

302
See 2016 Del. Ch. LEXIS 81, [WL] at *34-35 (citing JX 96; JX 110; JX 137; JX 170; JX
226; JX 344; JX 530).

•

303
Dell, 2017 Del. LEXIS 518, 2017 WL 6375829, at *19 ("In short, the record does not
adequately support the Court of Chancery's conclusion that the market for Dell's stock
was inefficient and that a valuation gap in the Company's market trading price existed in
advance of the lengthy market check, an error that contributed to the trial court's decision
to disregard the deal price.").

•

304
2017 Del. LEXIS 518, [WL] at *16 & n.112 (citing analyst reports discussing Dell's
M&A activity).

•

305
2017 Del. LEXIS 518, [WL] at *17 (citing DFC, 172 A.3d 346). Legal historians can
debate how longstanding that endorsement had been. See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc.
(Technicolor II), 684 A.2d 289, 301 (Del. 1996) (observing, in context of appraisal of
publicly traded company following arm's-length deal, that "the market price of shares
may not be representative of fair value" (internal quotation marks omitted)); Rapid-Am.
Corp. v. Harris, 603 A.2d 796, 806 (Del. 1992) (describing the Court of Chancery's
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rejection of market value in Chicago Corp. v. Munds, 20 Del. Ch. 142, 172 A. 452 (Del.
Ch. 1934), and observing that "Munds' succinct evaluation of the market has lost none of
its luster"); see also Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc. (Technicolor I), 542 A.2d 1182,
1187 n.8 (Del. 1988) ("Information and insight not communicated to the market may not
be reflected in stock prices; thus, minority shareholders being cashed out may be
deprived of part of the true investment value of their shares. The issue we are addressing
is not the manipulation of the transaction, nor the suppression or misstatement of material
information by insiders defrauding the market. Instead, we recognize that the majority
may have insight into their company's future based primarily on bits and pieces of
nonmaterial information that have value as a totality." (citations omitted)). See generally
Implicit Minority Discount, supra, at 8 ("Delaware appraisal law has never been
particularly friendly to the idea that stock market prices always accurately represent a
proportional share of the value of the enterprise as a going concern."). If the lens is
broadened to take in fiduciary duty cases, the longstanding nature of the endorsement
becomes even more debatable. See, e.g., Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361,
1384 (Del. 1995) (reaffirming the Delaware Supreme Court's recognition of the threat of
substantive coercion, defined as "the risk that shareholders will mistakenly accept an
underpriced offer because they disbelieve management's representations of intrinsic
value" (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Paramount Communications, Inc.
v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 n.12 (Del. 1989) ("Thus, we endorse the Chancellor's
conclusion that it is not a breach of faith for directors to determine that the present stock
market price of shares is not representative of true value or that there may indeed be
several market values for any corporation's stock."); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d
858, 875-76 (Del. 1985) ("[I]n the absence of other sound valuation information, the fact
of a premium [over market price] alone does not provide an adequate basis upon which to
assess the fairness of an offering price. . . . Using market price as a basis for concluding
that the premium adequately reflected the true value of the Company was a clearly faulty,
indeed fallacious, premise, as the defendants' own evidence demonstrates."), overruled on
other grounds by Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695 (Del. 2009). See generally Bernard
Black & Reinier Kraakman, Delaware's Takeover Law: The Uncertain Search for Hidden
Value, 96 Nw. U. L. Rev. 521 (2002) (surveying Delaware takeover decisions and
explaining their reliance on a theory of hidden value inconsistent with the efficient capital
markets hypothesis). If the management-buyout in Dell had instead been an unsolicited,
all-cash, all-shares offer at the deal price, I have no doubt that the Dell board of directors
could have defended against that offer based on management's belief in the considerably
greater long-term value of the company. See Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16
A.3d 48, 108-13 (Del. Ch. 2011).
Setting temporal characterizations aside, I do not question the authority of the Delaware
Supreme Court to endorse a traditional framing of the efficient capital markets hypothesis
as a method of assessing the reliability of market prices in appraisal proceedings. Once
the Delaware Supreme Court has done so, the obligation of a trial judge is to adhere to
that endorsement and its implications.
•

306

86

Dell, 2017 Del. LEXIS 518, 2017 WL 6375829, at *25.
•

307
See 2017 Del. LEXIS 518, [WL] at *17 ("The record before us provides no rational,
factual basis for such a 'valuation gap.'"); id. ("There is also no evidence in the record that
investors were 'myopic' or shortsighted."). The senior tribunal believed that, without any
evidence, I "presumed" that "'investor myopia' and hangover from the Company's 'nearly
$14 billion investment in its transformation, which had not yet begun to generate the
anticipated results,' produced a 'valuation gap'" and this "presumption contributed to the
trial court's decision to assign no weight to Dell's stock price or deal price." 2017 Del.
LEXIS 518, [WL] at *16 (quoting Dell Trial Fair Value, 2016 Del. Ch. LEXIS 81, 2016
WL 3186538, at *32, *34).
I did not use the term "presumption," and I regret that poor drafting on my part seemingly
created the impression that I had applied a presumption of some sort. I personally thought
I was relying on record evidence that took the form of contemporaneous assessments by
knowledgeable insiders about investors' growing short-term focus and a divergence
between the trading price and indications of fundamental value. See Dell Trial Fair
Value, 2016 Del. Ch. LEXIS 81, 2016 WL 3186538, at *2 (discussing divergence
between management's internal valuation and the market price, including Mr. Dell's
testimony that the market just "didn't get" Dell (Tr. 409) and his belief that, in spite of
Dell's transformation, "Dell [was] still seen as a PC business" (JX 44 at 1)); id.
(discussing management's hiring consultants to address market misperception (JX 46 at
1)); 2016 Del. Ch. LEXIS 81, [WL] at *4 (discussing Mr. Dell's assessment of
divergence between short-term results and long-term value (JX 109 at 7; JX 110 at 1));
id. (discussing management's reports to board regarding short-term challenges and need
to "sacrifice short term results" to create long-term value (JX 96 at 2; JX 97 at 16)); 2016
Del. Ch. LEXIS 81, [WL] at *5 (discussing JP Morgan report explaining that Dell's
recent earnings misses "have put investors in a 'wait and see mode' with increased focus
on quarter-by-quarter execution and improved visibility" (JX 137 at 7)); 2016 Del. Ch.
LEXIS 81, [WL] at *7 (discussing views of JPMorgan and Goldman Sachs regarding
factors contributing to low market valuation that appeared disconnected from
fundamentals (JX 170)); 2016 Del. Ch. LEXIS 81, [WL] at *9 (discussing Mr. Dell's
reasons for proposing a going-private transaction including that his initiatives would be
"poorly received by the public markets" and that they "could best be accomplished in an
environment without quarterly earnings pressure" (JX 231 at 2)); 2016 Del. Ch. LEXIS
81, [WL] at *19 (discussing buyout group presentations to financing sources and ratings
agencies, including management's explanation that poor short-term performance had
resulted from "conscious trade-offs to reposition and transform the company" (JX 660 at
32)); 2016 Del. Ch. LEXIS 81, [WL] at *17 (comparing analyst response to results which
focused on quarterly earnings miss with Boston Consulting Group's internal analysis
concluding that Dell's long-term earning power would not be adversely affected (JX
536)); 2016 Del. Ch. LEXIS 81, [WL] at *19 (comparing International Data
Corporation's response to quarterly results with buyout group's long-term projections to
lenders and related assessment of company (JX 669; JX 678)); 2016 Del. Ch. LEXIS 81,
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[WL] at *34-35 (summarizing evidence of valuation gap, including JX 96; JX 109; JX
110; JX 137; JX 170; JX 226; JX 344; JX 530).
That said, I do not question the Delaware Supreme Court's authority to elevate the
importance for a fair value determination of a trading price generated by a market with
attributes associated with semi-strong form efficiency. I also do not question the
Delaware Supreme Court's authority to hold that a trial court should require evidence
sufficient to make findings undermining market efficiency before considering and
regarding as persuasive case-specific evidence of the views of knowledgeable insiders.
See Dell, 2017 Del. LEXIS 518, 2017 WL 6375829, at *17 (observing that I did not
make any findings inconsistent with the premises of market efficiency, such as findings
that "Dell lacked a vast and diffuse base of public stockholders, that information about
the Company was sparse or restricted, that there was not an active trading market for
Dell's shares, or that Dell had a controlling stockholder—or that the market for its stock
lacked any of the hallmarks of an efficient market").
•

308
In re Appraisal of DFC Glob. Corp. (DFC Trial), 2016 Del. Ch. LEXIS 103, 2016 WL
3753123, at *22 (Del. Ch. July 8, 2016), rev'd sub nom. DFC Glob. Corp. v. Muirfield
Value P'rs, L.P., 172 A.3d 346 (Del. 2017).

•

309
Id. (citing Barner Tr. 533-37 and JX 428 at 16).

•

310
DFC, 172 A.3d at 372.

•

311
Id. at 373.

•

312
Id. at 374 n.145. To the extent a buyer bases its assessment on synergistic gains or other
aspects of value that would not exist but for the transaction, the Delaware Supreme
Court's "candid" observation regarding tension with the statutory standard makes sense to
me. To the extent that a buyer is assessing the target's standalone value in its pre-deal
configuration, it is not clear to me why any tension would exist. I personally would
regard the beliefs of knowledgeable market participants, including the buyer, as relevant
evidence of fair value. See In re Appraisal of Dole Food Co., Inc., 114 A.3d 541 (Del.
Ch. 2014) (ordering production of valuation materials prepared by appraisal petitioners
when deciding whether to purchase or sell shares of the subject company's stock). The
market price is, after all, merely an aggregation of the views of knowledgeable market
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participants. Id. at 559 ("The market price . . . represents an aggregation of the views that
many lay people hold about the value of a stock."); see also DFC, 172 A.3d at 367
(discussing "the collective judgment of value embodied in a market price"). Nor would
one need to exclude the possibility of downside risk when evaluating the buyer's
valuation, to the extent that the buyer had not already taken that risk into account. A court
could consider evidence showing that the buyer's assessment was overly optimistic. In the
past, courts deciding appraisal cases have considered conceptually similar valuation
indications. Chancellor Allen considered the fact that "knowledgeable officers and
directors all sold their stock" at the transaction price. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc.,
1990 Del. Ch. LEXIS 259, 1990 WL 161084, at *32 (Del. Ch. Oct. 19, 1990) (Allen, C.),
aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 634 A.2d 345 (Del. 1993). Chancellor
Chandler considered third-party offers to purchase corporate assets, such as a wholly
owned subsidiary whose operations were not affected by the merger giving rise to
appraisal rights. See Ryan v. Tad's Enters., Inc., 709 A.2d 682, 702 (Del. Ch. 1996)
(considering offers to purchase one of corporation's two remaining businesses four
months after the merger, one year after the merger, and two years after the merger).
That said, I do not question the Delaware Supreme Court's authority to instruct the trial
courts that when determining fair value, they should give less weight to the views of
individual market participants, such as the buyer, and more weight to the collective views
of many market participants, aggregated through trading, or the information generated by
a sale process.
•

313
JX 466 at 1-2 (internal Aruba email distributing report).

•

314
Id. at 1 (email from Aruba General Counsel suggesting the stock price "reflects the
misconception that we missed. We actually beat guidance but no one knows that yet").

•

315
The idea of announcing the merger along with Aruba's strong quarterly results came from
Aruba management, not HP. When Whitman and Neri first re-engaged with Orr at dinner
on January 21, 2015, Orr suggested announcing the deal at an industry conference at the
beginning of March. JX 423 (email from Orr relaying exchange to Aruba management).
When Johansson contacted Orr at the end of January to notify him HP intended to bid
imminently, Orr accelerated the timeline, proposing "getting a deal announced by
[Aruba's] earnings on Feb 26." JX 454 (internal Barclays email summarizing Johansson's
relay of the call). When Evercore later attempted to negotiate with HP's banker, Evercore
again "emphasized that [Aruba would] like to announce [the] deal at or before the
[Aruba] earnings announcement" because Aruba was "afraid stock runs like Ubiquiti's
did which could make the deal more challenging from the [Aruba] perspective." JX 491
(email from Barclays to HP recounting exchange).
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•

316
See, e.g., DFC Trial, 2016 Del. Ch. LEXIS 103, 2016 WL 3753123, at *13
("[D]iscouraging financial results [were] issued on April 2, 2014, the same day the
transaction was announced."); In re Dollar Thrifty S'holder Litig., 14 A.3d 573, 591 (Del.
Ch. Sept. 8, 2010) (Strine, V.C.) ("Dollar Thrifty's advisors were suspicious that Hertz
wanted to use the deal to cover up what would be an otherwise disappointing earnings
announcement, but eventually concluded that Frissora's eagerness was attributable to a
normal desire to announce the deal in conjunction with an earnings release."); In re Trans
World Airlines, Inc. S'holders Litig., 1988 Del. Ch. LEXIS 139, 1988 WL 111271, at *4
(Del. Ch. Oct. 21, 1988) ("The proposal now under consideration was announced . . . the
same day on which the Company announced very favorable financial results for the first
quarter of 1988."), abrogated on other grounds by Kahn v. Lynch Communication Sys.,
638 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994); see also Boutros Dep. 203 ("[I]t's very customary, very, very
customary, if you're pursuing an M&A transaction and it's close to being done, . . . and
you have an earnings release, to make the two concurrent, because these are two material
events that will impact the stock price, and the last thing you want to do is release
material information piecemeal to your shareholders."); cf. In re Smurfit-Stone Container
Corp. S'holder Litig., 2011 Del. Ch. LEXIS 79, 2011 WL 2028076, at *8 (Del. Ch. May
20, 2011) ("[The bidder] threatened to suspend the merger discussions if the proposed
transaction could not be finalized before the end of the weekend and the release of both
companies' earnings announcements the following week.").

•

317
HP agreed to this course of action, which favored HP's interests. HP also may have
leaked news of the deal to further mask the significance of Aruba's strong earnings. On
February 25, 2015, one day before Aruba was scheduled to announce its earnings,
Bloomberg News ran a story on the merger. JX 866 (article). Qatalyst speculated
internally that HP had leaked the news so that Aruba's "results and subsequent stock price
reaction won't be easy to measure." JX 510. Aruba's stock price jumped from $18.37 to
$22.24. Proxy at 53.

•

318
Dell, 2017 Del. LEXIS 518, 2017 WL 6375829, at *18

•

319
Dell, 2017 Del. LEXIS 518, 2017 WL 6375829, at *17.

•

320
DFC, 172 A.3d at 370 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

•

321
90

But cf. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Good Finance, Bad Economics: An
Analysis of the Fraud-on-the-Market Theory, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 1059, 1084-85 (1990)
(explaining that efficient markets may process different types of information at different
rates and with different effects). Perhaps in an appropriate case an expert could opine that
the order in which information was released or the fact that information was bundled
together had some meaningful effect. No one made that argument or offered that opinion
here. Absent a case-specific expert opinion supported by credible evidence and the
weight of social-science research, I do not believe a trial judge has the flexibility to
disregard the Delaware Supreme Court's framing of the implications of the efficient
capital markets hypothesis.
•

322
JX 659.

•

323
Dell, 2017 Del. LEXIS 518, 2017 WL 6375829, at *22.

•

324
Golden Telecom, Inc. v. Glob. GT LP, 11 A.3d 214, 217-18 (Del. 2010) (quoting 8 Del.
C. § 262(h)).

•

325
Id. at 218.

•

326
DFC, 172 A.3d at 366.

•

327
Id.

•

328
Id.

•

329
Id. at 349 (formatting added).

•

330
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Id.
•

331
Id. at 388.

•

332
Id. at 388-89.

•

333
Dell, 2017 Del. LEXIS 518, 2017 WL 6375829, at *16.

•

334
Id.; accord 2017 Del. LEXIS 518, [WL] at *22 ("Overall, the weight of evidence shows
that Dell's deal price has heavy, if not overriding, probative value.").

•

335
2017 Del. LEXIS 518, [WL] at *17.

•

336
2017 Del. LEXIS 518, [WL] at *26.

•

337
DFC, 172 A.3d at 370-71.

•

338
Dell, 2017 Del. LEXIS 518, 2017 WL 6375829, at *24. The reference to "dissenters" in
this sentence strikes me as odd because the dissenters have opted not to receive the
merger consideration. By seeking appraisal, they avoided the possibility of being
"exploited" by the deal. The larger point seems to be for the trial judge to assess whether
the deal price is somehow exploitive such that it would exploit the dissenters for the court
to use it as the basis for awarding fair value.

•

339
JX 452 at 3 ("Indicative Non-Binding Proposal").

•

340
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JX 234 (minutes); accord Warmenhoven Tr. 261 (testifying the Aruba Board came to the
figure because "[w]e wanted to reaffirm that we thought there was great value there,
meaning they should bid higher, but we felt like if we put a 3 in the first digit and started
at 30, that they might conclude that's too big a gap to close and stop discussion").
•

341
JX 491 (email from Barclays to HP relaying Evercore's counter); accord JX 488 at 4
(internal Evercore emails confirming change in shares outstanding and suggesting
repurchases caused the change).

•

342
JX 798 at 2 (Barclays slide entitled "Impact of New Share Count and B/S Data on Offer
Price").

•

343
Proxy at 52.

•

344
Id.

•

345
See Marcus Tr. 151; Warmenhoven Tr. 264 (describing HP and Aruba as a "perfect
match" because "HP had all the switches and routers" but "no WiFi to speak of"); id. at
276-77 (calling the synergies "[v]ery substantial" and noting the acquisition "was part of
not just acquiring share in networking, but a bigger, broader enterprise strategy"); Orr Tr.
434-35 (discussing the benefits the transaction offered to both Aruba and HP); Galvin Tr.
578 ("[T]he win-win is HP provided us the muscle that we never had to really stand up to
Cisco in the high end of the corporate stack, in the big deals. And particularly when you
start to talk about a wired-wireless convergence, they provided a tremendous amount of
muscle for us to do that."); DePuy Tr. 682 ("[W]hen you put those two together, they
could attack customers in a way they could neither do individually."); Dages Tr. 753-54,
783; see also JX 805 at 2 (late-stage internal HP approval deck noting the acquisition
"will provide complementary go to market and wireless capabilities and uniquely
position[] HP as the market moves towards a unified wired/wireless solution"); id. at 7-8
(estimating approximately $1.4 billion in synergies); id. at 26 (slide titled "[Aruba] Fills
Key Product Gaps Across HPN's WLAN Product Portfolio").

•

346
JX 805; see also JX 350 (similar deck for earlier approval); JX 356 (same); JX 383
(McKinsey synergy analysis). The petitioners argued that the court cannot rely on HP's
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analyses because they are hearsay. The petitioners raised their objections in the Pre-Trial
Order and again at trial. See PTO ¶¶ 585-86 & Ex. A (objecting to JX 350 and JX 805);
Warmenhoven Tr. 273-74 (objecting to JX 350 as "hearsay posed" to Warmenhoven
because "[h]e's never seen the document").
HN10 Hearsay "is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at
the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." D.R.E.
801(c). "Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by law or by [the Delaware
Uniform Rules of Evidence]." D.R.E. 802. Rule of Evidence 803(6) recognizes an
exception for documents
made at or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with
knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity, and if
it was the regular practice of that business activity to make the
[document], [*73] all as shown by the testimony of the custodian or other
qualified witness . . . unless the source of information or the method or
circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness.
D.R.E. 803(6). "The business records exception to the hearsay rule permits the admission
of hearsay documents that are likely to be trustworthy because a business regularly
maintains and relies on them." Brown v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 774 A.2d 232, 239 (Del.
2001). "The principal precondition to admission of documents as a business record . . . is
that the records have sufficient indicia of trustworthiness to be considered reliable." Id.
(quoting Saks Int'l, Inc. v. M/V Exp. Champion, 817 F.2d 1011, 1013 (2d Cir. 1987)).
Johansson testified extensively by deposition about HP's thorough, routine approval
process for reviewing and approving transactions of this nature. See PTO ¶ 575
(stipulating
Johansson would testify "by deposition"). He testified that the process regularly includes
an "Approval to Negotiate," such as the one contained in JX 350, and an "Approval to
Sign," such as the one contained in JX 805. See Johansson Dep. 22-25. Although
Johansson's testimony did not explicitly address those two exhibits, his testimony
satisfies me that HP prepared and maintained them in the ordinary course of its business.
They therefore have the indicia of trustworthiness contemplated by Rule of Evidence
803(6). The petitioners' selective introduction of similar, and in some cases nearly
identical, documents bolsters this conclusion. See, e.g., JX 356 (draft Approval to
Negotiate deck); JX 398 at 6 (internal HP "discussion materials" deck); JX 780 (laterdated internal HP "discussion materials" deck).
•

347
See JX 907 § 5.2(b)(ii).

•

348
Id. at § 5.2(b)(ii)(A), (B).
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•

349
Id. at § 5.2(b)(ii)(B)(3).

•

350
Id. at § 7.2(b)(iv).

•

351
See, e.g., Dent v. Ramtron Int'l Corp., 2014 Del. Ch. LEXIS 110, 2014 WL 2931180, at
*8-10 (Del. Ch. June 30, 2014) (rejecting fiduciary challenge to "(1) a no-solicitation
provision; (2) a standstill provision; (3) a change in recommendation provision; (4)
information rights for [the acquirer]; and (5) a $5 million termination fee" where the
termination fee represented 4.5% of equity value and the change of recommendation
provision included an unlimited match right); In re Novell, Inc. S'holder Litig., 2013 Del.
Ch. LEXIS 1, 2013 WL 322560, at *10 (Del. Ch. Jan. 3, 2013) (describing "the no
solicitation provision, the matching rights provision, and the termination fee" as
"customary and well within the range permitted under Delaware law" and observing that
"[t]he mere inclusion of such routine terms does not amount to a breach of fiduciary
duty"); In re Answers Corp. S'holders Litig., 2011 Del. Ch. LEXIS 57, 2011 WL
1366780, at *4 & n.47 (Del. Ch. Apr. 11, 2011) (describing "a termination fee plus
expense reimbursement of 4.4% of the Proposed Transaction's equity value, a no
solicitation clause, a 'no-talk' provision limiting the Board's ability to discuss an
alternative transaction with an unsolicited bidder, a matching rights provision, and a
force-the-vote requirement" as "standard merger terms" that "do not alone constitute
breaches of fiduciary duty" (citation omitted)); In re Atheros Commc'ns, Inc. S'holder
Litig., 2011 Del. Ch. LEXIS 36, 2011 WL 864928, at *7 n.61 (Del. Ch. Mar. 4, 2011)
(characterizing a no-solicitation provision, a matching right, and a termination fee as
"standard merger terms" that "do not alone constitute breaches of fiduciary duty" (citation
omitted)); In re 3Com S'holders Litig., 2009 Del. Ch. LEXIS 215, 2009 WL 5173804, at
*7 (Del. Ch. Dec. 18, 2009) (describing "the no solicitation provision, the matching rights
provision, and the termination fee" as "standard merger terms" that "do not alone
constitute breaches of fiduciary duty").

•

352
See DFC, 172 A.3d at 371 ("[I]t is widely assumed that the sale price in many M&A
deals includes a portion of the buyer's expected synergy gains, which is part of the
premium the winning buyer must pay to prevail and obtain control."); Merion Capital
L.P. v. Lender Processing Servs., Inc., 2016 Del. Ch. LEXIS 189, 2016 WL 7324170, at
*11, *26 (Del. Ch. Dec. 16, 2016) (noting that evidence supported the view that the
merger consideration "included a portion of the value that [the acquirers] expected to
generate from synergies" and that "[t]he existence of combinatorial synergies provides an
additional reason to think that" the merger consideration "exceeded the fair value of the
Company"); see also Olson v. EV3, Inc., 2011 Del. Ch. LEXIS 34, 2011 WL 704409, at
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*10 (Del. Ch. Feb. 21, 2011) ("In an arm's-length, synergistic transaction, the deal price
generally will exceed fair value because target fiduciaries bargain for a premium that
includes . . . a share of the anticipated synergies . . . ."); Union Ill. 1995 Inv. Ltd. P'ship v.
Union Fin. Gp., Ltd., 847 A.2d 340, 356 (Del. Ch. 2003) (Strine, V.C.) ("[A]cquirers
typically share a portion of synergies with sellers in sales transactions and that portion is
value that would be left wholly in the hands of the selling company's stockholders, as a
price that the buyer was willing to pay to capture the selling company and the rest of the
synergies.").
•

353
See Dell, 2017 Del. LEXIS 518, 2017 WL 6375829, at *20-22 (describing company's
efforts to generate competition for the buy-out group); DFC, 172 A.3d at 349 (relying on
the Court of Chancery's finding that "the transaction resulted from a robust market search
that lasted approximately two years in which financial and strategic buyers had an open
opportunity to buy without inhibition of deal protections"). Before Dell and DFC, a series
of Court of Chancery decisions had stressed the importance of competition during the
sale process. See In re PetSmart, Inc., 2017 Del. Ch. LEXIS 89, 2017 WL 2303599, at
*40 n.439 (Del. Ch. May 26, 2017) (giving exclusive weight to merger price where
"negotiated at arm's-length, in real time, after a well-run pre-signing auction that takes
place in the midst of a fully functioning market"); Merion Capital LP v. BMC Software,
Inc., 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 268, 2015 WL 6164771, at *14-15 (Del. Ch. Oct. 21, 2015)
(giving exclusive weight to merger price where the company conducted "a robust, arm'slength sales process" that involved "two auctions over a period of several months," and
"was able to and did engage multiple potential buyers during these periods," and where
the lone remaining bidder "raised its bid multiple times because it believed the auction
was still competitive"); LongPath Capital, LLC v. Ramtron Int'l Corp., 2015 Del. Ch.
LEXIS 177, 2015 WL 4540443, at *9 (Del. Ch. June 30, 2015) (relying on "thorough"
sale process initiated in response to "a well-publicized hostile bid and a target actively
seeking a white knight"); In re Appraisal of Ancestry.com, Inc., 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 21,
2015 WL 399726, at *1 (Del. Ch. Jan. 30, 2015) (giving exclusive weight to the deal
price where the transaction resulted from an "auction process, which process itself
involved a market canvas and uncovered a motivated buyer"); Merlin P'rs LP v.
AutoInfo, Inc., 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 128, 2015 WL 2069417, at *12 (Del. Ch. Jan. 9,
2015) (giving exclusive weight to merger price that "was negotiated at arm's length,
without compulsion, and with adequate information" and it was "the result of competition
among many potential acquirers"); Huff Fund Inv. P'ship v. CKx, Inc., 2013 Del. Ch.
LEXIS 262, 2013 WL 5878807, at *14 (Del. Ch. Nov. 1, 2013) (evaluating sale process
and concluding that "the bidders were in fact engaged in a process resembling the English
ascending-bid auction" involving direct competition between bidders); Union Ill., 847
A.2d at 359 (using merger price as "best indicator of value" where the merger "resulted
from a competitive and fair auction" in which "several buyers with a profit motive" were
able to evaluate the company and "make bids with actual money behind them").

•

354

96

See Dell, 2017 Del. LEXIS 518, 2017 WL 6375829, at *20 ("Nothing in the record
suggests that increased competition would have produced a better result."); 2017 Del.
LEXIS 518, [WL] at *21 ("The Court of Chancery stressed its view that the lack of
competition from a strategic buyer lowered the relevance of the deal price. But its
assessment that more bidders—both strategic and financial—should have been involved
assumes there was some party interested in proceeding. Nothing in the record indicates
that was the case."); see also 2017 Del. LEXIS 518, [WL] at *23 ("[A]side from the
theoretical, the Court of Chancery did not point to any bidder who actually shied away
from exploring an acquisition out of fear of the winner's curse phenomenon."); 2017 Del.
LEXIS 518, [WL] at *25 ("[T]he court did not identify any possible bidders that were
actually deterred because of Mr. Dell's status.").
•

355
Id.

•

356
Id.; see also DFC, 172 A.3d at 375 n.154 ("[T]he absence of synergistic buyers for a
company is itself relevant to its value.").

•

357
DFC, 172 A.3d at 370.

•

358
Dell, 2017 Del. LEXIS 518, 2017 WL 6375829, at *24.

•

359
DFC, 172 A.3d at 371.

•

360
See JX 348 (email from Neri to Whitman).

•

361
Johansson Dep. 112.

•

362
Id.

•

363
97

See Proxy at 48-49; see also JX 328 ("We have been in dialogue with [HP] since August
27, and have not received a proposal in all this time. . . . We cannot continue to wait for
them."); JX 367 (email from Aruba to Qatalyst advising it had "decided to terminate
discussions with [HP] at this time" and that it would "let [Qatalyst] know if discussions
resume"); JX 372 at 1-2 (email from Aruba General Counsel relaying conversation with
Johansson during which she explained that "[w]e feel it's time to suspend discussions"
because "it has reached a point where we need to focus on running our business and not
be distracted by discussions that did not seem to be progressing").
•

364
See Lender Processing, 2016 Del. Ch. LEXIS 189, 2016 WL 7324170, at *19 ("The
Board's track record of saying 'no' gave [the acquirers] a credible reason to believe that
the Board would not sell below its internal reserve price.").

•

365
PTO ¶ 155.

•

366
JX 423 (email from Orr relaying exchange to Aruba management).

•

367
JX 454 (internal Barclays email summarizing executive's relay of the call).

•

368
JX 398 at 1-2 (cover email for deck seeking board approval); JX 805 at 12 (internal HP
deck).

•

369
JX 452 at 3 ("Indicative Non-Binding Proposal").

•

370
Proxy at 51.

•

371
JX 798 at 2 (Barclays slide entitled "Impact of New Share Count and B/S Data on Offer
Price").

•

372
98

Id.
•

373
JX 497 (internal HP email from Johansson); accord JX 805 at 12 (timeline showing
"02/08 — HP offer $24.00 and present as best and final. [Aruba] provide new shares
outstanding and cash information supporting paying $24.67 at the same enterprise
value.").

•

374
JX 235 at 1-2 (minutes); Proxy at 52.

•

375
Dell, 2017 Del. LEXIS 518, 2017 WL 6375829, at *21.

•

376
Id.; see also DFC, 172 A.3d at 375 n.154 ("[T]he absence of synergistic buyers for a
company is itself relevant to its value.").

•

377
See Warmenhoven Tr. 260 ("[I]t was definitive noninterest."); id. 329-30 (agreeing
potential bidders provided "feedback" that they "had no strategic interest in acquiring
Aruba" and that it "[h]ad nothing to do with the price").

•

378
DFC, 172 A.3d at 370.

•

379
Id. at 371.

•

380
See, e.g., DFC, 172 A.3d at 349 (relying on the Court of Chancery's findings that "the
company was purchased by a third party in an arm's length sale" and that "there was no
hint of self-interest" in the transaction); PetSmart, 2017 Del. Ch. LEXIS 89, 2017 WL
2303599, at *40 n.439 (acknowledging the persuasiveness of a merger price that was
"negotiated at arm's-length"); BMC, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 268, 2015 WL 6164771, at
*14 (giving exclusive weight to merger price where "[t]he record here demonstrates that
the Company conducted a robust, arm's-length sales process"); AutoInfo, 2015 Del. Ch.
LEXIS 128, 2015 WL 2069417, at *12 (relying on the merger price where "[t]he Merger
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was negotiated at arm's length, without compulsion, and with adequate information");
CKx, 2013 Del. Ch. LEXIS 262, 2013 WL 5878807, at *13 (giving exclusive weight to
merger price where "the process by which CKx was marketed to potential buyers was
thorough, effective, and free from any specter of self-interest or disloyalty"); Highfields
Capital, Ltd. v. AXA Fin., Inc., 939 A.2d 34, 42 (Del. Ch. 2007) (stating that a reviewing
court should give "substantial evidentiary weight" to the deal price when "the transaction
giving rise to the appraisal resulted from an arm's-length process between two
independent parties").
•

381
Dell, 2017 Del. LEXIS 518, 2017 WL 6375829, at *24.

•

382
DFC, 172 A.3d at 371.

•

383
JX 412 at 1 ("Meg [Whitman] spoke with conviction and emotion over dinner that they
[Qatalyst] were guilty." (referring to alleged fraud involving sale of Autonomy to HP));
JX 420 (Warmenhoven reporting that Whitman said "Qatalyst, Frank [Quattrone] &
George [Boutros] are not welcome in the negotiations. The issue is bigger than
Autonomy and goes back to EBay & Yahoo."); JX 426 (email from Orr to Aruba
management updating them on Qatalyst situation and reporting that, when Boutros
learned of HP's position, he was "so emotional, defensive AND offensive (to Meg
[Whitman]) that he hardly let me talk"); accord Warmenhoven Tr. 252-53 (testifying that
Whitman told him, "I don't care who you get, but it can't be Qatalyst" and that "I'm not
going to take into my boardroom a deal proposed by Qatalyst"). Aruba has argued that,
although Whitman refused to work with Qatalyst, she did not pick Aruba's banker. To my
mind, these are questions of degree, with vetoing a banker to reduce the other side's
choice set operating as a less extreme version of picking the other side's banker. In this
case, however, vetoing effectively meant picking. Warmenhoven testified that, when
considering bankers, Francis and Qatalyst were the only names who came up and that
"there was no third name mentioned." Warmenhoven Tr. 238.

•

384
JX 437 at 1 (Warmenhoven explaining that, in Qatalyst's view, "[t]he issue is not Aruba.
It is about the [Qatalyst] brand . . . . If word spreads that they were tossed from this deal
because HP will not engage with them on any M&A transaction, that creates a big issue
for them. . . . Frank wants to save his firm . . . . The relationship, or lack thereof, between
[Qatalyst] and HP / Meg [Whitman] is now their focus."); see also JX 521 (Quattrone
expressing concern that "Evercore will for sure be beating its chest about its role in this
deal and could very well be telling the world that HP wouldn't do the deal if we were the
advisor").
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•

385
See JX 430 (Quattrone asking Warmenhoven to intervene with Whitman on his behalf);
JX 434 at 1 (Quattrone asking Whitman for "the opportunity to speak or meet with you at
your earliest convenience to understand from you directly what your concerns are and
give me the opportunity to address them" and promising that "while our loyalties are
always to our client on any assignment, I am confident we can address your concerns,
play a constructive role and engage with your team in a professional manner"); JX 440 at
1 (email from Orr to Aruba management asking "how much time we allow" before saying
"sorry, [Qatalyst]. We need to protect our transaction. [W]e cannot worry about your
brand!"). At Quattrone's behest, Warmenhoven sent at least three emails to Whitman in a
forty-eight-hour period in which he vouched for Qatalyst and asked Whitman to meet
with Quattrone. See JX 430 (asking Whitman to meet personally with Quattrone); JX 436
(vouching for Quattrone and expressing confidence that "if you two could 'clear the air'
[then] Frank and [Qatalyst] could be constructive participants in getting this deal done");
id. (following-up with Whitman and asking whether her objection was to Qatalyst or only
to Boutros).

•

386
JX 426 at 2 (internal Aruba email); see also JX 5 (executed engagement letter with
Evercore showing fee of 1/4%); JX 413 (Warmenhoven observing that "Evercore is new
in the tech sector, so they may be willing to do a deal at 1/4% just to get a deal done that
they can brag about publicly"); Warmenhoven Tr. 241 (explaining that, when HP first
approached Aruba in August 2014, he considered contacting Francis, but passed because
he had no prior experience with Evercore and "didn't know the team").

•

387
See, e.g., JX 427 ("Truly amazing! This is a franchise transaction! Well done!"); id.
("This is franchise defining. Well done, and it shows the power of loyalty, which you
have always eschewed! [sic]"); JX 428 ("Just remarkable, Stu [Francis.] What a coup!
Would be, as you say, a dynamic advance for Evercore in The Valley."); JX 439
(congratulatory emails from two additional senior bankers).

•

388
JX 505 (Evercore bankers noting that that "[Whitman] is going to be very active" and that
HP "[w]ould be a great new relationship.").

•

389
Id.

•

390

101

Id.
•

391
Warmenhoven Tr. 255.

•

392
Orr Tr. 452.

•

393
See Warmenhoven Tr. 228-31; id. at 273 (Orr's "going to be 66 in March. He's told me
many times that he did not want to be in a regular employment situation when he turned
65"); id. at 289 ("[H]e was going to leave before his 65th birthday."); Orr Tr. 371-73
(describing activities during retirement, including spending time with his children,
learning to cook, traveling to Japan and taking Japanese classes, working with The
Philanthropy Workshop, and pursuing other philanthropic endeavors including founding
a non-profit business that provides low-power, solar-panel-driven phones); id. at 377 ("So
every year I say, you know, it's time. There's a lot of things I need to do. I need to go
back to my philanthropic work. My kids in Africa keep yelling at me to go back and visit.
. . . So I was just getting really anxious to do my own things."); id. at 378 ("I honestly am
having fun building this kind of transforming company against the incumbent, and
enjoying kind of stirring up a new way of doing things. But it's getting to the point that I
have to tell myself there are other things I want to do in life.").
Ironically, it was Aruba that stressed Orr's desire to retire in its pre-trial brief and at trial
as a means of undermining the reliability of management's projections, which Aruba
argued were too aggressive because they assumed that Orr would stay with the Company.
See Dkt. 138 at 20-21. Aruba also sought to use Orr's desire to retire to blunt the
petitioners' argument that HP's unauthorized discussions with Orr about post-transaction
employment undermined the negotiations. As Aruba pitched it, Orr agreed to remain
reluctantly. See id. at 44 ("Orr will testify that he planned to retire, but he was motivated
by loyalty to his team and a request from HP to stay on."). Once Aruba introduced the
retirement theory, the petitioners embraced it as an additional factor that undermined the
course of the negotiations, while disputing that Aruba's ability to achieve its projections
depended on Orr.
Aruba also helped prove the petitioners' case on this point by focusing at trial on an email
exchange from March 7, 2015, between Orr and an Aruba director that discussed why the
merger benefitted Aruba's customers and employees, including its salesforce in the field.
See JX 535; see also Warmenhoven Tr. 177-83 (discussing JX 535); Orr Tr. 381-97
(same). Aruba argued that this email showed that the HP deal was a good one. Whether
the deal was good for these corporate constituencies is a different question than whether
it provided fair value for stockholders. What the email did show is that Orr pursued the
HP deal (at least in part) because of loyalties to constituencies beyond the stockholders.
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In the grander scheme of life, I find that commendable. For the narrow purpose of
Delaware corporate law, those competing loyalties are factors that a court has to weigh.
•

394
See Warmenhoven Tr. 286 ("Dominic [Orr] guaranteed to us that he would go through an
orderly transition, that if we found the right person, he would step aside, and we would
just hire the person as CEO. And if we couldn't find somebody of that experience, he
would stay on for a year and help groom him."); id. at 290 ("Dom [Orr] was a very
committed CEO, and independent of the financial implications, he would not have left
abruptly. He was a founder of this company. And a founder is . . . it's like having a child.
You don't abandon it."); Orr Tr. 458 (testifying that he would not have left without a
suitable replacement); JX 326 at 1 (Orr explaining that he wanted to sell at a premium,
take care of the employees, and ensure that "the organization and structure is [sic] set up
for success and maintaining fun and pride and minimiz[ing] large company pain").

•

395
Aruba has argued that Orr could not have been motivated by a desire to retire because he
agreed to run the legacy business for HP for a period of time after the acquisition. I think
Orr was planning several moves ahead, and he realized that committing to stay on for a
period of time after the acquisition would help get the deal done. That, in turn, would
bring him closer to returning to a retirement during which he had engaged in a variety of
rewarding and commendable pursuits.

•

396
Dell, 2017 Del. LEXIS 518, 2017 WL 6375829, at *24.

•

397
DFC, 172 A.3d at 370.

•

398
DFC, 172 A.3d at 372; see also Dunmire v. Farmers & Merchs. Bancorp of W. Penn.,
Inc., 2016 Del. Ch. LEXIS 167, 2016 WL 6651411, at *8 n.95 (Del. Ch. Nov. 10, 2016)
(surveying academic literature); EV3, 2011 Del. Ch. LEXIS 34, 2011 WL 704409, at *10
("In an arm's-length, synergistic transaction, the deal price generally will exceed fair
value because target fiduciaries bargain for a premium that includes . . . a share of the
anticipated synergies . . . .").

•

399
Golden Telecom Trial, 993 A.2d at 507.
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•

400
Dages Opening Report ¶ 68.

•

401
See, e.g., Montgomery Cellular Hldg. Co., Inc. v. Dobler, 880 A.2d 206, 221 (Del. 2005)
("The Court of Chancery was unable precisely to quantify those 'deal-making' synergies,
because [the respondent] did not present any reliable evidence at trial of what those
synergies were worth."); ACP Master, Ltd. v. Sprint Corp., 2017 Del. Ch. LEXIS 125,
2017 WL 3421142, at *31 (Del. Ch. July 21, 2017) (recounting respondent synergy
estimates, noting that "[o]ther synergy estimates were higher still," and concluding that,
"[i]f the court relied on Clearwire's deal price, it would have to determine the value of
those synergies and back them out"); Ramtron, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 177, 2015 WL
4540443, at *26 (acknowledging that the "[p]etitioner's approach may understate the net
synergies" but nonetheless adopting it because "it better conforms to the evidence
adduced at trial than [the respondent's] position").

•

402
Union Ill., 847 A.2d at 353 n.27, 364.

•

403
Id. at 353 n.26.

•

404
Highfields, 939 A.2d at 61.

•

405
Id. at 60-62.

•

406
See Dages Opening Report ¶¶ 64-67.

•

407
See Highfields, 939 A.2d at 61 & n.87 (crediting synergy estimations included in a study
that "was not of the typically skewed, buy-side variety: rather, it was an objective study
created by a team of actuaries whose professional standards require neutrality" and noting
the study "stands in contrast to the often biased valuation work presented to opposing
boards by investment bankers representing a particular company").
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•

408
Dages Opening Report ¶ 68.

•

409
Id. ¶ 67.

•

410
Dages Opening Report ¶ 129; accord Dages Tr. 782 ("Q. You are all in on a DCF. Right?
A. I think that's fair."); id. ("I looked at other values, but the opinion was always stated,
and has always been stated, at the beginning as being based on DCF.").

•

411
Marcus Opening Report ¶ 9 ("I determined the fair value of Aruba's stock as of May 18,
2015 (the 'valuation date') by performing a discounted cash flow ('DCF') valuation.").

•

412
See generally Jesse A. Finkelstein & John D. Hendershot, Appraisal Rights in Mergers &
Consolidations, 38-5th C.P.S. §§ IV(H)(3), V.E. (BNA) [hereinafter Appraisal Rights].

•

413
Pinson v. Campbell-Taggart, Inc., 1989 Del. Ch. LEXIS 50, 1989 WL 17438, at *8 n.11
(Del. Ch. Feb. 28, 1989).

•

414
Andaloro v. PFPC Worldwide, Inc., 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 125, 2005 WL 2045640, at *9
(Del. Ch. Aug. 19, 2005) (Strine, V.C.).

•

415
In re Radiology Assoc., Inc., 611 A.2d 485, 490 (Del. Ch. 1991) (quoting Technicolor,
1990 Del. Ch. LEXIS 259, 1990 WL 161084, at *7).

•

416
Dell, 2017 Del. LEXIS 518, 2017 WL 6375829, at *28

•

417
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Doft & Co. v. Travelocity.com Inc., 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 75, 2004 WL 1152338, at *5
(Del. Ch. May 20, 2004); see also Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 2003 Del. Ch. LEXIS
146, 2003 WL 23700218, at *7 (Del. Ch. Dec. 31, 2003) ("When management
projections are made in the ordinary course of business, they are generally deemed
reliable. Experts who then vary from management forecasts should proffer legitimate
reasons for such variance.") (footnote omitted)), rev'd in part, aff'd in part, 884 A.2d 26
(Del. 2005); Gray v. Cytokine Pharmasciences, Inc., 2002 Del. Ch. LEXIS 48, 2002 WL
853549, at *8 (Del. Ch. Apr. 25, 2002) (finding "litigation-driven projections to be
unreliable" because "[a]ny other result would condone allowing a company's
management or board of directors to disavow their own data in order to justify a lower
valuation in an appraisal proceeding").
•

418
JX 233 at 1 (minutes from meeting where projections presented showing finance team
accompanied presentation with "third party analyst data regarding the enterprise wireless
LAN market growth rates for the last three years," "compared the Company's revenue
growth rates to the market growth rate," and "presented financial scenarios and explained
the assumptions underlying each scenario" during which "Board members asked
questions, provided feedback and discussion ensued"); see also Warmenhoven Tr. 223-24
(discussing process by which Aruba Board reviewed and "chose to accept" the February
Projections).

•

419
See Warmenhoven Tr. 219-20; id. at 313-14 (confirming Galvin prepared the June Plan
"in the spring of 2014, as part of the normal operations" of the Company); Galvin Tr.
553-54 (discussing development of "top-down" projections incorporating "broader
strategic assumptions" discussed by the Aruba Board regularly at the "June meeting").

•

420
See JX 297 at 2 (email from Galvin to member of the finance team); JX 315 at 1 (email
from Galvin to Qatalyst banker conveying early draft of the October Projections); see
also Warmenhoven Tr. 314-15 (discussing Aruba's ordinary process of preparing a yearly
operating plan in September); Galvin Tr. 586 (acknowledging the September figures
adjusted margins, reflecting "[t]he overall impacts" of Project Greyhound).

•

421
See Marcus Opening Report ¶¶ 209-217 (explaining reliance on February Projections);
see also Warmenhoven Tr. 220-22 (discussing how and why the finance team made the
projections more conservative); Galvin Tr. 558-563 (discussing process of extending
ordinary course, six-month budgeting projections out to three years to create February
Projections).
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•

422
See Marcus Opening Report ¶ 217; Warmenhoven Tr. 358 (referring to the added two
years as "a linear extrapolation"); Galvin Tr. 558-59 (testifying the February Projections
initially went out three years "[a]nd then ultimately until 2020, yes"); Dages Tr. 734
(discussing "the extensions that were done with Qatalyst to take it out to 2020").

•

423
See Marcus Opening Report ¶ 221; Galvin Tr. 560 (confirming February Projections used
by bankers).

•

424
Proxy at 63-64; Orr Tr. 529 (confirming approved projections to be included in the proxy
and shared with Qatalyst).

•

425
See Marcus Opening Report ¶¶ 218-220.

•

426
The Company had projected a tax rate of 4% for 2015 and 2016 and 25% thereafter. See
JX 475 at 1 (email from Galvin to Qatalyst suggesting "I would do 4% thr[ough] 17; then
do 25% thereafter"). Management attributed the rate to the Company's stockpile of
valuable net-operating loss credits or "NOLs" from its early, pre-profit days. Due to those
credits, the Company had a cash tax rate of only 3.2% and 3.1% in 2013 and 2014,
respectively. The Company anticipated it had enough credits remaining to continue
paying low taxes through at least 2016. JX 506 at 1 (internal email summarizing available
net-operating loss credits and approximate use rates as of February 2015); see also JX
895 at 93 (2014 10-K: "As of July 1, 2014, the Company's federal loss carryforwards for
income tax purposes were approximately $131 million with expiration dates starting in
2028."). Based on this evidence, Marcus adopted the Company's estimates. See Marcus
Opening Report Ex. 7-1.
Aruba instructed Qatalyst to use the same tax figures that Marcus ultimately adopted. See
JX 654 (Qatalyst working spreadsheet indicating Galvin provided tax rates); Marcus Tr.
46-47; Galvin Tr. 622.

•

427
Marcus Opening Report ¶ 222.

•

428
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See, e.g., DFC, 172 A.3d at 380 ("Indeed, if the record unambiguously supported the
proposition that DFC was to continue a new spurt of growth past 2018, it would have
been more appropriate to project out to a point where steady-state growth began. By
doing that, the appraiser would have to assess with discipline the next period after the
projections end and also the potential that the period might be negative, as well as that
another period of above-market growth might be followed by a terminal growth rate more
like inflation than the risk-free rate." (footnote omitted)); Prescott Group Small Cap, L.P.
v. Coleman Co., Inc., 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 131, 2004 WL 2059515, at *29 (Del. Ch.
Sept. 8, 2004) (Jacobs, J.) ("At the time of the merger, Coleman was projecting a 16%
growth in sales for year 2002, which represented a return to Coleman's prior operating
levels. Dr. Kursh utilized a three stage model because he did not believe a 16% growth
rate was sustainable long-term." (footnote omitted)); Robert W. Holthausen & Mark E.
Zmijewski, Corporate Valuation Theory, Evidence & Practice 216 (2014) ("We would
prepare detailed year-by-year forecasts for the company until the company reaches steady
state. You may need to value a company's cash flows for five years, ten years, or longer if
the company is far from becoming a stable mature company as of the valuation date.");
Shannon P. Pratt & Alina V. Niculita, Valuing a Business 219 (5th ed. 2008) ("The
appropriate length of the forecast period should be until that variability stops; at the point
in time that the company expects normalized or level growth, the terminal value is
calculated.").
•

429
See Johansson Dep. 40 (testifying that, in valuing a company, HP "want[s] to create a
model that gets you to like a steady state . . . . [T]ypically, the companies we look at, ten
years is kind of appropriate . . . . So we tend to do a ten-year DCF just to get to that
steady state.").

•

430
In calculating his WACC, Marcus used an all-equity capital structure. He noted, however,
that evidence in the record suggested that Aruba would have issued $300 million in
convertible debt if HP had not made its approach. See, e.g., PTO ¶ 51, JX 224 (Aruba
Board subcommittee minutes); JX 325 (email from Galvin relaying conversation with
Barclays banker wherein banker suggested executing the convertible offering). The debt
would have reduced Aruba's WACC and been a positive signal to the equity markets.
Marcus Opening Report ¶ 223. The decision to maintain Aruba's all-equity capital
structure could be seen as a valuation consequence that resulted from the expectation of
the merger, although one that had a negative effect on Aruba's stockholders by depriving
them of the value generated by a lower-cost capital structure. Cf. 8 Del. C. § 262(h)
(instructing Court of Chancery to exclude "any element of value arising from the
accomplishment or expectation of the merger"). The petitioners have not made this
argument, so this decision does not consider it.

•

431

108

In re Emerging Commc'ns, Inc. S'holders Litig., 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 70, 2004 WL
1305745, at *16 (Del. Ch. May 3, 2004) (Jacobs, J.).
•

432
Marcus Opening Report ¶ 225.

•

433
See Dages Opening Report ¶¶ 117, 124.

•

434
Marcus Opening Report ¶¶ 226-231.

•

435
See Merion Capital, L.P. v. 3M Cogent, Inc., 2013 Del. Ch. LEXIS 172, 2013 WL
3793896, at *18 (Del. Ch. July 8, 2013) ("[O]ne can 'smooth' beta by adjusting historical
beta by a market beta of 1, using a 1/3 weighting factor for the market and a 2/3
weighting for the subject company's beta . . . ."); Golden Telecom Trial, 993 A.2d at 524
("I find that a beta that gives 2/3 weight to the Bloomberg historic raw beta of 1.32 and
1/3 weight to the 1.24 industry beta is the best approach to this DCF analysis.").

•

436
Holthausen & Zmijewski, supra, at 300 ("Using more recent data might better reflect a
company's current (and more forward-looking) systematic risk."); Tim Koller, Marc
Goedhart & David Wessels, Valuation: Measuring and Managing the Value of
Companies 247 (5th ed. 2010) (noting that "changes in corporate strategy or capital
structure often lead to changes in risk for stockholders" and that, where that occurs, "a
long estimation period would place too much weight on irrelevant data"); Shannon P.
Pratt & Roger J. Grabowski, Cost of Capital: Applications and Examples 208 (5th ed.
2014) (noting that five-years is more common but where "business characteristics change
during the sampling period . . . it may be more appropriate to use a shorter sampling
period. However, as the sampling period used is reduced, the accuracy of the estimate is
generally reduced."); id. at 224 (recommending that "[i]f the underlying fundamentals of
the business have changed, a more recent period should be used in developing a beta
estimate"). Aruba had grown significantly during the years preceding the merger. See
PTO ¶ 77. Aruba's expert agreed that he typically uses a two-year weakly raw beta when
calculating WACC. Dages Tr. 793; Dages Dep. 432.

•

437
Marcus Opening Report ¶ 230. "In addition to the equity risk premium, an equity size
premium generally is added to the company's cost of equity in the valuation of smaller
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companies to account for the higher rate of return demanded by investors to compensate
for the greater risk associated with small company equity." Gearreald v. Just Care, Inc.,
2012 Del. Ch. LEXIS 91, 2012 WL 1569818, at *10 (Del. Ch. Apr. 30, 2012). Dages
disputed the applicability of a size premium at all because, "in [his] experience, a size
premium is rarely applied to midor larger-cap companies" and "Aruba did not share the
characteristics that researchers have hypothesized for returns in excess of what is
predicted by the CAPM." Dages Rebuttal Report ¶ 32. He further argued that Aruba
properly belonged in the sixth rather than fifth decile. Id.
•

438
Dages used a WACC of 11%. Dages observed that all three deal advisors and two
research analysts used higher WACCs. Dages Opening Report Ex. 18; Dages Rebuttal
Report ¶ 31.

•

439
Marcus Opening Report ¶ 235.

•

440
3M, 2013 Del. Ch. LEXIS 172, 2013 WL 3793896, at *21.

•

441
Marcus Opening Report ¶¶ 232-235. Marcus did not clarify why he adopted the risk-free
rate rather than the projected rate of inflation as the floor for his terminal growth rate. As
discussed in addressing Dages's report below, some of this court's precedent suggests
adopting the risk-free rate as a ceiling for a company's long-term sustainable growth rate.
This court's precedents support adopting the rate of inflation as a floor for a company's
long-term growth rate. See Golden Telecom Trial, 993 A.2d at 511-12 ("A viable
company should grow at least at the rate of inflation and . . . the rate of inflation is the
floor for a terminal value estimate for a solidly profitable company that does not have an
identifiable risk of insolvency."); see also Owen v. Cannon, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 165,
2015 WL 3819204, at *25 (Del. Ch. June 17, 2015) ("I find that it is appropriate under
Golden Telecom to calculate the terminal growth rate as a premium to inflation."). The
distinction does not alter the outcome in this case, and this decision expresses no view on
the issue.

•

442
Marcus Opening Report ¶ 236.

•

443
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Dages Tr. 747; see also Pratt & Grabowski, supra, at 194 ("Many high-tech companies
are good examples of stocks with high betas. . . . The classic example of a low-beta stock
would be a utility that has not diversified into riskier activities.").
•

444
See, e.g., Dages Tr. 790-91 ("I don't see a basis for getting comfortable with a beta that is
that low given this company, its position in the industry, and what I've heard about the
challenges it's facing. Especially when I look at the peers and they are all up over 1. And
I look at them, and they are well over 1 in a longer time period.").

•

445
See Dages Opening Report ¶¶ 118-19. See generally Dages Rebuttal Report ¶¶ 26-31
(criticizing Marcus's beta).

•

446
See JX 802 at 25; JX 809 at 31.

•

447
Marcus Opening Report Ex. 3-1.

•

448
See JX 806 at 14 (final Barclays valuation); JX 811 at 19 (final Qatalyst valuation); JX
812 at 14 (final Evercore valuation).

•

449
Dages Opening Report ¶¶ 7, 56.

•

450
See id. ¶¶ 89-96; Dages Rebuttal Report ¶ 4; see also Dages Dep. 311 (describing the
February projections with the two-year extension as the "best projections" for Aruba);
accord Dages Tr. 733.

•

451
See Dages Opening Report ¶¶ 98-106 (describing the stock-based compensation figures
he generated).

•

452

111

See id. ¶ 115 (using tax rate of 30%). Dages stated in his report that "[t]he 30.0 percent
tax rate is based on the effective tax rate used by Aruba in the Management Projections."
Id. At trial, he admitted that this was an error. See Dages Tr. 732-33; 812-15.
•

453
Dages Tr. 802-05.

•

454
See Dages Opening Report ¶¶ 108-109.

•

455
See id. ¶ 110. Dages's report did not cite the financial economists or the opinion.
Presumably, he was referring to the DFC trial-level opinion, where he also served as an
expert. There, Chancellor Bouchard adopted the risk-free rate as a ceiling in reliance on
Dages's identical suggestion "that some financial economists view the risk-free rate as the
ceiling for a stable, long-term growth rate." DFC Trial, 2016 Del. Ch. LEXIS 103, 2016
WL 3753123, at *17. In that case, Dages had also acknowledged that "one suggested
ceiling for a company's perpetuity growth rate is nominal GDP." 2016 Del. Ch. LEXIS
103, [WL] at *18; see also Golden Telecom Trial, 993 A.2d at 511 ("Generally, once an
industry has matured, a company will grow at a steady rate that is roughly equal to the
rate of nominal GDP growth."). Dages conceded that a 4.5% perpetuity growth rate,
substantially above the 3.14% risk-free rate calculated in that case, was "at the high end
of the reasonable range of long-term growth rates." DFC Trial, 2016 Del. Ch. LEXIS
103, 2016 WL 3753123, at *18. On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court stated that the
risk-free rate "is viewed to be the ceiling for a stable, long-term growth rate." DFC, 172
A.3d at 383. The idea that a company in a steady state will grow more or less in line with
the average rate of the broader economy has intuitive appeal. See 3M, 2013 Del. Ch.
LEXIS 172, 2013 WL 3793896, at *21 (quoting Golden Telecom for the proposition that
"the rate of inflation is the floor for a terminal value" and noting that "a terminal growth
rate should not be greater than the nominal growth rate for the United States economy").
Because the experts did not develop the issue further, and because resolving it is not
necessary to decide this case, this decision expresses no opinion on the matter.

•

456
See Dages Opening Report ¶ 117.

•

457
See id. ¶ 124.

•

458

112

See id. ¶¶ 118-122.
•

459
Id. Ex. 18.

•

460
Id. ¶ 127.

•

461
Dages Rebuttal Report ¶ 4.

•

462
See In re Orchard Enters., Inc., 2012 Del. Ch. LEXIS 165, 2012 WL 2923305, at *17
(Del. Ch. July 18, 2012) (Strine, C.) (expressing the court's preference for "the more
academically and empirically-driven CAPM model when that can be applied responsibly"
and noting that it involves "less (but still more than comfortable) amounts of
subjectivity"); Del. Open MRI, 898 A.2d at 338 (questioning the use of the build-up
method with its concept of "company-specific risk" and observing "[t]he calculation of a
company specific risk is highly subjective and often is justified as a way of taking into
account competitive and other factors that endanger the subject company's ability to
achieve its projected cash flows. In other words, it is often a back-door method of
reducing estimated cash flows rather than adjusting them directly. To judges, the
company specific risk premium often seems like the device experts employ to bring their
final results into line with their clients' objectives, when other valuation inputs fail to do
the trick."); Andaloro, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 125, 2005 WL 2045640, at *12 n.49
(criticizing expert who "spiraled" into a terminal growth rate "through an
incomprehensible 'iterative process'" and finding that "[r]ather than a reasoned exercise in
applied social science, [the expert] appears to have channeled inspiration, more like a
great songwriter than a valuation expert").

•

463
Dages Tr. 760-61 ("Q. So to be clear, your opinion, when you originally opined, was the
February revenue projections; right? A. Correct."); id. at 767 ("Q. So you didn't just swap
out the Dell'Oro projected growth rates for the industry for management's. You created
your own industry projections. A. Correct."); id. at 772 ("Q. Now, in fact, you don't have
any expertise that would allow you to determine whether Dell'Oro's industrywide growth
rates are a reasonable proxy for Aruba's expected future performance, do you? A. No. No
independent expertise, no.").

•

464

113

Dages Tr. 751, 813. In light of other evidence in the record, the cash tax rate is more
persuasive. See Galvin Dep. 296 (stating that management provided the cash tax rate); JX
548 (Qatalyst spreadsheet showing management's cash tax rates); JX 654 (Qatalyst
projections using management's cash tax rate); see also Dages Tr. 815 (testifying that
cash tax rate is typically more accurate than effective tax rate).
•

465
DFC, 172 A.3d at 388.

•

466
DFC, 172 A.3d at 370; accord Dell, 2017 Del. LEXIS 518, 2017 WL 6375829, at *17
(explaining that, when a market is efficient, "a company's stock price reflects the
judgments of many stockholders about the company's future prospects, based on public
filings, industry information, and research conducted by equity analysts. In these
circumstances, a mass of investors quickly digests all publicly available information
about a company, and in trading the company's stock, recalibrates its price to reflect the
market's adjusted, consensus valuation of the company" (internal quotation marks and
footnotes omitted)).

•

467
DFC, 172 A.3d at 369-70; see also Dell, 2017 Del. LEXIS 518, 2017 WL 6375829, at
*17 ("[T]he price produced by an efficient market is generally a more reliable assessment
of fair value than the view of a single analyst, especially an expert witness who caters her
valuation to the litigation imperatives of a well-heeled client.").

•

468
Applebaum, 812 A.2d at 890 (Del. 2002); see also Dell, 2017 Del. LEXIS 518, 2017 WL
6375829, at *15 n.108 (citing Applebaum); DFC, 172 A.3d at 369 & n.116 (quoting
Applebaum).

•

469
DFC, 172 A.3d at 367.

•

470
Id. at 373.

•

471
Id. at 368-69 (footnote omitted).
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•

472
Id. at 364.

•

473
Id. at 367; see also Dell, 2017 Del. LEXIS 518, 2017 WL 6375829, at *16 ("In fact, the
record as distilled by the trial court suggests that the deal price deserved heavy, if not
dispositive, weight.").

•

474
Dell, 2017 Del. LEXIS 518, 2017 WL 6375829, at *21.

•

475
Dell, 2017 Del. LEXIS 518, 2017 WL 6375829, at *13; DFC, 172 A.3d at 371.

•

476
Dell, 2017 Del. LEXIS 518, 2017 WL 6375829, at *26.

•

477
DFC, 172 A.3d at 369 n.118.

•

478
Id.

•

479
Id. at 370.

•

480
Dell, 2017 Del. LEXIS 518, 2017 WL 6375829, at *26.

•

481
DFC, 172 A.3d at 362; cf. Lender Processing, 2016 Del. Ch. LEXIS 189, 2016 WL
7324170, at *33 ("The proximity between [the discounted cash flow] outcome and the
result of the sale process is comforting."); Ancestry.com, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 21, 2015
WL 399726, at *23 ("The DCF valuation I have described is close to the market, and
gives me comfort that no undetected factor skewed the sales process.").
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•

482
Appraisal Rights, supra, at A-33 (quoting Technicolor I, 542 A.2d at 1187).

•

483
Technicolor II, 684 A.2d at 298.

•

484
Union Ill., 847 A.2d at 358.

•

485
Id.

•

486
See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70
Va. L. Rev. 549, 581 (1984). Behavioral economics, noise theory, and chaos theory may
provide reasons to question this assumption, but for the reasons already stated, I do not
believe that a trial court has the flexibility to disregard the Delaware Supreme Court's
framing of the efficient capital markets hypothesis.

•

487
Cf. Dell, 2017 Del. LEXIS 518, 2017 WL 6375829, at *26; DFC, 172 A.3d at 388.

•

488
See Rationalizing Appraisal, supra, at 1038, 1049.

•

489
See Rationalizing Appraisal, supra, at 1023-24, 1038, 1046-54, 1067; Implicit Minority
Discount, supra, at 30-36, 52; Fair Value of Cornfields, supra, at 139-41.

•

490
See Control Premiums, supra, at 866-71; Rationalizing Appraisal, supra, at 1052-53;
Implicit Minority Discount, supra, at 35, 52.

•

491
8 Del. C. § 262(h).
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•

492
See Rationalizing Appraisal, supra, at 1055 (explaining that, for an acquisition of a
widely held firm, "the firm's going concern value can be estimated . . . as the actual
purchase price minus synergies minus control value"). Failing to make this adjustment
would treat the value of the firm as greater than the aggregated value of individual shares,
which is the same analytical misstep reflected in the concept of the implicit minority
discount. See Control Premiums, supra, 854-59 (explaining conflict between efficient
capital markets hypothesis and implicit minority discount); Implicit Minority Discount,
supra, 53 (explaining logical equivalence between correcting for a non-existent implicit
minority discount and introducing a "'third-party sale value lite' standard in lieu of the
traditional 'proportionate share of going concern value' standard").

•

493
See Control Premiums, supra, at 858-59 ("The basic conclusion of the Efficient Capital
Markets Hypothesis (ECMH) is that market values of companies' shares traded in
competitive and open markets are unbiased estimates of the value of the equity of such
firms."); Implicit Minority Discount, supra, at 52 ("Take the case of a publicly traded
company that has no controller. Efficient market theory states that the shares of this
company trade at the pro rata value of the corporation as a going concern."); id. at 60
("As a matter of generally accepted financial theory . . . , share prices in liquid and
informed markets do generally represent that going concern value . . . ."); see also
Rationalizing Appraisal, supra, at 1033-34.

•

494
DFC, 172 A.3d at 369-70.

•

495
Dell, 2017 Del. LEXIS 518, 2017 WL 6375829, at *17

•

496
Cooper v. Pabst Brewing Co., 1993 Del. Ch. LEXIS 91, 1993 WL 208763, at *8 (Del.
Ch. June 8, 1993) (citing In re Shell Oil Co., 607 A.2d 1213 (Del. 1992)); accord Del.
Open MRI Radiology Assocs. P.A. v. Kessler, 898 A.2d 290, 310-11 (Del. Ch. 2006).
See generally Appraisal Rights, supra, at A-89 to A-90 ("If both parties fail to meet the
preponderance standard on the ultimate question of fair value, the Court is required under
the statute to make its own determination.").

•

497
8 Del. C. § 262(h).
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•

498
Dell, 2017 Del. LEXIS 518, 2017 WL 6375829, at *13 ("In reality, the burden falls on
the trial judge to determine fair value, using all relevant factors." (internal quotation
marks and alterations omitted)).
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